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Thesis Summary 
Little research has been undertaken into high stakes deception, and even less into high 
stakes deception in written text. This study addresses that gap. In this thesis, I present a 
new approach to detecting deception in written narratives based on the definition of 
deception as a progression and focusing on identifying deceptive linguistic strategy rather 
than individual cues. I propose a new approach for subdividing whole narratives into their 
constituent episodes, each of which is linguistically profiled and their progression mapped to 
identify authors’ deceptive strategies based on cue interaction. I conduct a double blind 
study using qualitative and quantitative analysis in which linguistic strategy (cue interaction 
and progression) and overall cue presence are used to predict deception in witness 
statements. This results in linguistic strategy analysis correctly predicting 85% of deceptive 
statements (92% overall) compared to 54% (64% overall) with cues identified on a whole 
statement basis. These results suggest that deception cues are not static, and that the value 
of individual cues as deception predictors is linked to their interaction with other cues. 
Results also indicate that in certain cue combinations, individual self-references (I, Me and 
My), previously believed to be indicators of truthfulness, are effective predictors of deceptive 
linguistic strategy at work.  
 
Keywords: Linguistic cues, Deception strategy, Episodes, Cue progression, Temporal 
lacunae
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CHAPTER 1 
1. Deception: Definition and Literature Review 
 
1.1. The Evolution of Deception 
For as long as there has been life on earth, there has been deception. The evolution of life is 
linked intrinsically with natural selection, which is in turn linked with the development of 
communication, which is inseparable from deception. By successfully manipulating the 
behaviour of others, ostensibly by taking advantage of recipients’ own rules, communicators 
gain an advantage, increasing their own fitness and, in the process, ensuring that they are 
therefore more likely to pass their genes on to the next generation (Wiley, 1983). 
  
In some organisms, deception is unconsciously biological, like the mimicry of plants to attract 
pollinators or the camouflage of fish to escape predators. In others, it is cognitively 
conscious, as in the behaviour of monkeys and of humans in order to mislead their 
colleagues to obtain a benefit for themselves.  
1.1.1. Definitions of Deception  
In its broadest sense, deception is defined as “The act of deceiving or the fact or condition of 
being deceived”1. In this socio-biological definition, conscious intentionality plays no part. No 
significance is placed on whether the deception is deliberate, whether it is a success or 
failure, or whether anyone (or anything) has benefited from the deception.  
 
Mitchell’s (1986) all-encompassing definition of deception uses a complicated formula: 
(1) An organism R registers (or believes) something Y from some organism S, where S 
can be described as benefitting when (or desiring that) 
(2a) R acts appropriately towards Y, because 
(2b) Y means X; and 
(2c) it is untrue that X is the case. 2 
 
Mitchell argues that while deceptions may not all have the same origins (and even if 
conscious intent is not present), the one thing they all have in common is that they are 
designed to deceive.  
  
                                                 
1 Biology Online http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/Deception [accessed 02 March 2010] 
2 Reproduced by permission from the State University of New York Press © 1985, State University of New York. 
All rights reserved. 
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Bond & Robinson (1988) adopt a slightly narrower definition to Mitchell, deception being “a 
false communication that tends to benefit the communicator”3, where deceivers promote a 
fictional truth that obtains for themselves some advantage. Although conscious intent is still 
absent from this definition, it nevertheless indicates that there has to be a purpose for the 
false communication, which is to benefit the deceiver.  
 
Güzeldere, Nahmias & Deaner (2002) structure deception definitions by proposing a 
categorical organisation - genetic, learned, and intentional - based on how deceivers 
understand their deceptive actions.  
 
At the lowest level, deception is genetically programmed and deceivers have no 
responsibility for their own behaviour. In his book On the Origin of Species, Darwin (1859) 
argues that under changing conditions of life, organic beings who adapt more readily to 
those conditions are more likely to survive. These organisms in turn produce offspring with 
similar characteristics, improving their own chances of survival in their environment. Darwin 
refers to this suitability of organisms to their environment -- the “principle of preservation, or 
the survival of the fittest” -- as Natural Selection.  
 
Darwin (1862) also suggests that natural selection can be seen in co-evolution between 
plants and their interactors (with specific reference to orchids and how they lure their 
pollinators) whose modifications and adaptations involve a considerable element of floral-
deception which allow plants to adapt positively to their environment. In the plants’ case, 
their evolutionary strategy of mimicry and camouflage is programmed into their genetic 
make-up through a period of natural selection.  
 
Such organisms do not intend to deceive or choose to misrepresent themselves to their 
pollinators, prey or enemies. However, while conscious intent may be absent, the deception 
is appropriate and adapted to their circumstances. Deceptive adaptation is only successful 
because organisms respond appropriately to feedback from their targets, just like humans, 
albeit at a much slower pace.  
 
In Güzeldere, Nahmias & Deaner’s (2002) second deception category, deception is learned 
through a history of imitation and reinforcement. Animals may not intend to deceive but they 
are able to project the consequences of a course of action (learned in its normal context)  
onto another context in order to obtain a desired result. Lewin (1987) (as cited in Bond & 
                                                 
3 Reproduced with permission from Springer and Science Business Media. 
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Robinson, 1988) reports such behaviour involving a young male baboon watching a female 
baboon dig for food on the ground. Glancing around him and seeing no other baboons in 
view, the young male screams as if attacked; his mother appears and chases the female 
away, leaving the young baboon free to eat the female’s food.  
 
It can be argued that while deceptive animals may understand how their actions achieve a 
specific objective (e.g. send baboon away and get her food), they do not have any conscious 
appreciation of why it works. However, there are those who believe that animals are capable 
of intentional deceit. Susan Blackmore argues that certain species of primates can “imagine 
events and manipulate them mentally...they have Machiavellian intelligence and the 
beginnings of a theory of mind”4 (p. 75, Blackmore, 1999). This ability to put oneself in 
another’s place, to understand how an individual may think and then manipulate the situation 
to misrepresent reality in such a way that is believable and acceptable to the individual being 
deceived defines Mitchell’s third deception category – intentional deception.  
 
In contrast to biologists and naturalists, cognitive scientists and psychologists require that 
deception be intentional, that deceivers need to have insight into the awareness of their 
intended victims. DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton & Cooper (2003) define 
deception as requiring intentionality, being “a deliberate attempt to mislead others”5 (p. 77), 
while Masip, Garrido & Herrero (2004) require deception to include the intention to deceive, 
as well as deceivers’ understanding that the information provided conveys a false picture. 
 
“Deception can be understood as the deliberate attempt, whether successful or not, to 
conceal, fabricate and/or manipulate in any way factual and/or emotional information, by 
verbal and/or nonverbal means, in order to create or maintain in another or in others a belief 
that the communicator himself or herself considers false.” (Masip, Garrido & Herrero, 2004, 
p. 148). 
 
Güzeldere, Nahmias & Deaner (2002) argue that true deception is not only intentional but 
also requires a theory of mind, cognitive abilities which enable deceivers to understand the 
mental state of their victims, which non-human animals do not have. They further suggest 
that, while only humans are capable of intentional deception, their sophisticated cognitive   
behaviours are built up from the more basic learned behaviours found in other animal 
species.  
                                                 
4 Reproduced with permission from Watson, Little Ltd (licensing agent). 
5 Reproduced with permission from the American Psychological Association 
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Smith (1987) disagrees. Genetically encoded behaviour and awareness of such behaviour 
are not mutually exclusive. Variation in deception behaviour patterns within and between 
animal species under the same environmental conditions suggests that animals make 
increasingly subtle adjustments in response to fine stimuli. Deception involves leading an 
individual into making an erroneous assessment of the environment, to the benefit of the 
deceiver.  
 
1.1.2. Memes, Genes, Language and Deception 
The suggestion that complex cognitive human deception evolved from lower-order animal-
learned behaviour is expressed in the theory of memes. Dawkins (2006) takes Darwin’s 
theory of natural selection from the biological into the cognitive by arguing that ideas, like 
genes, also undergo a natural selection process wherein the fittest ideas survive. Dawkins 
argues that living bundles of coded information capable of replicating themselves can be 
passed from one individual to another by imitation and mimicry. These ideas, or memes, lie 
dormant in an individual’s memory until the person embarks on a selection process that 
triggers the resurgence of that meme. The most useful memes survive, subject to mutation 
and variation (as in biological natural selection) as they pass from one individual to another. 
In time, the least useful memes are abandoned and forgotten while the fittest memes co-
evolve, eventually becoming the practices and beliefs that consolidate into a culture. This co-
evolution of a vast complex of selectively learned ideas, Dawkins argues, also gave rise to 
language.  
 
Blackmore (2008) expands on Dawkins’ theory, suggesting that cognitive pressures on early 
hominids to select the best memes and imitate productive behaviour began to grow brain 
size and direct cognitive development, eventually resulting in the appearance of language. 
Blackmore sees language as an evolving organism shaped by increasing brain capacities 
that, in turn, influences the fitness of memes. Language and memes in early hominids (like 
plants and their pollinators) co-evolve to take maximum advantage of each other, the 
changes in one driving changes in the other, and both of them driving an increase in brain 
size.  
 
Blackmore (1999) hypothesises that the same cognitive pressures that allowed early 
hominids to learn by imitation (best hunting or tool-making techniques etc) also applies to 
deception. Deceiving someone, just like imitation, requires that deceivers put themselves in 
other people’s mindset and imagine how they will respond, in order that those being lied to 
(or imitated) will find the deception/imitation credible. In addition, Güzeldere, Nahmias &  
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Deaner (2002) argue that deception and the development of language are interrelated. They 
suggest that the evolution of human verbal communication was crucial to the development of 
deception as it is extremely difficult to identify intentional deception that does not involve 
telling lies.  
 
In effect, deception is truth mimicry and humans have evolved to be expert at it, not only 
memetically (through the passing on of ideas), but also genetically.  
 
Studies into familial traits by Martin & Eyesenck (1976), Young, Eaves & Eyesenck (1980) 
and Martin & Jardin (1986) report that family members share a tendency to lie that cannot be 
explained by purely environmental factors, and that such similarities can only be the result of 
shared genes. Genes from good deceiver-parents provide their offspring with the ability to be 
good deceivers too, while memes learned from observing effective deception strategies from 
parents and other role models develop and refine offspring’s deceptive skills.  
 
Human psychological mechanisms appear to have evolved to aid and abet deception. The 
foundations of conversation, as described by Grice (1975) in his Cooperative Principles and 
conversational Maxims, are built on the theory that speakers are assumed by their 
communication partners to be truthful, clear, relevant and unambiguous. They take for 
granted that speakers are being cooperative and take information given by them at face 
value. Speakers violating the maxims are liable to mislead; in particular, violations of the 
Maxim of Quality are perceived by addressees to be significantly more deceptive than 
truthful messages (McCornack, 1992). Galasinski (2000) describes deception as a common 
parasitic feature of human communication. Like leeches, deceivers piggyback on speech 
acts that originally evolved to facilitate communication and take advantage of the 
Cooperative Principle. While deceivers may pretend to cooperate, they are in fact being 
deliberately uncooperative in intending to mislead.  
 
In the same way that natural selection breeds expert deceivers, so too it breeds expert 
deception detectors. Being a good deceiver conveys an evolutionary advantage to an 
individual, but so does being a good deception detector (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978). Dawkins 
& Krebs (1979) liken co-evolution to an arms race wherein evolutionary adaptations on one 
side produce counter adaptations on the other and so on and so forth, escalating constantly. 
While the apparatus or strategy might get better, it does not necessarily become more 
effective as the other side is also improving at the same time.  
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However, Bond, Kahler & Paolicelli (1985) argue that deception skills have evolved further 
than deception detection skills. Human individual differences in the ability to deceive are 
larger and vary more in their deceptive strategies than the ability to detect it. In fact, 
practically everyone has only the smallest ability to detect lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). 
Evolution, so says DePaulo, Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton & Cooper (2003), 
favours the flexible liar 
 
1.2. The Flexible Liar: Approaches to Deception and Deception Detection 
1.2.1. Accurately Identifying Deception  
Studies through the years have generally shown that people’s deception detection accuracy 
rarely exceeds little more than chance (Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981; DePaulo, 
Stone & Lassiter, 1985; DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991). In his review 
of 39 studies on spoken deception published after 1980, Vrij (2000) reports that, overall, 
receivers of deceptive messages only have 57% accuracy in identifying deception. 
Subsequent reviews (Vrij & Mann, 2005; Granhag & Vrij, 2005) of lie detection studies 
involving practitioners (police etc) report even lower accuracy rates of 55%. Levine et al. 
(1999) believe the rate is even lower. They argue that there are large differences between 
people’s ability to correctly judge truth and identify deception and that, in fact, people are 
more likely to identify truths correctly and lies incorrectly. Buller, Strzyzewski & Hunsaker 
(1991), for example, report exceptionally low results with 29% accuracy in identifying 
deception and 81% for identifying truths, although Vrij, Mann, Robbins & Robinson (2006) 
obtain exceptionally high results with 72% lie accuracy and 70% truth accuracy (averaged 
over four tests). However, Vrij et al. stress that their detectors’ performances lacked 
consistency and suggest that, as this study dealt with real life high-stakes deception (in 
contrast to the earlier laboratory designed student studies), the lies may have been easier to 
detect.  
 
The most common excuse for poor deception detection rates is that people tend to focus on 
stereotypical behaviours when trying to identify deception, relying on generally held, albeit 
diagnostically poor preconceptions as to how deceivers should behave (Miller & Stiff, 1993). 
Hubbell, Mitchell & Gee (2001) sum up the consensus saying, “It is considered axiomatic in 
the deception literature that individuals are at best inaccurate at deception detection... 
Overall, the probability of accurately detecting deception is slightly greater than chance”6 
(Hubbell, Mitchell & Gee, 2001, p.1).  
 
                                                 
6 Reproduced with permission from Taylor & Francis. 
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However, DePaulo, Rosenthal, Green & Rosenkrantz (1982a) argue that these statistics do 
not correctly reflect people’s ability to identify deception. On the contrary, people are 
generally very good at detecting differences between truthful and deceptive messages but, 
in the absence of other supporting evidence, they are reluctant to make the inferential leap 
that the person is lying. Reviewing omitted evidence from previous studies, DePaulo et al. 
suggest that meta-analysis rating the veracity of truths against the rated veracity of lies on a 
multipoint rating scale (as opposed to percentage correctly identified) shows that people do 
in fact have a strong discriminative ability and regard lies as less credible than truths 85% of 
the time (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). It appears that the difficulty is people are unable to 
translate this discrimination into positive identification of deception.  
 
Such conclusions are problematic due to two reasons. Firstly, deception has different 
characterisations. Lying takes a multitude of forms. DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Myer & 
Epstein (1996) categorise lying into three groups: outright (total falsehoods), exaggerated 
(overstated facts or impressions), and subtle (evasions, omissions, and literal truths) lies. 
The vast majority of these lies are unremarkable, told in a social context and are of little 
consequence to deceivers. They do not experience much regret in telling them, nor do they 
expect to get caught; and even when they are caught lying, the consequences are little more 
than temporary slight embarrassment. This type of lying is an integral part of everyday life 
(DePaulo et al. 1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et al. 2003). Overall, cues for these 
lies are very weak and are unlikely to be identified (DePaulo et al. 2003).  
 
However, interspersed amongst this social lying are serious lies; should deceivers be 
caught, the consequences to them would be costly. Deceivers are highly motivated to 
succeed with this deception, so much so they may be burdened by guilt at their 
transgression, by concern as to how well their deception is being received, and by fear of 
failure and the implications to their reputation and well-being should their deception be 
detected. In such circumstances, deception cues are likely to be stronger (DePaulo et al. 
2003).  
 
Such motivation to lie would be difficult to recreate ethically in a laboratory environment and 
therefore difficult to test, leading to the second problem: experiments are conducted under 
different contexts and limitations. In laboratory and controlled experiments, raters are 
forewarned to expect deception and told to differentiate between lies and truths; this does 
not happen in real world scenarios. Much research relies on speech content and behaviour 
analysis of experimentally constrained deception where deceptive features and the way they 
are defined differ from study to study, as well as the manner in which the cues are extracted. 
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The structure of experiments varies considerably, with people much more able to 
differentiate between truth and deception in certain communication media (such as reading a 
transcript) than others (when watching a video) (Vrij, 2005). Lies in laboratory contexts are 
largely trivial in nature and participants are required to lie convincingly in the absence of real-
life motivation, irrespective of their actual ability to deceive. In addition, people are 
vulnerable to judgemental biases and preconceptions regarding what constitute truthful and 
deceptive behavioural cues, and this hampers their ability to identify real deceptive 
behaviour.  
 
Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal (1981) report a Truthfulness Bias effect (termed truth-bias 
by McCornack & Parks, 1986) wherein people have a general tendency to ascribe 
truthfulness rather than deception to messages in experiments, irrespective of the 
messages’ veracity. People do not expect deception until they actually detect it (Zhou & 
Zhang, 2007); this leads them to judge messages as truthful even when it is false and there 
are obvious signs of deception (Levine, Parks & McCormack, 1999). While people are 
generally poor at identifying deceptive messages, Vrij (2000) reports that they are able to 
identify truthful messages 67% of the time, while Buller, Strzyzewski & Hunsaker (1991) 
observe an even higher accuracy rate of 81% in their study. 
 
On the other hand, preconceptions regarding what constitutes deceptive behaviour create a 
slight lie bias, which also results in incorrect judgements. Toris & DePaulo (1985) report 
when people are forewarned to expect deception, they identify it more often than those who 
have not been forewarned. However, when deception is anticipated, expectations of 
dishonesty lead people to focus on the wrong sort of behaviour, missing the correct cues.  
 
Stereotypical beliefs as to what constitutes deceptive behaviour result in unusual behaviour 
being judged as deceptive even when the individual is being truthful. In spite of this, Hubbell, 
Mitchell & Gee (2001) argue this lie-bias effect is not strong enough to overturn the truth-bias 
effect, although Vrij & Mann (2005) found that, while this may be the case for laypersons, it 
does not apply to professional lie catchers such as the police. In fact, Meissner & Kassin 
(2002) identify a tendency for longer-serving police officers to judge suspects as deceptive 
compared to their shorter-serving colleagues. While Vrij, Mann, Kristen & Fisher (2007) did 
not find this correlation in their study, they suggest that the style of police interviewing affects 
the strength of the lie bias, with police engaged in accusatory interviews (as opposed to 
police engaged in information-gathering interviews) more likely to incorrectly continue to 
believe a suspect to be guilty.   
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1.2.2. Leakage of Deception Cues 
Although some argue that deceivers and deceiver-detectors have reached equilibrium in the 
deception evolutionary arms race (Dawkins and Krebs, 1979), and others do not (Bond, 
Kahler & Paolicelli, 1985), the idea that human deception can be identified through 
behaviour and language continues to capture researchers’ imagination. Approaches to 
deception detection work on two premises: that people behave, speak and write differently 
when they are lying than when they are telling the truth; and that in spite of deceivers’ efforts 
to appear truthful, behaviours triggered by emotions (such as guilt and fear) and cognitive 
pressures associated with lying can be identified.  
 
Freud observed that how people subconsciously feel about someone or something is 
reflected in how they behave, “He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince 
himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his fingertips; 
betrayal oozes out of him at every pore” (Freud, 1905, p. 94). 
 
Ekman & Friesen (1969) were the first to suggest that cues to deception might be observed 
in physical behavioural leakages which deceivers are unaware of and therefore do not 
control as well as their more overt behaviours. Studies on self-control have since found that 
individuals are generally unable to manage all their behaviour even when they are aware of 
them. Muraven & Baumeister (2000) argue that even if deceivers do try to control all of their 
behaviour, individuals only have finite self-control over their cognitive resources and, hence, 
deceivers would be unable to do so. Deliberately trying to control some behaviour uses up 
such considerable cognitive control resources that people are normally unable to control all 
of their other behaviour at the same time. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven & Tice (1998) 
further argue that managing current behaviour uses up so much cognitive resources that it 
reduces one’s ability to control behaviour as effectively in the future.  
 
Since deceivers attempting to manage their behaviour are unable to monitor and control all 
of it, they instead focus on controlling what they believe to be their most important behaviour 
and ignore others, which leaves such channels open to leakage. Documented by DePaulo & 
Kirkendol (1989) and termed The Motivational Impairment effect, serious attempts to control 
physical behaviour (including what deceivers themselves deem to be stereotypically 
deceptive) result in increasingly unnatural behaviour. Consequently, deceivers who are 
highly motivated to succeed in a deception (and are visible or can be heard by their 
addressees) are less successful than those who are less motivated as they are more likely  
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to be detected, particularly when deceivers attempt to control all of their behaviour at the 
same time (DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang & O’Brien, 1988). Eventually, deceivers would be 
unable to control even limited behaviour successfully as they use up their cognitive 
management resources (in agreement with Baumeister et al. 1998). This is consistent with 
Butterworth (1978, as cited in DePaulo et al. 2003) who argues that such depletion of 
resources might result in deceivers being unable to monitor adequately their addressees’ 
reactions to the deception and consequently fail to adjust their deception strategy 
successfully in response to that feedback. 
 
The difficulty is that while attempted control and fear leakage may indicate that individuals 
are experiencing strong emotions, it does not necessarily mean they are lying. Such leakage 
does not reveal the reason for the emotion, which could just as easily indicate fear of not 
being believed as being caught out in a serious lie, and the serious consequences for either. 
Furthermore, Mann, Vrij & Bull’s (2002) study involving real life high-stakes deception 
reveals that there are huge individual differences in deceivers’ behavioural leakages, 
including those that go against behaviour traditionally associated with deception.  
 
Freud (1901) also extended the impact of the subconscious to speech, believing that the 
word choices people make betray unconscious emotions and motives which are reflected in 
their verbal communication through parapraxes -- speech errors and word slips. He cites as 
an example a doctor saying to his patient “If, as I hope, you will not leave your bed soon…”, 
reflecting a conflict between the doctor’s subconscious wish (to keep treating the well-to-do 
patient for longer so as to be able to continue charging his fees) and his overt desire (to see 
her get better). Freud further observes that word slips are made more readily in writing than 
in speech, possibly because the delay in writing down an idea held in the author’s mind 
allows other thoughts and emotions to interfere in the process, therefore finding their way on 
to the page too.  
 “In the course of normal speaking the inhibitory function of the will is continuously 
 directed to bringing the course of ideas and the articulatory movement into harmony 
 with each other. If the expressive movement which follows the idea is retarded 
 through mechanical causes, as is the case in writing…such anticipations make their 
 appearance with particular ease” (Wundt, 1900, as cited in Freud, 1901, p. 131).  
 
The theory, that conflict between someone’s privately and publicly held beliefs manifests 
itself in speech errors, is supported by Mehrabian (1971) and Zuckerman, DePaulo & 
Rosenthal (1981). Weiner & Mehrabian (1968) further propose in their concept of immediacy 
that word choice reflects individual thought. They argue that the psychological relationship 
between speakers and the subjects of their communication can be determined by 
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scrutinising referents used by the speakers, and that these can be interpreted independent 
of context. Verbal distancing (non-immediacy) between speakers and their communication 
allows them to stand back subtly from fully validating the information they provide when they 
lie. Wagner & Pease (1976) expand on this, hypothesising that non-immediacy arises from 
the conflicts that speakers experience when their expressed beliefs are inconsistent with 
their privately held opinions.  
 
Other studies support the relationship between verbal non-immediacy and inconsistencies in 
speakers’ expressed beliefs and their unexpressed opinions. Kuiken (1981) reports that 
increases in non-immediacy are associated with fabricated statements, although he is 
unsure whether this results from speakers’ uncertainties over their fabrications or because of 
the inconsistencies themselves. DePaulo et al. (1996) suggest that deceivers verbally 
distance themselves from their expressions because they might feel distressed at telling lies; 
even if they feel no such distress, deceivers lack the emotional investment and personal 
involvement in the claims they make as they are distanced naturally from the information.  
 
However, Buller & Burgoon (1996) argue that deception is not so straightforward and 
deceptive strategies (and therefore linguistic cues) are heavily dependent on the context in 
which they are produced. In their Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), Buller & Burgoon 
(1996) present a framework for how deception works from a conversation perspective. 
Deception is adaptive, they argue; there is no such thing as a single profile for deception 
because deceivers vary their linguistic behaviour according to their intentions and the 
circumstances of the deception (Burgoon, Buller, Floyd & Grandpre, 1996a). Factors such as 
the seriousness of the lie and the consequences of its discovery for deceivers’ reputation 
and well-being, their motivation to deceive, their relationship with their addressees, and 
addressees’ degree of suspicion towards the deceptive information all influence deceivers’ 
choice of deception strategy.  
 
Unlike truth tellers, deceivers do not take their credibility for granted (DePaulo et al. 2003; 
Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004) and they are prepared to adapt their deceptive strategy to suit 
the situation. Deceivers are more likely to monitor their addressees’ reactions in order to 
check whether they are getting away with their lies (Schweitzer, Brodt & Croson, 2002) and 
adjust their behaviour to their ongoing interaction with addressees in order to make their 
messages appear truthful (Burgoon, Stern & Dillman, 1995). Pennebaker, Mehl & 
Niederhoffer (2003) sum it up saying, “What we say and how we say it changes depending  
on the situation we are in” (p. 562).   
 
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
24 
 
Buller & Burgoon (1996) suggest that, while monitoring the reactions of their addressees 
might be cognitively difficult at first, deceivers do gain confidence and increase their 
cognitive control as their deceptions progress. Thus, they are able to adjust their strategies 
successfully as their deceptions develop, resulting in increased communication confidence 
and more immediacy instead of distancing, contrary to Butterworth (1978) who argues that 
depletion of cognitive resources may interfere with deceivers’ ability to monitor their 
addressees’ reactions effectively.  
 
DePaulo et al. (2003) also agree that the requirement for increased regulatory control during 
deception does not always result in the depletion of cognitive resources. They challenge 
earlier approaches to deception detection by arguing that the premise, that it is more 
cognitively difficult to lie than to tell the truth (hence, the deception cues), is not always the 
case. Suggested cues to deception are not constant, nor do they always identify deception. 
Simple lies of everyday deception do not raise arousal levels above that of telling the truth 
and deceivers do not worry about being caught lying (DePaulo et al. 1996; Vrij, 2000). 
 
Telling the truth can be just as equally demanding cognitively, if not more so than routine 
social or simple rehearsed lies, particularly if this involves the careful presentational editing 
of difficult-to-tell or threatening truths. Humans are such competent deceivers that most lies 
leave only weak cues in verbal behaviour, otherwise deception detectors would have 
recognised them a long time ago. However, when deception becomes more cognitively 
demanding than truth telling, deception cues become more apparent (Zuckerman et al. 
1981; DePaulo et al. 2003).  
 
Personality also plays its part in language and, therefore, deception. People have a wide 
range of linguistic variation between them (Biber, 1988) and psychological evidence 
suggests that personalities such as Neuroticism and Extraversion influence significantly the 
way people speak and write (Pennebaker & King, 1999; Gill & Oberlander, 2002; Campbell 
& Pennebaker, 2003; Gill & Oberlander, 2003; Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer, 2003; 
Oberlander & Gill, 2004; Mehl, Gosling & Pennebaker, 2006). Pennebaker & King (1999) 
suggest that high immediacy (such as use of First Person Singular Pronouns) is 
characteristic of Neurotic personalities, while Oberlander & Gill (2004) find that Neurotics 
use more pronouns generally, and also repeat themselves frequently, leading to very low 
speech lexical density (Gill & Oberlander, 2003). Extroverts prefer to use other references 
while Introverts prefer self-references (Gill & Oberlander, 2002).  
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Indeed, the complexity of language, the different characterisations of deception and the 
variability in verbal deception strategies is such that, to date, no single linguistic cue or set of 
cues has been found to occur only during deception and not at any other time (Zuckerman, 
DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981; DePaulo et al. 2003). Overall, results are erratic and no cues 
consistently emerge as valid across topic, time, context, and medium. Deceivers do not 
always lie in the same way. 
 
1.3. Linguistic Cues to Deception: Previous Research 
Research on deception across the board has been based largely on theoretical assumptions 
regarding how deception affects people’s thoughts, feelings and cognitive processes, and 
how this might be reflected in language when people lie compared to when they are telling 
the truth. Undeutsch (Undeutsch, 1967, as cited in Vrij, 2005) hypothesises that the quality 
and content of fabricated statements will be different to that of truthful statement because 
inventing a false memory requires more cognitive creativity and control than remembering an 
actually experienced event. Termed the Undeutsch hypothesis (Steller, 1989, as cited in Vrij, 
2008), this led to the development of certain criteria that is used to check the credibility of 
statements in verbal assessment tools (Vrij, 2008) such as Statement Validity Analysis. 
 
Although results in this field have been contradictory, four linguistic features have been the 
subject of focus by deception researchers: word quantity, pronoun use, emotion words and 
markers of cognitive complexity.  
 
1.3.1. Word Quantity  
The literature on word quantity is contradictory. Some research has found that deceivers 
provide shorter verbal responses compared to truth tellers when lying (Vrij, 2008; DePaulo et 
al. 2003; Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Kronvist, 2006). Deceivers are said to have moral 
qualms about their deception and therefore fail to embrace their lies as fully as they do their 
truth telling (Weiner & Mehrabian, 1868). This possibly results in deceivers not wanting to 
provide too much information regarding a scenario for which they have no actual experience 
(Vrij, 2008) as saying too much makes it easier for them to be caught out lying, particularly if 
they are to be re-interviewed by police and end up contradicting themselves (Granhag & 
Stromwall, 1999). Deceivers may also find managing misinformation to be too cognitively 
demanding (DePaulo et al. 2003) or believe that their nervousness is overtly visible in their 
speech behaviour (Savitsky & Gilovich, 2003). Consequently, it is easier to say as little as 
possible.  
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Truth tellers, on the other hand, say more. They see the truth as being obvious to others and 
have no need to watch what they say. Belief in their own truthfulness and the transparency 
of that truth encourages truth tellers to be more forthcoming with information, resulting in 
longer statements than those provided by deceivers (Hartwig et al. 2006). Deceivers also 
think that their deceptive behaviour is obvious to others (Gilovich, Medvec & Savitsky, 1998) 
and so they need to work harder at being careful with information, which results in saying 
less. Gilovich, Medvec & Savitsky (1998) refer to this “tendency for people to overestimate 
the extent to which others can read one’s internal states” (p. 332) as the illusion of 
transparency. This perception, that a social spotlight shines brightly on what one is thinking 
or how one behaves, arises out of people’s inability to see beyond their own experience of 
themselves.  
 
However, other studies also find that deceivers use more words than truth tellers (Anolli & 
Ciceri, 1997; Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri, 2002; Burgoon et al. 1996a; Burgoon et al. 2003; Zhou, 
Burgoon, Zhang & Nunamaker, 2004a; Hancock, Curry, Goorha & Woodworth, 2004; 
Hancock, Curry, Goorha & Woodworth, 2005; Zhou & Zhang, 2007). Believing their 
deception to be more transparent than it actually is, deceivers feel the need to provide a 
complete story filled with the sort of detail they assume is typical of truthful recall (Burgoon et 
al. 1996a) or they try to hide their lies within a mass of truthful, albeit irrelevant, information 
(Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri, 2002). However, Vrij, Mann, Kristen & Fisher (2007) find no 
difference in statement lengths between truth tellers and deceivers when lying orally. 
 
1.3.2. Pronoun Use  
Weiner & Mehrabian (1968) suggest that the degree to which speakers associate with 
(immediacy) or distance (non-immediacy) themselves from their addressees or the subject of 
their communication can be identified through the literal interpretation of the referents they 
use, rather than through connotative meaning. An example would be differences in the literal 
meaning of We and You and I, where a speaker associates her/himself together with the 
addressee in the former, but disassociates her/himself in the latter. 
 
Deceivers’ lack of embracement and their desire to disassociate themselves from their lies 
lead them to refer to themselves in their communication less often (Weiner & Mehrabian, 
1968). Using First Person Singular Pronouns involves taking ownership of the information 
provided, which deceivers are less likely to do, resulting in a significant third person 
orientation (Newman, Pennebaker, Berry & Richards, 2003). The association between Third  
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Person Pronouns and deception finds strong theoretical support from DePaulo et al. (2003) 
who argue that deceivers may find First Person Singular Pronouns uncomfortable to use as 
this would require associating themselves too closely with false information for which they 
have no experience of, or emotional investment in.  
 
Deceivers’ attempts to move focus away from themselves to third parties result in 
communication with fewer First Person Singular Pronouns (e.g. I, Me, and My) and more 
Third Person Pronouns than truth tellers (Weiner & Mehrabian, 1968; Knapp, Hart & Dennis, 
1974; Knapp & Comadena, 1979; Vrij, 2000; Burgoon, Blair, Qin & Nunamaker, 2003; Zhou, 
Burgoon, Nunamaker & Twitchell, 2004b; Hancock et al. 2004; Hancock et al. 2005).  
 
However, some studies contradict this. Newman et al. (2003) report that while deceivers 
consistently use fewer First Person Singular Pronouns than truth-tellers in their written 
deception, they also use fewer Third Person Pronouns. They suggest this may be due to the 
topic (abortion attitudes) being written about in their experiment; deceivers may prefer to 
enhance the credibility of their deception by referring to specific people instead of simply 
using the pronoun She. Bond & Lee (2005) find similarly in their study involving oral 
deception, suggesting that in their case (prison inmates’ truthful and deceptive 
conversations), this might be due to the type of stimuli used, with prisoners commenting on 
people depicted in a video, which would require the use of such pronouns. Zhou, Burgoon, 
Twitchell, Qin & Nunamaker (2004c) also find in their study on written computer messaging  
that Third Person Pronouns are higher in truthful than deceptive messages. 
 
These conflicting findings are reflected in Vrij’s two major reviews of deception studies. Vrij 
reports in his first (2000) review that deceivers use more other references than truth tellers. 
However, in his second (2008) review, Vrij states that, in fact, there does not appear to be 
any relationship between self-references, immediacy and deception, and most of the findings 
reporting the association only comes from the Burgoon et al. group of researchers; the 
majority of other research found either no association or only weak ones. 
 
1.3.3. Emotion Words 
Guilt and negative emotion experienced by deceivers during deception may also leak into 
their language (Newman et al. 2003; Vrij, 2008), resulting in more negative statements 
(Knapp & Comadena, 1979; DePaulo et al. 2003; Zhou et al. 2004c) and more negative 
emotion words (e.g. hate, worthless, enemy etc) (Newman et al. 2003) than truth tellers.  
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However, the literature on this is also contradictory. DePaulo et al. (2003) report only a weak 
association between negative comments and deception, while Hancock et al. (2004 & 2005) 
identifies no support for the association. Although their study involves physical rather than 
verbal behaviour, Mann, Vrij & Bull (2002) argue that their findings suggest nervousness 
might not have such an impact on behaviour as generally believed. In their real life high 
stake deception study, suspects blink less when lying, indicating behaviour affected by 
cognitive loading; in prior research, nervousness resulted in increased blinking.  
 
However, negation as an indicator of obfuscation and not of emotion may have a part to play 
in deception studies. Only a handful of researchers to date have considered the use of 
negation (e.g. no, not, never) as a deceptive cue, as opposed to their inclusion in a class of 
negative (emotion) words. Hancock et al. (2005) report in their study into deceptive email 
and instant messaging that unmotivated senders increase their use of negation during 
deceptive interactions, although motivated senders do not. Toma & Hancock (2010) also find 
that online daters who lie in their profiles use more negation than truth tellers, while Adams & 
Jarvis (2006) identify a marginal positive relationship between the use of negation and 
deception.  
 
The easiest way to lie is to deny something. Hancock et al. (2005) argue that unmotivated 
deceivers prefer to create simple lies using simple negations, while motivated deceivers 
make more of an effort to construct elaborate deceptions. Deceivers may think that denying 
a statement alleging to be the truth is an easy way to lie, but simple lies do not necessarily 
result in plausible lies; simply denying that something is does not make the most convincing 
deception.  
 
According to Wason (1965, as cited in Vasek, 1986), negation generally functions to 
emphasise a fact that is contrary to expectation. “Making a negative statement involves the 
idea of presupposition; that is something must be asserted in order to be negated”7 (Vasek, 
1986, p. 282). In other words, to be plausible, deceivers must first ground the negation in a 
suitable context that establishes a norm, and then negate it. This may be beyond the 
cognitive ability of many deceivers. Newman et al. (2003) report that using exclusive words 
(e.g. except, without, but) is a significant predictor of truthfulness and they argue that 
distinguishing between what belongs in a category (establishing the norm) and what does 
not (negating it) may be too cognitively complex for deceivers to juggle successfully.  
 
                                                 
7 Reproduced with permission from Elsevier. 
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A less cognitively demanding form of deception involves the use of equivocal negation (e.g. 
I’m not sure, I don’t know etc), a form of evasive negation that creates ambiguity without 
commitment to any actual information. Galasinski (2000) points out that, in saying what they 
did not know or did not do, deceivers offer no actual information as to their actions. Instead, 
saying what did not happen raises the question as to what actually did. 
 
1.3.4. Cognitive Complexity 
Deceivers’ lack of actual experience in imagined events and the cognitive process involved 
in their manufacture also may be reflected in language. 
 
 According to Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne & Bull (2008), six aspects of deception 
contribute towards increased mental loading. Deceivers have to (1) deliberately formulate 
their lies, while (2) suppressing the truth, (3) monitor their behaviour while (4) monitoring 
their addressees’ reactions, and (5) remember to stay in-role. Finally, (6) the lie itself may be 
cognitively difficult.  
 
In addition to suppressing detrimental information, deceivers have to create an alternative 
story that is believable and consistent with the other facts. At the same time, they have to 
manage their communication in order to appear credible as well as ensure that their 
addressees respond favourably to the deception, or make strategic changes if they do not. 
All this requires mental juggling of information and cognitive resources that may prove to be 
beyond the ability of normal deceivers. 
 
Various studies suggest that under certain condition, deception can be made even more 
cognitively burdensome (Vrij, Fisher, Mann & Leal, 2006), increasing the likelihood of 
discrimination between deception and truth telling. DePaulo et al. (2003) report that the 
cognitive burden of lying increases significantly when deceivers are required to provide 
longer responses during interview, as opposed to a simple Yes or No answer. Requiring a 
story be told in reverse order (Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne & Bull, 2008), or that a second 
task be carried out at the same time as telling the story (Vrij, Fisher, Mann & Leal, 2008) also 
greatly increases the cognitive burden of lying. 
 
Sporer (1997) builds on the idea of cognitive burden by using the presence of cognitive 
operations as a criterion for lying in his set of rules by which oral and written statements may  
be judged truthful or deceptive, integrating Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA) and  
Reality Monitoring. CBCA forms part of the Statement Validity Analysis toolbox designed to 
assess the evidence of children involved in sexual-offences cases. It grades the truthfulness 
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of transcribed interviews using 19 criteria based on the Undeutsch Hypothesis (Undeutsch, 
1967), of which criteria 1-13 measure cognitive features. Vrij (2008) encourages the 
adoption of the Reality Monitoring cognitive operations feature into the CBCA checklist, 
arguing that otherwise there would be no lie criterion in CBCA assessment.  
 
Reality Monitoring (RM) is defined as “the process by which perceived and imagined events 
are discriminated and confused in memory” (Johnson et al. 1988, p. 371). According to 
Johnson & Raye (1981), memories derived from actually experienced events, particularly in 
recent memory, result in vivid sensory-derived accounts containing more visual, spatial and 
contextual detail, e.g. Around 12:20 a black male, 5’8” 170 lbs, wearing a black stocking cap, 
black shirt, long-sleeved or a light jacket, black baggy pants, tennis shoes, with a black 
automatic pistol came into the bank. 
 
On the other hand, internally generated (imagined) accounts produce fewer details and more 
subjective information based on cognitive processes and personal history, e.g. He thought 
her crying always meant she needed something.   
 
Suengas & Johnson (1988) report that memories of imagined events lose their clarity and 
become vague after only 24 hours, degrading faster than experienced events. This reduction 
in detail and increased vagueness in internally generated memories is earlier identified by 
Knapp, Hart & Dennis (1974) who report that deceivers are less specific and more vague 
than truth tellers, use more levelling words suggesting “allness” (e.g. every, all, none etc), 
fewer absolute verbs, and more modal verb constructions (a feature also identified by Buller 
& Burgoon, 1994).  
 
However, as with the other features, findings are contradictory. Studies into words identifying 
cognitive processes ( e.g. think, know, appear) as a deception marker contradict each other, 
with some studies reporting increased cognitive information in deceptive accounts, while 
others identify more cognitive operations in truthful accounts (see review by Masip, Sporer, 
Garrido & Herrero, 2005). Vrij (2000) initially dismisses the use of cognitive words as a lie 
criterion, arguing that people use cognitive operations to encode their experiences into 
memory; he later reports that deceivers use more cognitive operations in their speech than 
truth tellers when recalling events in reverse order (Vrij, Mann, Fisher, Leal, Milne & Bull,  
 
2008). Memon, Fraser, Colwell, Odinot & Mastroberardino (2010) report that cognitive 
operation words occur more often in truthful than deceptive accounts (although not 
statistically significantly when controlled for response length) in their own study using RM. 
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Inconsistency in definition as to what constitutes cognitive operations may be partly 
responsible for these discrepancies (Sporer, 2004; Memon et al. 2010). For example, 
Johnson & Raye (1981) describe cognitive operations as thoughts going on in someone’s 
mind reflecting idiosyncratic memory e.g. When I was very sure [about my words] I could 
remember I had a very specific reason for making the association. However, Vrij (2008) 
broadens the definition to include inferences about sensory observations e.g., I must have 
had my coat on as it was very cold that night. 
 
Colwell, Hiscock-Anismas, Memon, Rachel & Colwell (2007) suggest that differences in 
stimuli used during experiments might also be responsible for these conflicting findings. In 
one experiment, students watch a videotape of a simulated theft and are asked to provide 
truthful and deceptive statements regarding the event. In the first experiment, truthful 
statements contain more cognitive references than deceptive statements. However, in the 
second experiment, where prison inmates witness a staged theft with live actors, deceptive 
statements relating to the event contain significantly more cognitive references than truthful 
ones. Consequently, Colwell et al. suggest that perhaps simply viewing videotapes does not 
reproduce the vivid stimuli found in real life situations necessary to generate deceptive cues.  
 
1.4. Deceptive Strategies 
Deception is influenced by the context in which it occurs (McCornack, 1987; Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996). Just like any other construction, deception is tailored with an eye on the 
environment in which it is created. Deceivers build their deception on truthful foundations 
over which they erect layers of ambiguity studded with falsehoods and omissions. As they 
progress with their deceptive construction, deceivers adapt to the changing landscape, 
altering and restructuring their communication blueprint as they encounter obstacles.  
 
Part of the difficulty in identifying linguistic cues to deception lies in the diverse verbal 
strategies deceivers adopt in order to conceal their lies. The different strategies and the 
ability of deceivers to quickly regulate and amend their approach in response to the situation 
make standardised deception detection over a broad range of contexts difficult.  
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Research appears to suggest that deceivers adopt particular oral deceptive strategies 
according to their degree of preparation (Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri, 2002; Burgoon et al. 2003), 
and the attitude of their addressees (Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri, 2002). Some deceivers adopt a 
vague and verbose noncommittal personal approach when lying (Knapp et al, 1974; Kuiken, 
1981; Buller & Burgoon, 1996), while others prefer to maintain a reticent attitude, using 
simpler concise impersonal constructions (Knapp & Comadena, 1979; Vrij, 1995); some are 
assertive in their deception while others appear uncertain (Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri, 2002).  
 
When they have sufficient time to prepare their lie, or when lying to unsuspecting 
addressees, deceivers adopt a strategy of creating ambiguity through wide use of irrelevant 
information, vague and general references, and complex sentences using many words, 
modifiers and variation in voice. This involves embedding the lie in the middle of truthful 
sentences, thereby blurring the boundaries of the deception. This allows deceivers to be 
vague and non-committal, lulling unsuspecting recipients into comfortable acceptance of the 
deceptive message. 
 
However, when addressees are suspicious and probing, or when deceivers have little time to 
prepare their deception, deceivers retreat and cut back on information, becoming reticent 
and saying as little as possible. This results in shorter concise sentences, with deceivers 
being more emphatic in their pronouncements, attempting to appear reliable by asserting the 
truthfulness of their information but, at the same time, avoiding further questioning. However, 
studies into the effects of probing on deception detection find that suspicious addressees 
end up attributing higher levels of truthfulness to deceivers rather than improving their 
deception identification (Buller, Comstock, Aune & Strzyzewski, 1989; Buller, Strzyzewski, & 
Comstock, 1991). Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Vrij (2002) also report that probing did not 
increase accuracy rates of deception detection and suggest that perhaps probers did not 
appear suspicious enough to elicit a material change in behaviour from the deceivers, or 
deceivers misinterpreted the response cues they received. 
 
Yet another strategy involves depersonalising the deception, whereby deceivers 
disassociate themselves from responsibility for, or connection with the lie. In this 
communication style, deceivers provide impersonal information, preferring to refer to third 
party experience instead of their own, increasingly relying on impersonal conditions (use of 
impersonal pronouns such as One or We) in order to reduce their personal liability by 
sharing responsibility for the information (Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri, 2002).  
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Thus, deceivers appear able to alter their communication strategy in response to their 
addressees’ reactions, choosing the most effective approach to persuade or retreat as 
needed, enabling them to camouflage their deception within the interpersonal environment in 
which it occurs.  
 
The response of deception detectors to this flexible deception approach has been to 
increase the cognitive load of lying in order to magnify differences between truth tellers and 
deceivers. Traditionally, researchers have only passively monitored the behaviour of the two 
groups during studies. With most deception cues being weak and difficult to identify in the 
first instance (Zuckerman et al. 1981; DePaulo et al. 2003), this has resulted in poor 
detection rates (Vrij, 2008). However, by creating situations that aggressively tax the 
cognitive resources of deceivers, differences between them and truth tellers are enhanced 
and deception cues become more easily identifiable.  
 
This approach has been used in structuring police interviews, with positive results. Vrij et al. 
(2008) require interviewees to narrate events in reverse order, resulting in considerably more 
obvious behavioural differences between deceivers and truth tellers, including deceivers’ use 
of more cognitive operations (thought and reasoning and cognitive supposition of sensory 
experiences). Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall & Vrij (2005) use late disclosure of evidence in 
interviews (as opposed to disclosure in the early part of the interview) to make interviewees 
feel more nervous. This results in deceivers providing shorter statements with less detail 
than truth tellers as well as an increase in cognitive operations, where deceivers end up 
contradicting themselves more than truth tellers (Hartwig et al. 2006). 
 
1.5. Lying Cues: Verbal vs. Written Deception 
Undertake any course in identifying deception provided by security ‘consultants’ and the 
cues identified for verbal and written deception will be the same. Although there are 
psychological and linguistic reasons why deception cues will be different across media, there 
are simple reasons for not applying verbal cues to textual deception under current research 
information.  
 
The first is that we use language differently when we speak and when we write, moving from 
language expressing reality as a process (spoken language) to reality as an object (written 
language). Where properties and processes are construed as verbs and adjectives in  
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speech, the same processes and properties are construed as nouns in writing, the dynamic 
reality of language in motion being replaced by the synoptic representation of reality as an 
object (Halliday, 1993). 
The second is that verbal cues as a deception signal are themselves not constant across 
verbal contexts, as the earlier contradictory findings and varied linguistic strategies reveal. 
The third is that (the limited) existing studies in written deception indicate that cues are also 
not consistent across textual contexts. 
 
The largest group of studies dealing with deception in written text is that by the information 
technology community, testing automated deception detection programmes in text based 
computer mediated communication (CMC) such as instant messaging and email. These 
studies provide insight into how people lie in written text. 
 
1.5.1. Face-to-Face Communication and CMC Messaging 
At first glance, CMC appears to be a halfway house between informal Face-to-Face (FtF) 
communication and written statements. In some ways, CMC retains aspects of speech. 
Although deceivers communicate in writing, the context remains a conversational one and 
the interaction between sender and receiver is time dependent as the sender expects a 
quick response.  
 
Zhou et al. (2004a) suggest that basic deception cues found in FtF communication could be 
applied to interactive CMC messaging, describing it as a kind of virtual conversation where 
turn-taking is brief, context rich and immediate. Hancock et al.’s (2005) research into 
automated lie detection for email and SMS messaging points out that deceivers’ linguistic 
style changes according to how message recipients view their communication, very similar 
to strategy adjustments made by FtF deceivers. However, what those cues are remain to be 
seen (Zhou et al. 2004b). 
 
In CMC context, language cannot be used in a truly conversational manner. Extralingual 
aspects associated with conversation, such as speed or tone of speech, are not present and 
there is no opportunity to interrupt. Equally as important, the visual cues that aid with 
meaning are absent. A study by Woodworth, Hancock & Goorha (2005) into automated 
deception detection reveals that there are fundamental differences in detecting deception 
when people communicate FtF and when they lie in a CMC context. Woodworth et al. (2005) 
argue that, firstly, written text is largely the sole medium of communication in CMC. As  
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communicators do not see each other, the physical behavioural cues available in FtF do not 
exist in the messaging and, consequently, the Motivational Impairment effect (the over-
correction of nonverbal behaviour by highly motivated deceivers during deception) is 
excluded as a source of deception cues. Vrij, Edwards, Roberts & Bull (2000) believe that 
this elimination of nonverbal cues has the potential to block deception detection altogether in 
CMC exchanges, a view supported by Burgoon, Stoner, Bonito & Dunbar (2003) who report 
that deceivers appear more truthful than truth tellers in CMC exchanges.   
 
Secondly, as Coulthard (1999) points out, the grammatical and lexical construction of verbal 
and written statements are considerably different.  
“As a generalisation spoken language tends to have short clauses, a low ratio of 
lexical to grammatical words and to present what happened as processes by verbs, 
whereas written language tends to have longer clauses, a higher lexical density and 
to present what happened as products by the use of nominalisations.” (Coulthard, 
1999, p. 111).  
 
How emails fit in within this communication spectrum is more problematic than instant 
messaging. Email as a CMC medium cannot be treated as spoken language because, in 
addition to lacking the visual and intonational cues which convey nonverbal meaning, the 
longer response time (than instant messaging) normally associated with it removes the turn-
taking context. Neither can it be treated as written language such as found in written 
monologue statements because it is produced more quickly and lacks the formal writing 
conventions normally associated with such texts. 
 
Thirdly, important differences are also to be expected because time to construct the 
deception, pressure to respond to questions, and differences in response time all affect 
deception cues (Zhou, Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon & Nunamaker, 2003a; Hancock, Woodworth 
& Goorha, 2010). CMC deceivers have the advantage of being able to reflect on and edit 
their messages before transmission, compared to deceivers in FtF interactions. This lightens 
somewhat the cognitive burden of deception for motivated deceivers by allowing them a few 
more seconds or minutes respite, enabling them to be more selective in the presentation of 
their information. Furthermore, while FtF communication partners have the difficulty of 
needing to remember what was said previously in the conversation, CMC communicators 
have available to them a message stream recording the exchange, which can be reviewed at 
any time (Zhou & Zhang, 2007). 
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Studies also suggest that deceivers’ word production differs between FtF and CMC. While 
the trend indicates that deceivers in an interactive FtF context use fewer words and provide 
fewer details and shorter responses when lying (Vrij, 2000; DePaulo et al, 2003; Burgoon et 
al, 2003), the opposite appears to be the case in CMC messaging.  
 
In text-based CMC studies, Zhou et al. (2004b) find that deceivers use significantly more 
words during deception in their experiments with email communications, as did Hancock et 
al. (2004)(2005). This increased verbosity is also supported by Zhou & Zhang (2007) who 
report that, in a group decision-making task using instant messaging, deceivers tend to use 
a verbose persuasive strategy, dominating the argument by incorporating many facts and 
using rich language in order to manage the conversation flow and convince addressees of 
their truthfulness. 
 
It also appears that deceptive language changes according to the opportunity for planning, 
rehearsal and editing, even within CMC media, producing different cues. Deceivers in 
synchronous communication (such as instant messaging) have less time to construct their 
written lies as an immediate response is normally expected, than those in asynchronous 
communication (such as email), where a reasonable response delay is expected. As a 
result, deceptive synchronous communication has briefer, less complex and less expressive 
communication, while those in asynchronous communication, with more time to plan and 
control their behaviour, produce texts which tend towards longer more elaborate messaging.   
 
Burgoon et al. (2003) report that deceivers in a synchronous interactive context (interview 
conducted via text chat and FtF) produce shorter messages of greater complexity, in 
contrast to deceivers in an asynchronous email context covering several days, who produce 
longer messages with less complexity. However, a third study involving deception in a 
synchronous context (text chat, FtF and audio-conferencing) reports that deceivers’ 
language tends towards briefer responses of low complexity than truth tellers’. Burgoon et al. 
attribute these differences in style to difference in media (text chat, audio chat, email) and 
the time available to prepare responses. Similar results are found with Zhou & Sung’s (2008) 
study into synchronous CMC communication involving online chat with Chinese groups, with 
deceivers communicating less than truth tellers, while two studies by Zhou et al. (2003) 
(2004b) using asynchronous email exchange also reports deceivers using more words than 
truth tellers.  
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However, Hancock et al. (2004) (2005) (2008) find in their studies that deceivers produce 
more words during synchronous CMC messaging, contradicting the above trend. Hancock et 
al. (2005) suggest that the properties of the experiment may influence cue production in 
interactive CMC deception, which may explain the contradictory results. In the Burgoon et al. 
(2003) experiment, participants are asked to lie to an interrogator, while in the Hancock et al. 
experiments, participants are asked to lie in conversation. In the former, deceivers may be 
avoiding incriminating themselves by saying as little as possible while, in the latter, deceivers 
are trying to convince addressees of the truthfulness of their assertions. Context matters. 
 
1.5.2. CMC Messaging and Written Witness Statements 
As with FtF and CMC text interaction, studies so far suggest that the differences between 
CMC messaging and written statements are large. Even though CMC may be conducted 
largely in writing, there are material differences between it and the production of longer 
written statements, such as witness narratives, that are likely to affect linguistic cues to 
deception. 
 
Written witness statements are textual monologues, without the turn-taking virtual 
conversation interaction that characterises CMC messaging. Although verbal monologues 
have been included in deception studies, these involve speaking to an observer according to 
instructions issued as part of the experiment. Thus, preparing a statement for later 
consumption by an addressee who is not present at the time of the writing of the statement 
presents a different communication context from speaking to a person who is present, even 
if that person does not respond. Buller & Burgoon’s (1996) Interpersonal Deception Theory 
states that deceptive communication strategies differ between those engaged in interactive 
and non-interactive deception. Therefore, while observers are passive participants in the 
monologue, they are nevertheless still participants, as distinct from the recipients of 
statements (who will judge the veracity of the statement) who are not there at all. 
 
Lacking the interpersonal relationship found in CMC communication, witness statement 
writers have no periodic feedback as to how well their deceptive strategy is working; this will 
come only once the statement has been written and unavailable for further editing. Having 
the time to prepare their story is of limited use to deceivers in the absence of feedback.  
 
Consequently, lying witness statement writers have to decide at the outset which strategy 
might be the most successful in order to convince addressees of their sincerity, without the 
luxury of being able to build a relationship with them, or modify their deceptive approach.  
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Identifying an addressee is also problematic, as deceivers have no control over the 
distribution and readership of their statements, and it is unlikely they would be able to tailor 
them for all possible addressees. 
 
This lack of control over the distribution of their witness statements and their inability to 
direct deception towards specific addressees could create a greater degree of arousal for 
deceptive writers than deceivers working in CMC contexts. Zhou & Zhang (2006) report that 
deceivers experience higher arousal levels when attempting to deceive larger groups of 
people, which increases the likelihood of leakage of deceptive cues and, in turn, the 
likelihood of probing questions from suspicious group members. In addition, producing texts 
such as narrative witness statements involve disclosing one’s identity, in contrast with the 
anonymity normally associated with CMC communication where the source of information 
may be unknown and hiding behind a user-name. While anonymity helps to reduce 
participants’ apprehension towards their group-colleagues (Valacich, Dennis & Nunamaker, 
1992), there is no such comfort for the lying witness statement writer. 
 
1.6. Weaknesses in Deception Studies 
Some researchers have criticised weaknesses in deception studies, blaming such limitations 
on their own, as well as other studies, for the contradictory results they obtained.  
 
Sporer (1997) admits that the incentives for participants to lie in his experiments are 
extremely weak. Both Bond & Lee (2005) and Colwell et al. (2007) suggest that the use of 
videotape in their studies may provide the wrong type of stimulus (resulting in truth tellers 
using more Third Person Pronouns than deceivers); Newman et al. (2003) wonder whether 
the topic (abortion attitudes) results in the same finding. Other researchers criticise the use 
of structured questions and settings which do not allow deceivers room to manoeuvre as in 
real life (Dulaney,1982), or the failure to examine whole discourses and participants’ lack of 
freedom to choose their own deceptive strategies (Dilmon, 2009). Participants in research 
experiments are given permission to lie, which is likely to eliminate any guilt feelings they 
may have about deceiving someone else (Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2002). 
 
Porter & Yuille (1996) criticise the lack of diversified research populations. Most deception 
studies use students and research suggests that students do not behave deceptively in the 
same way as those regularly found in deceptive environments (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010). 
Liars such as criminals who are more exposed to deceptive environments are more 
knowledgeable as to which deceptive strategies work and may produce more plausible  
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deceptions and different cues. Kassin, Meissner and Norwick (2005) report that prison 
inmates they worked with lied with little difficulty and were adept at creating convincing false 
confessions.  
 
A major limitation of deception studies is the inconsistency in the definition of deception 
(Sporer, 2004; Memon et al. 2010) and the focus on trivial lies, which make for poor 
deception models. This makes it difficult to assess the validity of the cues they report. 
Newman et al.’s (2003) approach to deception (linked to their studies on language and 
mental health) involve participants writing dishonestly on abortion attitudes. Hancock et al.’s 
(2008) participants lie about significant persons, unpleasant jobs and recent mistakes. Zhou 
et al. (2003) (2004) and Zhou & Zhang (2004)(2007) ask participants to rank items in terms 
of importance necessary for surviving in the desert after a plane crash and to falsely justify 
their decision to others. Zhou & Sung (2008) have participants playing an online game 
pretending to be mafia, villagers and police officers. Although Bond & Lee (2005) use prison 
inmates in their experiment, they still have them lying about trivia (a video they had 
watched). Such models cannot hope to replicate the strong emotions and cognitive 
pressures produced by high-stake deception, when the consequences of being caught out 
mean not getting paid $10, compared to being sent to prison and public humiliation.  
 
A surprising revelation of the extensive literature review is just how inconsistently cues 
behave. Research papers tend to be selective about the previous studies they report on, 
giving the impression of consistency in findings when, in fact, this is not the case. Thus, 
deception research needs firmer foundations. It requires studies into real life high stakes 
deception to produce valid cues, which means research conducted outside of the laboratory 
environment as such conditions cannot hope to adequately replicate real world stimuli.  
 
1.7. Narrative Analysis 
1.7.1. Linguistic Studies 
Labov (1997) defines a narrative as “a report of a sequence of events that have entered into 
the biography of the speaker by a sequence of clauses that correspond to the original 
events” 8. He differentiates between narratives of personal experience and narratives of 
simple observations, with the former reinterpreting actual events in the light of the narrators’ 
emotional and social involvement, and the latter being a straightforward retelling of events.  
  
                                                 
8 This definition is based on the original conception of Labov & Waletsky, 1967. 
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The work of Labov & Waletsky (1967) on narratives of personal experience is the bedrock 
upon which narrative analysis rests. Originating out of sociolinguistic field studies into how 
people speak when they were not being observed, Labov & Waletsky report that oral 
narratives share common structures, with fully formed narratives (those with a beginning, a 
middle, and an end) containing five9 structural features: Orientation (setting the scene), 
Complication (what happened), Evaluation (opinion of narrator towards features in the 
narrative), Resolution (the outcome), and Coda (returning to the present time).   
 
However, not all narratives contain all the structures. As a minimum, a narrative consists of 
two independent clauses containing the Complication separated by a temporal juncture (the 
time separating from each other the earlier and later actions reported in the clauses) where 
the interpretation of the order of events would change if the clauses were reversed (Labov & 
Waletsky, 1967). Thus, the chronological ordering of clauses and the semantic function of 
those clauses are important for providing meaning in narratives. 
 
Bruner (1990) holds that this sequentiality is the key characteristic of narratives as “the 
sequence of its sentences, rather than the truth or falsity of any of those sentences is what 
determines its overall configuration or plot” (p. 43). The constituent features of narratives 
(the individuals involved, their mental states, and the events) derive meaning from their 
place in the overall plot configuration, and their interaction with other features at different 
levels in the narrative, according to the author’s perspective of reality (Barthes, 1996). 
Indeed, narratives are not objective retellings of what happened as narrators linguistically 
reconstruct reality to create meaning. They manipulate their narratives to get across their 
point of view through linguistic devices of factivity and causativity, reordering the narrative 
structure and selecting (and omitting) events to suit their personal theory of causality (Labov, 
1997). In other words, meaning in narratives is derived from the temporal organisation of 
events selected by the narrator.  
 
All the events selected are important in one way or another because they have been 
selected by the narrator out of a multitude of other events as “worth noting”, to be included in 
the narrative (Barthes, 1996). Such information needs to be credibly linked together in order 
to be acceptable to addressees. Labov (2001) argues that credibility arises from addressees 
believing that the reportable event (what the narrative is all about) did indeed occur in real 
time. To achieve this, narrators have to introduce a chain of events which explain how the  
                                                 
9 Labov (1999) later adds a sixth structure, the Abstract (what the narrative is about). 
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reportable event came about (narrative cohesion) in order to get their theory of causality 
(coherence) across to their audience.  
 
Studies on narrative coherence owe much to Danes’ theory of thematic progression which 
states that information flow in texts is managed by the connective ordering of Theme (Given 
information) and Rheme (New Information) (Danes, 1974, as cited in Fries, 1995).  Danes 
proposes three patterns by which information may be structured so as to keep texts 
coherent: simple linear progression (where the rheme of the first clause becomes the theme 
of the following sentence), constant continous theme (where the theme of the first clause 
remains the theme of the clauses following), and theme progression with derived themes 
(using a hypertheme to which all other clauses relate). 
 
Danes’ work forms part of a larger theory of language known as the Functional Sentence 
Perspective (FSP) promoted by the Prague School (founded by Vilem Mathesius and 
operating in the immediate pre-World War II period), which focused on the functional 
analysis of sentences, as compared to its formal analysis. FSP (developed by Firbas) 
proposes that the structures of clauses and sentences function along different perspectives 
(orientation) according to the purpose of the communication; the interaction of semantic and 
syntactic factors (in written communication -- word order, context and semantics10) drive 
communication forwards, with each element of meaning having different degrees of 
communication potential (Svoboda, 2005; Firbas, 2006). 
 
Halliday’s (2003) systemic functional linguistic theory of language builds on Danes’ work, 
seeing language as a network of systems of meaning (systemic) which evolved out of 
human social interaction to meet a variety of needs (functional). In his method of 
development of texts, Halliday argues that information flow in texts is managed by the 
thematic organisation of clauses in first position. Meaning and a particular interpretation of 
text is achieved by highlighting certain information (the theme) and then carrying it on 
throughout the rest of the message. Thus, the organisation of thematic clauses has huge 
implications for the interpretation of the message (Halliday & Mathiessen, 2004). 
 
In Halliday’s approach to language, there is no distinction between lexis and grammar; both 
are meaning-creating. Consequently, word choice reflects the point of view of speakers and 
their experience of the world, which the speaker then transmits to others. Halliday refers to 
this transitivity as “the set of options whereby the speaker encodes his experience of the  
                                                 
10 In oral communication, the fourth factor is intonation. 
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processes of the external world, and of the internal world of his own consciousness, together 
with the participants in these processes and their attendant circumstances” (Halliday, 1971, 
p. 119). Thus, Halliday sees language as a social construct influenced by the situation in 
which it occurs, according to the speaker’s communication purpose.  
 
This personalisation of language choice and construction has interesting consequences for 
the analysis of witness narratives; it suggests that a person’s selection of lexis and process 
in recounting an event will differ from the next person’s, even though they have experienced 
the same event. Labov (1972) also argues that people are so engrossed in the detail of their 
narratives that they fail to monitor their speech and word selection, which they might 
otherwise do under other circumstances (Labov, 1972). Labov refers here to oral narratives; 
however, the same focus on narrative detail at the expense of word monitoring is also likely 
to apply to written witness statements, making the genre ripe for deception analysis. 
 
1.7.2. Episode Partition in Narratives 
The only linguistic research to date on written witness statements made to law enforcement 
officers involving real life high consequence events is that of Adams & Jarvis (2006). An 
important feature of the analysis involves dividing narratives into three partitions -- the 
prologue, the criminal incident, and the conclusion -- based on the opinions of Sapir (1987), 
Rudacille (1994) and Rabon (1996). A statement subdivided into three balanced partitions is 
taken to be an indicator of truthfulness, while an imbalance or absence of one or more of the 
partitions is suggestive of deception.  
 
The issue of narrative partition and how managing information flow might affect its 
construction has been examined in a non-deception context. Studies into narratives have 
found that storytellers use segmentation markers as grammatical signals to manage the flow 
of information in a story and facilitate readers’ understanding of events. Prideaux’s (1989) 
work on the role of marked sentence structures in narratives suggests that deviation from the 
standard sentence construction of main clause + subordinate clause to that of subordinate 
clause + main clause is not just a stylistic preference, but serves the reader as a kind of 
linguistic signposting. 
 
Prideaux (1989) treats the main-subordinate constraint as an instance of markedness, with 
the usual main clause + subordinate clause (MC+SC) sentence structure being unmarked 
(more common) and the rarer (less typical) subordinate clause + main clause (SC+MC) 
structure being marked. He also points out that information contained in the main clause + 
subordinate clause structure generally follows the order of events, whereas this order is  
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
43 
 
frequently reversed when the subordinate clause precedes the main clause, increasing 
processing complexity (Order of Mention Constraint).  
 
Halliday (2004) also identifies preposed adverbial clauses and prepositional phrases as 
marked structures in his work on clause message construction. He argues that in the 
Theme-Rheme construction of sentences (where the theme is Given information and the 
rheme is New information), instances where the theme does not overlap with the subject of 
the sentence should be taken as an instance of markedness. For example, in the sentence -- 
The guys started to say insulting and belligerent things before I got to 4th Street -- the Theme 
(“The guys”) is also the subject of the sentence. However, in the sentence -- Before I got to 
4th Street, the guys started to say insulting and belligerent things -- the theme (“Before I got 
to 4th Street”) does not overlap with the subject (which remain “the guys”). 
 
Studies indicate that the use of marked sentence structures is not random. In Halliday’s 
view, the creation of marked sentence structures is always deliberate and always context 
sensitive. It is easier for the communicator to choose the unmarked structure, therefore there 
must be a reason to choose a marked structure instead, and the motivation for that is to be 
found in the context of the communication (Halliday, 1967; Halliday, 1968). Prideaux (1989) 
observes that such changes in sentence structures are normally to be found at the beginning 
of paragraphs in more oral-type written narratives (very infrequently in the paragraph-final 
position in more stylistically elaborate prose texts).  
 
The placement of such structures is governed by language management requirements which 
have to be learned, developing with age as children acquire more complex communication 
competencies (McEwen & Prideaux, 1997). These structures serve as segmentation 
markers, alerting readers to changes in continuity and the introduction of new discourse 
packages (Bestgen et al. 2009). More importantly, they signal discontinuity in discourse 
(Bestgen, 1998).  
 
Unexpected changes in sentence structure draw attention to themselves. Marked sentences 
are more difficult to process than their unmarked counterparts and slow down readers’ 
processing of the text. In doing so, they highlight the information contained in the sentence, 
drawing readers’ attention to major changes in topic (as in Figure 1 example 1a) or important 
incidents (Prideaux & Hogan, 1993) (as in example 2a), as well as temporal shifts in the 
narrative (as in example 3a) (Bestgen & Vonk, 2000; Prideaux, 2000).   
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1a) Before I got to 4th Street the guys 
started to say insulting and belligerent 
things. 
1b) The guys started to say insulting and 
belligerent things before I got to 4th Street. 
2a) When she was going through the metal 
detector she didn’t put her bags on the x-
ray machine. 
2b) She didn’t put her bags on the x-ray 
machine when she was going through the 
metal detector. 
3a) and moments later the ambulance 
arrived. 
3b) The ambulance arrived moments later. 
Figure 1: Main-Subordinate Constraint: Marked (a) and Unmarked (b) Sentence 
Structures 
 
Most importantly, the decision where and when to use these structures rests solely with the 
narratives’ authors and provides insight into their focus when deciding to introduce a 
thematic break (Halliday, 1967; Bestgen, 1998). 
 
As they read a story, readers construct a mental image of the situation being described 
(Graesser, Millis & Zwaan, 1997, as cited in Bestgen et al. 2009). Placing marked structures 
at paragraph-initial positions open new thematic bundles. This keeps the situational 
information relevant to understanding that part of the story active in reader’s short-term 
memory (Prideaux, 1989). As the situation changes, new thematic bundles introduced by 
other marked structures help readers update their mental image (Zwaan, Langston & 
Graesser, 1995, as cited in Bestgen et al. 2009) by closing the previous thematic frame and 
opening a new one. In more elaborate literary texts, where marked sentence structures are 
found in a variety of positions, there is less reliance on short-term memory and this allows 
the main-subordinate constraint to be violated for stylistic purposes (Prideaux, 1989). 
 
Fronted adverbials (adjuncts) operate similarly, identifying thematic change in discourse 
(Virtanen, 1992, as cited in McEwen & Prideaux, 1997). Virtanen suggests that clause-initial 
temporal adverbials also serve to highlight peak episodes in the narrative, differentiating 
between events leading up to a climax from the climax itself (Virtanen, 2008).  
  
This structuring of episodes has implications for the identification of deception. Although 
research indicates that the use of marked sentence structures assist readers in constructing 
a mental image of the story, no study has explored how such episode constructions reflect 
the presence of deception. In a truthful story based on actual experience, narrators naturally 
decide what information to include or leave out, resulting in thematic shifts in time, place and 
topic while maintaining the continuity and overall cohesion of the narrative as it progresses. 
However, in deceptive narratives, where deception involves inventing false scenarios, such  
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unconnected details lacking grounding in reality temporally displace the actual timeline. This 
may result in fragmentation of the storyline because the story elements lack cohesion and 
the creation of many more episodes than one would expect to find. The same episode 
fragmentation may also apply in deception by omission, where temporal lacunae (gaps in the 
time sequence) create new episodes where none are expected. Thus, episode construction 
to a point where a narrative becomes highly fragmented may be a consequence of 
deception. 
 
1.8. Conclusion 
This chapter started some 84 million years ago with deceptive organisms and ends with the 
complex verbal strategies humans employ to deceive and that lie detectors use to catch 
them. Humans are genetically programmed to deceive and their psychological orientation 
and linguistic evolution promote survival of the deceptively fittest. Deception ability, it 
appears, is an inherent part of survival of the fittest and, thus, has evolved to be adaptive 
and flexible. Whether deception is genetically programmed or consciously intentional, 
success (and therefore survival) very much depends on deceivers’ strategic adaptations to 
the circumstances, their ability to respond to feedback and putting themselves in someone 
else’s mindset and selecting the best deceptive strategy. 
In humans, this deceptive linguistic flexibility appears to be backed up by the evidence of 
previous research. No researcher appears to have obtained the same result in every study, 
either identifying single cues or cue clusters, and this holds for both oral and written 
deception. Although results are contradictory, Vrij (2008) observes that there appears to be 
general trends in oral deception, with more researchers finding that deceivers use less self-
references, more negation, more generalising, and shorter responses. Since the majority of 
deception studies are undertaken with students lying about trivial matters, how valid these 
cues really are, and how they compare with real life high stakes deception, is difficult to 
assess.  
How oral cues apply to textual deception is also uncertain. Given the diversity of contexts in 
CMC experiments and the inconsistencies in findings between them, no meaningful trend in 
textual deception cues has yet been identified. Word quantity appears to indicate the 
opposite in synchronous (less) and asynchronous (more) deception, while deceptive 
language complexity measurements vary according to the properties of the CMC messaging 
and the task performed. At best, what can be said is that word quantity appears not to 
translate across the media, with oral deceivers generally saying less and textual deceivers 
generally writing more than their truth telling counterparts.  
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It is impossible to say anything about linguistic cues in high stakes textual monologue 
deception as very little exploration has been undertaken in this field. How cues in interactive 
deception (real and virtual) compare with textual monologues, in particular, textual 
monologues involving high consequence deception, may be described once the linguistic 
cues to such deception have themselves been identified. To date, this has not been 
addressed. This study contributes towards filling the gap in that knowledge base and 
providing a strong foundation for informed deception detection in written text. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. The Study: Cues to Deception in Written Witness Statements 
 
2.1. Theoretical Background  
This study was originally inspired by the requirement for intent-based standards of proof for 
fraud prosecution in court. Legal statutes worldwide require convincing proof of fraudulent 
intent in order to prosecute and hold that the misrepresentation of information in the honest 
belief that it is true (no matter how unreasonable that belief) is not fraudulent. This 
requirement to distinguish between deliberate and accidental deception has given rise to a 
massive industry geared towards the identification of deception in a forensic context. 
2.1.1. Detecting Truth, Detecting Lies, and Credibility Assessment 
Getting to the truth has long been a social issue. In early societies, truthfulness and lying 
were perceived as moral conditions. Truth was a revealed truth as provided by God through 
the Church. The way a person behaved dictated whether he or she was lying or telling the 
truth, irrespective of what the person said. In English courts in medieval times, such 
dilemmas were tested by ordeals of fire and water, the general belief being that death was 
the consequence of sinful lying while God would protect the truthful individual.  
 
Between the 13th and 17th century, pain (arising from torture) was perceived as a source of 
truth (Cohen, 2010). Truth had to be spontaneous; the real truth was that which was dragged 
out as a result of inflicted pain rather than the personal truth that was composed in a 
person’s mind. Although man’s will resisted telling the truth, truth and deception could be 
identified by reading involuntary body signals such as pallor, which was taken to be an 
indication of guilty knowledge (Silverman, 2010). In the 1600s, the idea that the truth could 
be arrived at in court by detailed questioning of the person and analysis of the evidence first 
made its appearance and led to the practice of cross-examination and adversarial debate 
that underpins the British legal system today.  
 
However, in the 19th century, the idea that lying could be identified by the involuntary 
behaviour of deceptive individuals again made its appearance; but instead of a search for 
truth, mindsets shifted to the detection of deception. The identification of deception and 
criminal personalities became fashionable with the development of new scientific techniques  
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such as the plethysmograph and the sphygmograph which worked on the assumption that 
lying affected deceivers’ heart rate and blood pressure.11 This was followed by streams of 
new machines that monitored physical behaviour such as galvanic skin response, muscular 
activity, breathing rate and pulse rate in the belief that changes in their measurement 
identified deceptive behaviour. These machines became the foundations for the modern 
polygraph. 
 
Such developments were eagerly embraced by law enforcement agencies which saw the 
new science of lie detection as replacing the need for police interrogation and, potentially, 
judges and jury service in determination of guilt -- “there will be no jury, no horde of 
detectives and witnesses, no charges and counter charges, and no attorney for the defence. 
These impediments of our courts will be unnecessary. The State will merely submit all 
suspects in a case to the tests of scientific instruments”(The New York Times, 1911).  
 
As lie detecting technologies developed, identifying reliability and validity measurements that 
made them good enough to serve as evidence for court became an increasing problem. In 
1923, the defence counsel of James Alphonso Frye attempted to introduce polygraph results 
as evidence of his innocence in a Washington DC (USA) court. The Court rejected the 
application, agreeing with the prosecution’s argument that, “while the courts will go a long 
way in admitting expert testimony, deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or 
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs” (Frye v United 
States, 1923, Court of Appeals of District of Columbia). 
 
The Frye case instituted the requirement that, for evidence to be acceptable to the Court, it 
had to enjoy general acceptance in the scientific community. This remained the majority rule 
in US courts until 1993 when it was rejected in favour of Daubert v Merrel Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. The Daubert test introduced a requirement for independent judicial 
assessment of evidentiary reliability which trial judges could consider, such as evidence of 
testability and known or potential rates of error, in addition to peer review and general 
acceptance of the methodology within the relevant scientific community, none of which have 
been met by the polygraph. 
  
                                                 
11 The author Daniel Defoe also thought that deception could be identified through monitoring heart 
rate in his 1730 publication, An Effectual Scheme for the Immediate Preventing of Street Robberies 
and Suppressing All Other Disorders of the Night, addressed to the Lord Mayor of London. 
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The Law Commission in the UK favours a more Daubert-style approach and suggests that 
modifications to criminal procedure12 and how evidence is presented would be the best way 
forward to reducing miscarriages of justice resulting from failings in expert evidence (Law 
Commission, 2009). In contrast, the Appeal Court has consistently chosen to reject the 
Daubert test in dealing with admissibility of evidence, supporting the assertion that there “is 
no single test which can provide a threshold for admissibility in all cases”(R v Harris, Rock, 
Cherry and Faulder [2005] EWCA Crim 1980).   
 
Although the polygraph is not accepted as evidence in UK courts and has previously not 
been used by UK police, Hertfordshire Police trialled its use as a lie detection tool in the first 
ever pre-conviction testing of (sex) offenders in 2011, with further trials to commence in April 
201213. This is a retrograde step as the polygraph functions as an old fashioned instrument 
of torture which works by instilling fear into its subjects in order to extract confessions. No 
real life study on the effectiveness of polygraphs has been published to my knowledge but 
general literature refers to its unacceptably high false-positive rate. A 1986 study found that 
most polygraph studies which reported very high success rates had serious methodological 
flaws and that truthful persons labelled as liars by polygraph testing would outnumber 
correctly identified liars (Brett, Phillips & Beary, 1986). 
 
Techniques have also been promoted for assessing the credibility of individuals when there 
is no evidence available other that the testimony of the person. As opposed to determining 
whether an individual is being truthful or deceptive, credibility assessment revolves around 
how believable a person is perceived to be. First developed in the 1950s to assess the 
reliability of children as witnesses in sex abuse cases for court, Statement Validity 
Assessment (SVA) is the most well known procedure. It consists of four stages, where case 
file information is examined, followed by an interview stage where information is extracted 
from the child witness and is credibility assessed using 19 criteria based on the Undeutsch 
Hypothesis at the CBCA stage; further assessment of the witness occurs in the final stage 
using a Validity checklist.  
  
                                                 
12 Although the Law Commission stresses that their Consultation paper only applies to evidence and 
not practice. (Law Com No 190: 1.12) 
13 Update 20th July 2012 - The Ministry of Justice is to allow probation officers to use polygraph testing 
to manage paroled sexual offenders. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/9414112/Sex-
offenders-will-take-lie-detector-tests-to-keep-a-check-on-them.html 
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CBCA is now used by police and other investigators during interviews with adult suspects to 
determine the veracity of their information. Although studies have suggested that CBCA can 
successfully judge the truthfulness of statements (Sporer, 1997; Vrij, 2008) CBCA was not 
developed originally to distinguish truthful from deceptive accounts, and neither was it meant 
to be used independently of the SVA process. A problem associated with using CBCA as a 
truth/lie detection tool is that it cannot distinguish between accounts that are partially 
experienced with non-experienced elements inserted in it (Akehurst, Manton & Quandte, 
2011). Thus, its strength remains as a credibility, rather than a veracity, assessment tool. 
2.1.2. Linguistic Cues and Textual Communication Contexts 
In recent years, research into how deceivers behave linguistically when they lie in writing has 
centred on developing automated deception detection strategies to analyse the masses of 
text produced by online communication. Given the implications this has for national security, 
Government departments such as those dealing with military defence and border security 
have been keen to support this research. Such automated approaches have successfully 
identified differences between false and truthful communications, whether they be FtF (Zhou 
et al. 2004a; Zhou et al. 2004b; Hancock, Curry, Goorha & Woodworth, 2008)  or CMC 
(Bond & Lee, 2005; Burgoon & Qin, 2006); however, the linguistic cues which distinguish 
deceptive from actual accounts differ across the studies. 
 
Such research shows that deception appears so complex that no single behaviour can be 
uniquely associated with it (Vrij, 2000; DePaulo et al. 2003; Memon, Vrij & Bull, 2003; Vrij, 
2008). This raises questions as to how deception affects linguistic markers in the types of 
textual communication produced by different media. Do linguistic cues differ between 
different types of written deception, such as when lying in the interpersonal synchronous 
context of CMC messaging or in the more asynchronous context of email? Studies so far 
suggest that they do (Burgoon et al. 2003; Zhou et al. 2003; Hancock et al. 2004; Zhou et al. 
2004b; Hancock et al. 2005; Zhou & Zhang, 2007; Zhou & Sung, 2008; Hancock et al. 2008). 
If this is indeed the case, can we expect additional differences between these interactive 
messaging contexts and the monologue textual context of written witness statements?  
 
Zhou & Sung (2008) attribute contradictions in their findings regarding deceivers’ linguistic 
diversity, quantity and immediacy in instant messaging, as compared with other online 
communication studies such as email, as possibly being due to difference in media. “Email is 
considered a leaner communication medium in comparison to instant messaging in terms of 
the pace of feedback and the level of interactivity” (Zhou & Sung, 2008, p. 6).  
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Instant messaging being a dialogue (albeit a textual one), both sender and addressee are 
expected to constantly acknowledge each other’s messages to show they have understood 
what the other is attempting to communicate. This is different for textual monologues (such 
as email), where no grounding is necessary as the sender does not interact with an 
addressee and the speed of feedback is considerably slower than that of instant messaging.  
 
Consequently, one would expect written witness statements to be an even leaner 
communication medium than email. Generally, witness statements are intended for more 
general consumption (other police officers, solicitors, Court officers etc) than a single 
addressee and feedback to the statement writer would only come much later at the 
investigative interview stage. Given these differences, it is therefore reasonable to expect 
that deception cues in written statements will differ from those identified in computer-
mediated communication.  
 
Can we expect deception cues to be stronger in deceptive witness statements than 
interactive deceptive text communications? Theoretically, yes. DePaulo et al. (2003) argue 
that lying is such an unexceptional part of social interaction in everyday life, causing little 
shame or guilt to the deceiver, which results in deception cues being weak and subtle and 
having little impact on language. To trigger the occurrence of more obvious linguistic cues, 
deceivers need to be highly motivated to succeed with their lies (DePaulo & Kirkendol’s 
(1989) motivational impairment effect). 
 
However, not all motivations are equal. Instrumental motivations (financial or material 
reward) produce cues that are as weak as no-motivation deceptions, while identity-related 
motivations (involving those that affect the public awareness and self-confidence of the 
deceiver) produce cues that are significantly stronger than chance (DePaulo et al. 2003). 
This requires that the consequences of being discovered attempting to deceive should result 
in such severe negative social and/or judicial repercussions that deceivers’ self-esteem, 
public standing, liberty, and perhaps even life will be threatened. Such repercussions might 
motivate deceivers more highly to succeed in their deception, increasing emotional and 
cognitive stress to such an extent that, in so doing, their language is affected in some way. 
The problem is that no one quite knows what cues to look for. 
  
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
52 
 
2.2. Theoretical Perspectives of Deception and Their Cues 
The identification of cues characteristic of deception has long been associated with certain 
behaviours that deceivers are thought to default to when they lie. Deceivers are said to 
appear less forthcoming, less pleasant, and more tense (DePaulo et al. 2003) as a result of 
the emotional and regulatory burden they bear when lying which is reflected in their physical 
and linguistic behaviour. While there is empirical evidence that behaviour does change 
during deception (Vrij & Mann, 2001), informed deceivers may be able to control certain 
behaviours successfully and so evade the scrutiny of lie catchers looking for such cues 
(Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2002).  
 
Researchers have identified certain perspectives -- emotion, cognitive load, and attempted 
behavioural control (Memon, Vrij & Bull, 2003) and lack of embracement (Vrij, 2008) -- which 
they believe underpin physical and linguistic cues to deception. Although these processes 
are hypothetical and identified retrospectively to explain  differences in deceptive behaviour 
between deceivers and truth tellers (Memon, Vrij & Bull, 2003), evidence exists that 
deceivers do experience some of these processes more than truth tellers (Vrij, Semin & Bull, 
1996; Vrij & Mann, 2001). However, while such behaviour may arise as a result of 
experiencing processes like cognitive complexity, strong emotions and the sort of attempted 
control associated with deception, the behaviours are by themselves not indicators of 
deception; merely that the processes are active in the individual. 
2.2.1. Emotion  
DePaulo et al.’s (2002) description of deceivers’ language being less pleasant arises from 
research which suggests that emotions associated with deception such as anxiety and guilt 
lead to fear cues such as negative emotions or negative effect which manifest themselves in 
verbal behaviour (Knapp et al. 1974; DePaulo, Rosenthal, Rosenkrantz & Green, 1982b; 
Newman et al. 2003; Zhou et al. 2004a). However, Vrij, Ennis, Farman & Mann (2010) argue 
that tellers of simple lies are only marginally more tense than truth tellers and that labelling 
them as ‘nervous’ is an exaggeration; although it may be that as the seriousness of a lie 
increases in line with deceivers’ attempts to avoid getting caught, so may their level of 
tenseness. However, Vrij & Mann (2001) report this not to be the case in their study involving 
the interview of a murder suspect (who was subsequently convicted of murder). While the 
suspect was more nervous when lying than when telling the truth, he did not exhibit nervous 
behaviour for so high stake a situation. In this case, the individual was a seasoned criminal, 
so it may be that experience tempers leakage of nervous behaviour. 
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Fear cues may also surface when truth tellers worry about not being believed. This results in 
truth tellers experiencing similar processes to liars and leads to their negative behaviour 
being interpreted as deceptive. Such misguided interpretation of nervous behaviour results 
in the Othello Error (Ekman, 2001), named after the Shakespeare play in which Othello 
murders his wife, Desdemona, having misread her emotional behaviour as a sign of guilt of 
the infidelity of which she is accused. Indeed, in a review of polygraph tests, Vrij (2000) 
reports that 21% of innocent people are wrongly accused of lying as a result of truth tellers 
experiencing fear during testing. Fear of not being believed leads both truth tellers and 
deceivers to make more of an effort to control what they believe to be  nervous behaviour 
(Vrij, Mann, Leal & Granhag, 2010) and try to be more convincing (Bond & Fahey, 1987), 
resulting in unnatural behaviour which may be misinterpreted by deception detectors.  
 
Vrij (2008) categorises Negation under the emotion theoretical perspective, as guilt and fear 
associated with deception may leak into language as negative comments (Knapp et al. 1974; 
Zuckerman et al. 2001; Vrij 2000). Included in negative comments is the use of negative 
affect, words reflecting negative emotion and anxiety. However, given the Othello Error, the 
use of Negation as a deception cue in an emotional sense is unhelpful. Instead, Negation 
would be better employed as an indicator of lack of specificity (as described by Weiner & 
Mehrabian, 1968), where it is used to describe what did not happen or say what is not 
without clarifying what is. In this context, Negation should fall under DePaulo et al.’s (2003) 
description of deceivers being less forthcoming (Cognitive Effort) rather than less pleasant. 
2.2.2. Cognitive Effort  
Zuckerman et al. (1981) first made the association between cognitive effort and deception. 
They argue that deceivers use up greater cognitive resources than truth tellers in order to 
come up with a more plausible deceptive story. However, this is not always the case as 
telling a well-rehearsed lie about a simple matter can be just as cognitively easy as telling 
the truth (Vrij, 2000). Deceivers become more tense managing their cognitive loading as the 
seriousness of the lie increases; thus, the more effort deceivers put into their deception, the 
tenser they become (DePaulo et al. 2003; Vrij et al. 2010).  
 
Vrij (2008) suggests that high cognitive loading may result in non-immediacy and ambiguity, 
characterised by fewer self-references and shorter statements with less detail. Pronouns 
remain the preferred linguistic measure of immediacy and conviction, with use of self-
references being the strongest measurement of association (and honesty) and Third Person 
Pronouns the measure of distancing (non-immediacy). Although Vrij (2008) believes that the 
association between immediacy and deception is not as strong as the data suggests,   
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previous research supports a negative correlation between self-references and deception 
(Burgoon et al. 1996a; Burgoon et al. 1996b; DePaulo et al. 1982b; Ebesu & Miller, 1994; 
Newman et al. 2003).  
 
The association between short responses and deception is also well-documented (Ebesu & 
Miller, 1994; Vrij, Edward, Roberts & Bull, 2000; Newman et al. 2003; Burgoon & Qin, 2006; 
Zhou & Zhang, 2006). Shorter responses potentially signal the increased cognitive load 
deceivers have to contend with when managing their lies, resulting in less detail, or they may 
simply reflect a reticent attitude towards information disclosure.  
 
However, this is not always the case, as some studies show that deception is also 
associated with verbose responses (Anolli & Ciceri, 1997; Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri, 2002; 
Burgoon et al. 1996a; Burgoon et al. 2003; Zhou et al. 2004a; Hancock et al. 2004; Hancock 
et al. 2005; Zhou & Zhang, 2007). Zhou et al.’s (2004a) studies produce contrasting results, 
with deceivers using fewer words in the first part of their experiment and more words in the 
second part. 
 
There are difficulties associated with linguistically measuring lack-of-detail and response 
lengths. Low lexical diversity14 resulting from shorter sentences (due to deceivers carefully 
considering the information they provide) is traditionally associated with deceptive utterances 
(Burgoon et al. 2003; Zhou et al. 2004b; Hollien, 1990, as cited in Dilmon, 2009). However, 
being careful about one’s choice of words may also lead deceivers to using different words, 
leading to higher lexical diversity (Carpenter, 1981, as cited in Vrij, 2008). Low lexical 
diversity is also associated with truthfulness, as truth tellers often repeat information they 
previously provided as that is all the truth they know (Larcker & Zakolyukina, 2010); 
however, deceivers also repeat information in order to stress its credibility (Zhou et al. 2003). 
High lexical diversity is associated with deceptive statements when deceivers are verbose 
and provide much irrelevant information to create ambiguity, resulting in an increase in 
unique words (Colwell et al. 2002; Zhou & Sung, 2008). Vrij (2008), however, found no 
association between lexical diversity and deception.  
  
                                                 
14 Lexical diversity is measured using Type-Token Ratio, calculated by dividing the number of unique 
words in a statement by the total number of words in the statement. 
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2.2.3. Attempted Behavioural Control 
Both truth tellers and deceivers manage their behaviour in order to create a favourable 
impression with other people. However, trying to regulate behaviour brings with it certain 
dangers as the motivation to be believed makes people behave in such a manner that they 
come across as less plausible, irrespective of whether they are lying or telling the truth 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
 
Thus, trying to correct deceptive behaviour may instead inadvertently create other deceptive 
cues as the cognitive burden of attempting to appear honest and truthful becomes more 
demanding (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989). Although deceivers may want to appear 
cooperative and provide information regarding a particular event, they are unable to do so 
because they lack the experience and risk contradicting themselves or being disproved if 
they provide too much information (Hartwig et al. 2005). Therefore, deceivers may keep their 
statements short; but they may also attempt to provide alternative information in exchange 
for that which they cannot provide, resulting in verbose and ambiguous statements (Anolli, 
Balconi & Ciceri, 2002).  
2.2.4. Lack of Embracement 
Without actual experience of the false scenarios they provide, deceivers lack the conviction 
of their truth teller counterparts and fail to embrace fully their deception (Larcker & 
Zakolyukina, 2010). Deceivers are able to step back from fully committing to their lie by 
using more tentative, vague and generalising terms (Newman et al. 2003; Bond & Lee, 2005; 
Adams & Jarvis, 2006); they may provide shorter responses (Ebesu & Miller, 1994; Vrij, 
Edward, Roberts & Bull, 2000; Newman et al. 2003; Zhou et al. 2004a; Burgoon & Qin, 
2006; Zhou & Zhang, 2006) and use less self-references (Burgoon et al. 1996a; Burgoon et 
al. 1996b; DePaulo et al. 1982b; Ebesu & Miller, 1994; Newman et al. 2003).  
 
However, research suggests there is only a weak positive correlation between generalising 
(identified linguistically as the use of non-specific language, such as levelling words e.g. all, 
every etc, passive constructions and modal verbs) and deception (Knapp et al. 1974; Cody, 
Marston & Foster, 1984; Cody, Lee & Chao, 1989), and DePaulo et al. (2003) found no 
support for its use as a deception cue.  
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2.3. Development of Hypotheses 
In contrast to other studies which use poor simulations of deception in laboratory 
environments or real life but low-stake deception, this study makes use of high consequence 
deception in real life contexts, examining witness statements written by individuals reporting 
serious crime such as rape, arson, kidnapping, aggravated assault, murder, manslaughter, 
and theft. This study sets out to examine the predictive power of cues arising from high stake 
textual deception by, first, extracting linguistic features from a test group of deceptive and 
truthful statements and second, applying them to a second group of statements in a double 
blind study. No other deception study has undertaken a double blind study or even a blind 
study in its research. In this respect, this study is unique. 
 
This study is also the first to examine deception from an episode perspective as determined 
by the statements’ own authors. All previous uninterrupted monologue statements (oral and 
written) were examined either in their entirety or, in the case of experiments involving 
statement analysis, artificially subdivided (according to analysts’ opinion as to where the 
prologue, main event, and epilogue begin and end). 
 
To date, only one study (Adams & Jarvis, 2006) to my knowledge15 has examined deception 
cues in real world author-written witness statements relating to high stake crime. This study 
retrospectively analysed 60 witness statements written by individuals involved in serious 
criminal events using statement analysis. However, the status of the statements was already 
known to the analysts and no attempt was made to predict deception using the cues 
identified. 
 
The term statement analysis refers to a variety of analysis techniques such as Scientific 
Content Analysis (SCAN) (Sapir, 1987) and Investigative Discourse Analysis (IDT) (Rabon, 
1996) popular with law enforcement agencies. The techniques claim that the absence or 
presence of pronouns or the selection or variation of word choice or tense potentially 
identifies deception. For example, a bank teller incriminates herself in a theft when she 
changes from using “currency” to “money” (SCAN); a woman incriminates herself in her 
husband’s murder when she changes the referent from “the money” to “my money” (IDA). 
SCAN also claims to be cross-cultural and can be applied to any language.  
  
                                                 
15 Fuller et al. (2008) analysed 163 written witness statements from personnel in two military bases 
involved in “high-stakes” crime. However, these included “crimes” such as being caught driving 
erratically.  
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To date, no empirical evidence exists to support their claims. Specific criticisms made of 
SCAN include lack of standardised assessment methodology (which results in different 
persons focusing on different criteria when analysing the same statement) and the absence 
of guidance in determining what weighting should be attached to the presence or absence of 
the various cues (Smith, 2001; Vrij, 2008). Shuy (1998) criticises its application to language 
without any consideration for cultural and socio-economic differences that may exist16. A 
recent study by Nahari et al. (2012) finds no support for SCAN and concludes that the 
“findings do not justify the use of SCAN for lie detection purposes in real life practice” 
(Nahari et al. 2012, p. 75). The continuing use of such unproven and unsupported lie 
detection techniques in police and investigative operations, when their unreliability has been 
demonstrated by academia, goes against all ethical principles promoted in responsible 
policing (Heydon, 2011). 
 
Witness statements are the ideal textual material to work on as they are the product of 
individuals with firsthand experience of a real world event deception. These persons would 
be highly motivated to produce believable and convincing deceptive statements due to the 
seriousness of the consequences to their personal reputation and well-being should they be 
found lying. Such motivation for their deception to be believed would be much higher than 
that found in laboratory based deception simulations, which are rarely consequential and 
cannot replicate the stimuli of real life deception.   
 
Thus, given the self-presentational implications should deceivers be caught lying and the 
incentive to preserve their reputation and liberty, it is expected that linguistic cues will be 
stronger and occur more often in the language of deceptive statements than would otherwise 
occur in a laboratory environment where no such impetus exists. This motivation to succeed 
with deception is a fundamental part of this study, which relies on the magnification of cues 
which would otherwise be absent or very faint in inconsequential lying (DePaulo et al. 2003). 
2.4. Linguistic Cue Selection 
This study is consistent with others in hypothesising that the linguistic styles of truth tellers 
and deceivers differ from each other. It also hypothesises that cues in combination make 
better diagnostic markers (in agreement with DePaulo et al. 2003) than cues in isolation, and 
that the degree of use of such cues is a measurable feature of textual deception.  
  
                                                 
16 SCAN is used in countries such as Australia, Belgium, Canada, Israel, Mexico, UK, US, the 
Netherlands, Qatar, Singapore, and South Africa (Nahari et al. 2011). 
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A wide scale literature review was undertaken to identify the most promising cues suitable 
for textual deception. As seen in this review, no single cue or combination of cues emerges 
as consistently indicative of deception across media, or even within verbal and textual 
contexts. So far, no cues have been identified specifically for textual deception; the only 
other study into high stakes textual deception (Adams & Jarvis, 2006) identifies some 
support for an association between deception and equivocation and negation consistent with 
some trends. Neither can linguistic behavioural patterns be assumed to increase in line with 
the seriousness of the deception (Porter & ten Brinke, 2010), so there is little assurance that 
cues identified in simulated low stake deception apply to high stake lying. Thus, there is little 
guidance in the literature for cue selection. 
 
Consequently, cues were systematically selected to meet the following criteria. First, cue 
categories were identified on the basis of their association with deception in previous studies 
which establish to a general extent the effectiveness of the cue. Second, cue categories 
were tightly defined for the purpose of this study; third, cues were identified for 
distinctiveness (to be picked out easily and differentiated from other cues) and modelling 
capacity (easily quantifiable); fourth, cues were selected to be as sociolinguistically neutral 
as possible in the context of American-English native speakers.  
 
Certain cue categories developed for interview and interrogation contexts such as quantity of 
detail and temporal and spatial information were excluded from the analysis as they were 
difficult to implement. 
 
This study did not seek to assess veracity cues or predict truthfulness, although cues 
previously associated with truth telling, like First Person Singular Pronouns, were analysed 
in order to explore their collective and individual interaction with deception cues.  
 
Based on the literature review, linguistic cues selected for analysis were: Amount of Words, 
First Person Singular Pronouns, Third Person Pronouns, Vague Pronoun References, Verb 
Strings, Negation, and Cognitive Verbs.  
 
Word lists were created for each cue category by subjectively identifying the relevant words 
in individual statements and then counting them manually.  
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2.4.1. Amount of Words 
Previous literature generally reports that deceivers say less. However, Zhou et al. (2004c) 
point out that linguistic patterns change according to the type of statements being analysed, 
which goes some way towards explaining the contradictory findings relating to the amount of 
word use in deception. In textual contexts, previous literature reports that lying in interactive 
CMC results in increased word use as deceivers use rich and expressive language to 
convince their addressees of their sincerity instead of limiting themselves to simple facts. In 
criminal witness statement analysis, where much depends on the recollection of facts, 
deceivers may prefer to say less as they would be unable to provide the same quantity of 
detail and information as truth tellers. On the other hand, with time to think about and 
prepare their statements, deceivers are able to provide alternative information to 
compensate for that which they cannot give. Thus, they may offer their opinions or explain 
why they performed particular actions, subjective information which is difficult to verify. They 
may also concentrate and expand on truthful information into which they insert their lies, 
hoping that they will be difficult to spot. Therefore, it is believed that deceivers will be more 
verbose than truth tellers. 
 
Hypothesis 1 - Verbosity is positively correlated with deception. Deceivers use more words 
in their Statements than truth tellers. 
a) Deceivers will use longer clauses in Deceptive Statements than in Truthful 
Statements.  
b) In Deceptive Statements, Deceptive Episodes will contain longer clauses than 
Truthful Episodes. 
 
A clause is defined as a group of words that does not necessarily constitute a sentence, 
consisting of a subject (which may be implied) and a predicate. 
2.4.2. Pronouns 
Pronouns have had a long association with language-based deception detection. DePaulo et 
al.’s (2003) review of studies relating to verbal cues associated with deception identifies a 
general (albeit weak) trend wherein liars refer to themselves less often than truth tellers. 
Theoretically, this reduction in self-references should be accompanied by an increase in 
other oriented references such as Third Person Pronouns (Knapp et al. 1974) as deceivers 
use them to refer to other persons, things or events in the process of moving focus 
elsewhere away from themselves. After all, blaming someone else is perhaps one of the 
oldest deception strategies known to humans. 
  
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
60 
 
Curiously, Newman et al. (2003) report in their study an unexpected corresponding reduction 
in Third Person Pronouns as well as First Person Pronouns, which is inconsistent with 
previous research. Newman et al. attribute this reduction in Third Person Pronouns to being 
the result of the topic, abortion attitudes. They hypothesise that perhaps those who lied 
about their opinions on abortion preferred to refer to specific people rather than use pronoun 
references; referring to concrete and specific people increases the credibility of their 
information, while pronoun references are more abstract and less convincing. Or it may 
simply be that Newman et al.’s deception model was poor and involved low stake lying. 
 
This study examines only First Person Singular Pronouns (I, Me, My, Mine) and not all First 
Person Pronouns because of ambiguity in the focus of plural pronouns. The interpretation of 
First Person Plural Pronouns is heavily context dependent. We and Our can be interpreted 
as positive indicators of group identity, which includes the author in the group (Pennebaker & 
Lay, 2002, as cited in Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer, 2003). However, it also has 
negative connotations when deceivers use the pronouns to share responsibility for their 
actions by referring to themselves acting in or hiding behind their association with others. As 
a figure of speech, the pronouns can even be used in a manner that excludes the author 
from the group17 (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010), in spite of the overt association.  
 
The individual pronouns I, Me and My were also examined in this study with a view towards 
exploring how they interact with each other during deception, and establishing whether 
deceivers are predisposed towards using any one of them over the other. Previous studies 
have tended to look at First Person Singular Pronouns collectively, as if all the pronouns in 
the group are equally weighted. However, research into pronoun use as an indicator of 
mental health by Campbell & Pennebaker (2003) suggests that, in fact, pronouns are not all 
weighted equally and an individual’s perception may influence choice of one or the other. 
Indeed, a comparison between the active I and the passive Me identifies two very different 
perceptions by authors of the roles they play in a particular scenario -- as agent of the action, 
and as recipient of the action. In the first instance, authors actively initiate the behaviour, 
while in the second, they step back from focusing on their actions and distance themselves 
by describing what is being done to them, being the victim of an action initiated by someone 
else.  
  
                                                 
17 For example, when a supervisor tell his graduate student ‘We need to analyse this data’, he means 
‘you the student’ rather than ‘you and I’ (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). 
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Second Person Pronouns are not explored in this study. Like Third Person Pronouns, You 
pronouns act as markers of social awareness (Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer, 2003) and 
the extent to which authors’ foci is on others rather than themselves. However, in the context 
of witness statements, where there is no one to address as You, the pronoun is redundant in 
any case. 
 
Therefore, this study uses First Person Singular and Third Person Pronouns as measures of 
embracement and distancing, and hypothesises that deception is negatively correlated with 
First Person Singular Pronouns and positively correlated with Third Person Pronouns. No 
hypothesis was put forward regarding differences in weighting between First Person Singular 
Pronouns, although I, Me, and My were assessed individually as well. 
 
Hypothesis 2 - The use of First Person Singular Pronouns is negatively correlated with 
deception. Deceivers refer to themselves in their Statements less often than truth tellers. 
a) Deceptive Statements will contain a lower rate of First Person Singular Pronouns 
than Truthful Statements.  
b) In Deceptive Statements, Deceptive Episodes will contain a lower rate of First Person 
Singular Pronouns than Truthful Episodes. 
 
The First Person Singular Pronouns analysed collectively are: I, Me/Myself, and My/Mine. 
The pronouns I, Me, and My are also analysed individually in order to explore differences in 
weighting between them, although no hypothesis is put forward regarding their performance 
as no information is available on it. Therefore, this study is the first to analyse differences in 
weighting of individual self-references and explore any association with deception. 
 
Hypothesis 3 - The use of Third Person Pronouns is positively correlated with deception. 
Deceivers refer to others more often in their Statements than truth tellers. 
a) Deceptive Statements will contain a higher rate of Third Person Pronouns than 
Truthful Statements.  
b) In Deceptive Statements, Deceptive Episodes will contain a higher rate of Third 
Person Pronouns than Truthful Episodes. 
 
The pronouns analysed collectively are: He, She, Him, His, Her, They, Them, Their, and all 
variations e.g. Herself, Themselves etc. 
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2.4.3. Vague Pronoun References 
In this study, the category of Vague Pronoun References applies to pronouns that generate 
non-specific language, characteristic of deceivers’ attempts to avoid detail that could 
otherwise be verified easily. This lack of specificity may also arise as a result of the cognitive 
burden associated with high stake lying. It may be beyond the ability of the average deceiver 
to construct an imaginary scenario populated with the sort of detail that might be difficult to 
remember due to the stress of lying. Pronouns such as some, someone, or everything are 
vague references to unspecified people and words that deceivers can safely use to create 
an alternative ambiguous reality or safely generalise.  
 
This is the first study to examine the association between generalising pronouns and 
deception in this narrow context. DePaulo et al.’s 2003 review found no association between 
generalised statements and deception. However, generalising terms in previous studies 
largely referred to Leveller words such as always, never, nobody or everybody (Vrij, 2008). 
Zhou et al. (2004b) define generalising terms according to Weiner & Mehrabian (1968) as 
referring “to a class of persons or objects that includes the person (or object)” (p.94). This 
broad definition captures anything suggesting inclusiveness.18  Zhou et al. (2004b) report no 
association between generalising terms and deception, although Zhou et al. (2003) report 
mixed results (less generalising terms than truthful email senders but more than truthful 
email receivers).  
 
This study excludes Levellers as a category and redistributes relevant words to other 
categories (such as never and nobody to Negation), while retaining generalising words such 
as someone and everybody as Vague Pronoun References. As well as a generalising 
feature, Vague Pronoun References is an indicator of other orientated focus traditionally 
associated with Third Person Pronouns, which deceivers may prefer to use to create non-
immediacy. Consequently, this study hypothesises that Vague Pronoun References will be 
correlated positively with deception. 
 
Hypothesis 4 - The use of Vague Pronoun References is positively correlated with 
deception. Deceivers are more vague in their use of references in their Statements than truth 
tellers. 
  
                                                 
18 According to Weiner & Mehrabian (1968), this included references such as entire, books, and high 
school girls. 
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a) Deceptive Statements will contain a higher rate of Vague Pronoun References than 
Truthful Statements.  
b) In Deceptive Statements, Deceptive Episodes will contain a higher rate of Vague 
Pronoun References than Truthful Episodes. 
 
Vague Pronoun References are defined as indefinite pronouns that refer to non-specific 
people and things. The references included in this definition are: someone, something, 
everyone, everything, one, any, some, and thing(s). 
2.4.4. Verb Strings 
The use of Verb Strings as an indicator of ambiguity and lack of embracement is another 
linguistic feature not previously explored as a deception cue. Verb Strings consist of two or 
more verbs functioning as a single verb where the supporting verbs modify the main verb in 
some way, implying an action or retracting an implied action. This creates ambiguity as to 
what is actually going on and may signal authors’ lack of conviction to the information they 
are providing, resulting in a less plausible story. For example, in the Verb Strings needed to 
see and started yelling, while an action is proposed, it evades confirmation as to what was 
done or whether the action was completed. This opens up alternative possibilities as to what 
actually did happen.  
 
As with Vague Pronoun References, the Verb String is a recharacterisation of previously 
identified cues at times found to be associated with deception, such as modal verbs, passive 
voice, modifiers, and increased verb use. These cues contribute towards making the 
message unclear and non-immediate while, at the same time, providing information that 
appears complete. Weiner & Mehrabian (1986) report that verbal non-immediacy results in 
making the link between actor and action less clear. Verb Strings do exactly that, functioning 
as a type of subjective language suggesting unreality or action that has yet to be performed 
(wishing, possibility, necessity, intention) or completed. Thus, the concept of unclear 
language is incorporated into Verb Strings without having to analyse other unpromising 
cues. 
 
On the basis that deceivers are more non-immediate and ambiguous than truth tellers, this 
study hypothesises that deception will be positively correlated with increased use of Verb 
Strings.  
 
Hypothesis 5 - The use of Verb Strings is positively correlated with deception. Deceivers use 
more ambiguous language than truth tellers to describe events in their Statements.  
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a) Deceptive Statements will contain a higher rate of Verb Strings than Truthful 
Statements.  
b) In Deceptive Statements, Deceptive Episodes will contain a higher rate of Verb 
Strings than Truthful Episodes. 
 
A Verb String is defined as a combination of two or more verbs acting together to play the 
role of a single verb e.g. started to walk, need to retrieve, trying to go down.  
2.4.5. Negation 
In this study, Negation refers to a denial of something, rather than an indicator of emotional 
leakage. Coulthard (1992, as cited in Adams & Jarvis, 2006) finds that in both spoken and 
written discourse, the majority of clauses tend to be affirmative, what is rather than what is 
not. Therefore, clauses containing Negation are taken to be a rarer marked form (than 
affirmations) serving a specific function. Given that people generally try to be informative, 
and negative sentences tend to be less informative than their affirmative counterparts 
(Leech, 1983), then the context in which Negation is used must be somehow relevant to the 
communication (Israel, 2004). 
 
Considering that the instruction given to those writing witness statements is to state what 
happened, providing information about what did not happen raises questions as to what did 
occur and why the author has chosen to move the story forward by using the negative. “One 
does not normally deny something unless one thinks that someone might believe it”19 (Israel, 
2004, p. 706), 
 
For example, the negative assertion They got more belligerent and insulting. I don’t recall 
what was said allows the author to avoid providing more detailed information in support of 
his claim that his attackers were being belligerent and insulting; the author tries to be 
cooperative but is less forthcoming about the specifics. Negation here anticipates any 
request to clarify this point further.  
 
Negative statements as an indicator of deception are only weakly supported in DePaulo et 
al.’s (2003) review. However, the studies in the review included analysis of negative effect, 
and no studies were conducted on real life high stake monologue text statements. The only 
two studies exploring Negation in a textual context are those of Newman et al. (2003) (low 
stake lying) and Adams & Jarvis (2006) (high stake lying), and both found a positive  
  
                                                 
19 Reproduced with permission from John Wiley & Sons. 
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association with deception, as did Hancock et al. (2005) and Toma & Hancock (2010) in their 
low stake lying online. Consequently, this study hypothesises that the use of Negation will be 
positively correlated with deception. 
 
Hypothesis 6 - The use of Negation is positively correlated with deception. Deceivers create 
ambiguity by providing clarification in their Statements through the use of denial.  
a) Deceptive Statements will contain a higher rate of Negation than Truthful Statements.  
b) In Deceptive Statements, Deceptive Episodes will contain a higher rate of Negation 
than Truthful Episodes. 
 
Negation is defined as a word expressing a single negation, such as no, not, never, nothing, 
nobody, no one etc, as well as containing adjectives prefixed by un- expressing a negation 
e.g. I was unsuccessful. 
2.4.6. Cognitive Verbs 
The use of Cognitive Verbs as a lie detection tool is taken from the Reality Monitoring 
approach which states that memories derived from actual experience (perceived through the 
senses) will differ from those that are internally generated (from imagination) (Johnson & 
Raye, 1981; Johnson et al. 1988). An indicator of memory derived from imagination is the 
presence of words reflecting thought and reason, the cognitive processes involved in the 
creation of such memories.  
 
There does not appear to be any doubt about Reality Monitoring’s ability to discriminate 
between truth and deception above the level of chance (Masip, Garrido & Herrero, 2004; 
Vrij, 2008), although the jury is still out on the use of cognitive words as a deception cue. An 
assessment of the true value of the cue is difficult to make and different researchers have 
defined cognitive operations differently in their studies. Vrij et al. (2008) conclude that 
cognitive operations can successfully discriminate between truth and deception, but their 
study incorporates a wider definition20 of cognitive operations than that put forward by 
Johnson & Raye (1981).  
 
For the purpose of this study, the definition of Cognitive Verbs is based on Johnson & 
Raye’s original description which deals with idiosyncratic inferences by the authors about 
themselves and others e.g. I hadn’t thought about it till now (Johnson & Raye, 1981). The  
  
                                                 
20 Vrij et al.’s (2008) study included any “thoughts or reasoning” and “cognitive suppositions of 
sensory experiences” in their definition of cognitive operations. 
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cue is further limited to the use of verbs, which simplifies identification and makes it easier to 
tag manually.  
 
In addition to being a potential indicator of imagined memory, Cognitive Verbs are also 
useful as an indicator of alternative information. If deceivers are unable to provide truthful 
information, which compromises their position, they cooperate by volunteering subjective 
information, which is difficult to confirm. Thus, deceivers appear helpful by explaining what 
they thought or how things seemed to them, which also serves to justify their behaviour e.g. I 
thought the sight of my pistol would stop these guys … The guy seemed like he knew what 
he was doing. 
 
On the basis that Cognitive Verbs are indicative of memory originating from imagination and 
serves as a means of providing alternative subjective information, this study hypothesises 
that their use is positively correlated with deception. 
 
Hypothesis 7 - The use of Cognitive Verbs is positively correlated with deception. Deceivers 
provide more subjective information than truth tellers, and use more words identifying 
thought processes which reflect the internal source of their false memories. 
a) Deceptive Statements will contain a higher rate of Cognitive Verbs than Truthful 
Statements.  
b) In Deceptive Statements, Deceptive Episodes will contain a higher rate of Cognitive 
Verbs than Truthful Episodes. 
 
A Cognitive Verb is defined as a single verb which refers to a cognitive process e.g. recall, 
remember, think, seem etc. 
2.4.7. Combined Cue Set 
Finally, in addition to individual cues, the predictive power of linguistic markers combined in 
cue sets is also considered. 
 
DePaulo et al. (2003) suggest that combining cues could potentially increase their 
effectiveness. Automated text-based deception detection systems have long used large sets 
of collective cues to identify deception. Zhou et al. (2004c) originally used 24 cues in building 
their automated classification model to identify deception in email communication. However,  
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they found that accuracy improved when they pared the cues down to only the 14 most 
important, achieving accuracy rates of 67% using an artificial neural network system21.  
In their investigation into high-stake deception using military personnel witness statements, 
Fuller, Biros & Wilson (2009) experimented with the Zhou/Burgoon cue set, as well as three 
other sets which incorporated linguistic markers drawn from different deception theories 
such as Buller & Burgoon’s (1996) Interpersonal Deception Theory, Information Manipulation 
Theory, Reality Monitoring and Criteria Based Content Analysis. They achieved their highest 
accuracy result of 74% using 12 cues, also with a neural network classification system.  
 
In a later study, Fuller, Biros & Delen (2008) achieved a slight accuracy increase to 76% with 
another combination of eight cues22 using a classification algorithm system. It is interesting 
to note that in their earlier study23, Fuller, Biros & Wilson (2009) concluded that 15 variables 
had not been important in any of their four cue set studies, including average sentence 
length, passive verbs and exclusive terms, the same cues which proved successful in their 
later study. 
 
Such studies are limited by the use of cues that can be objectively identified and analysed 
independent of context. The studies are promising to the extent that they use cues such as 
imagery (words that provide a clear mental picture) and verb quantity, which have not 
previously been explored in deception detection. However, it appears from the above that 
the selection of linguistic cues is dependent on the type of classification tool that is used to 
analyse them. Zhou et al. (2004c) point out that cues identified as important using a 
statistical approach might not be suitable for studies using automated analysis requiring pre-
training or vice versa, as there are substantial differences between the linear models 
involved in discriminant analysis and the non-linear models in neural networks.   
 
Hypothesis 8 - The presence of combined cues (MoDs set) is more strongly indicative of 
deception than individual cues. 
  
                                                 
21 An artificial neural network is a computational programme designed to replicate biological 
processing systems. It consists of a multi-layer network of units which processes information by taking 
information from a top input layer, subjecting it to analysis based on pre-programmed weighted 
decisions, and combining the results into a single value passed on to the output layer.  
22 The cue set consisted of bilogarithmic type-token ratio, imagery, average sentence length, passive 
verbs, First Person Singular Pronouns, First Person Plural Pronouns, exclusive terms, and lexical 
diversity. 
23 Fuller et al. (2008) is a later study to that reported in Fuller et al. 2009. 
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The MoDs set consists of any number of features defined as a Vague Pronoun Reference, 
Verb String, Negation and Cognitive Verbs, analysed collectively.  
 
a) Deceptive Statements will contain a higher rate of MoDs than Truthful Statements.  
b) In Deceptive Statements, Deceptive Episodes will contain a higher rate of MoDs than 
Truthful Episodes. 
   
2.5. Automatic vs. Manual Classification of Cues 
Over the past decade, there has been increasing use of automatic detection technology in 
the study of deception in written text, particularly to analyse text-based online messages. 
Using data mining techniques based on psychosocial dictionaries (e.g. DICTION and LIWC) 
inputted with preclassified vocabularies, this technology is able to label and count words and 
analyse the overall tone of thousands of email messages and blogs, making it attractive to 
intelligence and national security agencies.  
 
However, there are challenges associated with this system. These preclassified vocabularies 
are highly sample specific, and satisfactory results needed to create reliable baselines 
depend on training the software to semantically analyse the texts relevant to its particular 
context (Larcker & Zakolyukina, 2010). Furthermore, automated word identification is highly 
objective as the dictionaries cannot analyse context. They do not distinguish between words 
spelled in the same way but having different meanings, or whose meanings change because 
of their context or grouping with other words. Therefore, meta data, where meaning that 
depends on the semantic network in which words are located, is lost is the analysis. 
 
Another analytical methodology involves manually hand counting the presence of particular 
words previously identified by analysts. While this is more labour intensive than using 
automated classification, it enables analysts to identify linguistic dimensions and word 
constructs relevant to the study and determine whether words in their contexts are labelled 
correctly. A significant advantage of this approach over automatic classification is that 
subjectively identifying and tagging cues results in more powerful discrimination between 
truth and deception (DePaulo et al. 2003).  
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2.6. The Data  
The research material in this study consisted of 40 written witness statements containing 
narratives voluntarily produced by individuals involved in serious crime (such as abduction, 
sexual assault, arson, burglary, child abuse, harassment and homicide) and provided to law-
enforcement agents.  
 
As this study required that the individuals making the report personally write the statements, 
the statements used were sourced from the United States. In the United Kingdom, it is 
standard practice that police officers write statements together with witnesses. This results in 
contamination of statements with the linguistic style of the interviewing police officers as they 
may rephrase the information given to them. Police intervention also contaminates the 
statement content, with requests for clarification as well as additional information that 
witnesses may not consider important enough to include. Witness statements are therefore a 
combination of witness and police input rather than witnesses’ own production. In the US 
Statements used in this study, although police involvement in their production is kept to a 
minimum, ‘police-speak’ is noticeable in some of them, probably influenced by television 
programmes.  
 
Sociolinguistic information regarding the authors is minimal. However, in the context of this 
study, this is not considered problematic. While it is accepted that people can behave 
linguistically differently with respect to individual variables of age, gender, ethnic group and 
class, this analysis seeks to identify valid linguistic generalisations regarding texts (in the 
American English written witness statement genre) that have different communication 
purposes -- to lie or tell the truth.  
 
Halliday (1973) views language as having a clear communicative construct in a situational 
context -- the authors’ goals at the time of communication influence linguistic choice. Swales 
(1990) uses such communicative purpose to define genre, arguing that discourse 
communities share common standards of communication, to the point that texts with specific 
communication goals are similarly schematically structured and unfold in a particular way. 
Swales also argues that there are two types of communicative purpose -- the overt intention 
which is characteristic of the genre, and the covert intention, which exists in the genre but 
may not be typical of it24.  The author’s goal and the context in which the communication is  
  
                                                 
24 Swales (1990) uses media broadcasts as an example, with the overt intention of the genre typically 
being to keep the public informed, while the covert intention may be manipulating the information so 
as to produce a particular slant. 
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delivered exert a strong influence on the construction of the communication, and it is 
differences in the linguistic construction of deceptive and truthful witness statements that this 
study seeks to identify. 
 
While this study does not have a sociolinguistic approach, consideration must be given to 
factors such as gender and age of the authors which could affect results, particularly with 
regards to number of words, First Person Singular Pronouns, Negation, and Cognitive 
Verbs. As with deception studies, gender study findings on language differences are 
contradictory. Some report that females are wordier25 (in writing -- Mulac & Lundell, 1994; 
Bell, McCarthy & McNamara, 2006; in speaking -- Poole, 1979; Mulac & Lundell, 1986, 
Mulac, Weimann, Widenmann & Gibson, 1988), while others report that males use more 
words (in speaking – Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson & Keating, 1988; Mulac, Seibold & 
Farris, 200026). At least one study reports that males use more Negation (Mulac, Seibold & 
Farris, 2000) while others report that females do (Mulac, Lundell & Bradac, 1986; Schler, 
Koppel, Argomon & Pennebaker, 2005; Newman, Groom, Handelmann & Pennebaker, 
2008).  
 
Studies are generally consistent in reporting that females use more cognitive verbs -- as 
hedges (Lakoff, 1973; Mulac & Lundell, 1994; Poole, 1979)  and as indicators of 
psychological processes (Newman et al. 200827) -- and more First Person Singular 
Pronouns (Mehl & Pennebaker, 2003; Argomon, Koppel, Fine & Shimon, 2003; Newman et 
al. 2008); although Bell, McCarthy & McNamara (2006) find the opposite, and  Mulac & 
Lundell (1994) and Mulac, Studley & Blau (1990) report that males make more ‘I’ references. 
Age also plays a role in language. Research into the influence of age on linguistic style in 
blogs finds that teenagers use more pronouns and Negation than their counterparts in their 
20s and 30s, but are less verbose than them (Schler et al. 2005).  
 
It must be borne in mind that gender-related differences are gender tendencies, not sex-
related; not all men and women are masculine and feminine respectively (Cheng, 
Chandramouli & Subbalakshmi, 2011). Furthermore, similar linguistic differences can arise 
from multiple variables; for example, with age, the language of males and females becomes 
increasingly associated with ‘male’ language, while pronoun use of males in their teens is 
comparable with that of older (30s+) females (Schler et al. 2005). Such sociolinguistic   
                                                 
25 Using mean sentence length as a measurement. 
26 Men used more words overall but women used longer sentences. 
27 Newman et al. suggest that hedging is an indicator of psychological processing and politeness 
rather than uncertainty. 
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factors are not expected to significantly impact this study given the author mix of gender, 
age, and social status, and that language variation on an individual basis are small (Newman 
et al. 2008). Context plays a significant part in determining which linguistic strategies males 
and females may adopt and so which features will be more apparent (Bell, McCarthy & 
McNamara, 2006); it is therefore expected that such linguistic strategies will be equally 
affected by the authors’ intentions whether lie or tell the truth.  
 
Thus, this study takes a broad generalist approach in examining how deception affects the 
textual behaviour of American English-speaking witness statement writers, irrespective of 
linguistic variation as a result of sociolinguistic factors. In short, the intention is to let the data 
decide which linguistic differences between truthful and deceptive statements are the most 
meaningful. 
 
The 40 witness statements are divided into Groups 1 and 2, which were collected several 
years apart. Group 1 consists of 15 test Statements to be analysed post hoc, where the truth 
or falsity of the statements are known, and from which cues distinguishing the Truthful from 
Deceptive Statements are to be extracted. Group 2 consists of 25 Statements to be 
analysed a priori in a double blind study using cues extracted from Group 1 as predictors of 
truthfulness or deception.   
 
Group 1 consists of 10 Deceptive Statements (numbered 1-10) and 5 Truthful Statements 
(numbered 11-15). The uneven numbers were due to difficulties in obtaining Statements at 
the first stage of the study which were known to be completely truthful. Ensuring that these 
Statements are indeed completely truthful was important as truthful language provides the 
baseline against which deceptive cues are identified. The truthfulness of statements were 
established through law-enforcement investigation, the evidence of other witnesses, or the 
authors’ own admissions of guilt with supporting evidence; the deceptiveness of Statements 
were established through law-enforcement investigations, the evidence of other witnesses, 
or by court decisions on the basis of witness and/or forensic evidence.  
 
The Statements range in length from 75 words to 884 words. The Statements’ authors are 
US native-English speakers from diverse sociolinguistic backgrounds, ranging in age from 
late teens to mid-50s. They narrate events which they experienced either as an onlooker or 
were actively involved in the event. All individuals voluntarily wrote their own Statements 
between a few hours and a few days of the events occurring in response to requests to ‘write 
what happened’.   
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
72 
 
Statement no. Sociolinguistic Information 
1 White male, 20s 
2 White female, 36 yrs old 
3 White male, 40 yrs old 
4 White female, 17 yrs old 
5 Female, age unknown, nurse 
6 White male, 53 yrs old, taxi driver 
7 White male, 37 yrs old, lawyer 
8 Male, age unknown, security guard 
9 White female, 25 yrs old 
10 White male, 47 yrs old, linguistics  professor 
11 White male, 28 yrs old 
12 White female, 34 yrs old 
13 Black male, 19 yrs old 
14 Black male, 20s 
15 Black male, 23 yrs old 
 
The Group 2 Statements comprising the double blind study consist of 25 Statements 
(numbered 16 to 40) provided under the same conditions and written by US native-English 
speakers, ranging in length from 111 words to 3,495 words. No information was provided 
regarding the authors other than their gender (12 males and 13 females). Background 
information regarding the texts were sent in individual emails directly to one of the study 
supervisors; these emails remained unopened until all analysis conducted on the Statements 
were completed and the study written up to the unblinding stage, at which time the emails 
were forwarded for unblinding. 
 
Most of the Statements were collected as scanned copies of the original written witness 
statements, which were then transcribed into electronic format. Where the handwriting 
rendered transcription difficult, the transcribed Statements were emailed to the law 
enforcement agency who supplied them to verify that they accurately reflected what was 
written in the original Statement.  
 
2.7. Ethical Consideration 
A number of social and ethical issues were carefully considered in the collection of these 
Statements given the sensitivity of the information they contain. The Statements were 
provided by USA based law enforcement sources. To protect the privacy of the Statements’  
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authors, it was agreed that access to the Statements would be strictly controlled and 
everything possible has been done to maintain confidentiality. 
 
To protect the identities of the authors and their families, the Statements have been 
anonymised, with all dates and geographic and personal names altered so as to be 
unrecognisable, particularly when excerpts are used as examples in the thesis. The 
anonymised Statements are only available to the research supervisors and thesis examiners 
and are not bound together with the main thesis. The original scanned electronic documents 
are retained on a CD disk and no copies electronic exist outside of that disk. Any hard 
copies are of the anonymised versions, and these are stored under secure conditions 
together with the CD. Confidentiality and anonymity conditions make it inappropriate to verify 
the information contained in the Statements with their authors, therefore this has not been 
done. In three Statements belonging to the Known Group (1), information regarding the 
cases is available on the internet, and some verification has been undertaken in this manner. 
2.8. Episode Analysis 
In addition to examining linguistic cues in Truthful and Deceptive Statements, the placement 
and behaviour of cues at the sub-statement episode level and cue progression through the 
different episodes contained within individual Statements were also investigated.   
 
This is the first study to conduct deception analysis of this kind and it will change the way 
monologue narratives are analysed in future. This analysis of statement episodes is much 
more informative than whole statement analysis as it allows greater insight into the way 
deception cues are introduced and how they are used throughout the statements. Episode 
analysis allows for the sequencing of cue behaviour and identifying fluctuations in their use 
which provide insight into how deceivers manage their deception. 
 
The only previous research which examined deceptive language at the sub-statement level 
is that of Adams & Jarvis (2006) who subdivided their statements into three portions -- the 
incident central to the statement, and the events that occurred before and after it -- and 
measured differences in cues between the partitions. They argue (based on statement 
analysis techniques such as SCAN) that unbalanced narratives which lack one or more of 
these portions are indicative of deception, citing Johnson et al.’s (1988) finding that 
memories of actually experienced events tend to be associated with supporting memories 
preceding and following the remembered event. However, DePaulo et al. (2003) contradict 
this, reporting that deceivers refer to events peripheral to the central event more often than 
truth tellers.  
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In any case, the weakness of this partition method is that analysts decide at what point the 
different partitions begin and end. Furthermore, if a statement does not contain a central 
event, then there can be no partition (Adams & Jarvis, 2006). Subdividing a narrative into 
episodes, on the other hand, is possible whether the statement contains a central event or 
not. Additionally, it is the author who creates episodes and signposts where one episode 
begins and another ends; it is not left up to the discretion of the analyst.  
 
For the purpose of this study, an episode is a discourse unit which forms part of a 
progression of similar units in a narrative, the boundary of each episode being defined by a 
marked sentence structure signalling the opening of a new unit (and the closure of the old). 
The narratives contained in the Statements consist of a progression of episodes, each 
episode being created by the Statements’ authors through the use of linguistic mechanisms 
which signal the start of a new thematic bundle and, therefore, the end of the previous 
bundle.  
 
Marked sentence structures are defined as those sentences which have “an initial adjunct, 
subordinate clause or phrase, or prepositional phrase with an adverbial function” (McEwen & 
Prideaux, 1997, p. 56). Existential and presentative sentences, which contain clauses 
beginning with phrases such as there was and that was when, are also treated as marked 
(McEwen & Prideaux, 1997) e.g., That is when I called the police about everything. The use 
of the adjunct then in a clause initial position is also treated as the start of a new episode, 
although it belongs to a lower order of importance. Then is treated in this manner as it 
serves to signal the temporal order of lesser events within a larger episode.  
 
The use of marked sentence structures to identify episodic boundaries is illustrated below on 
a written witness statement28 not included in the study. This statement, originally written as a 
single paragraph over five pages, has been edited for length.  
  
                                                 
28 Used with the permission of Long Island Wins http://longislandwins.com/. The full statement is 
available at 
http://www.longislandwins.com/index.php/blog/post/jeffrey_conroys_written_statement_to_police_his_
sketch_of_the_crime_scene_a/  (accessed 05 July 2012).  
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On Saturday, November 8, 2008 my friend Jose Pacheco and I went to a girl named 
Alyssa’s house at Atlantic Point to have dinner. I got the feeling her mom did not like me so 
Jose and I left. I called my Dad and he picked us up at Stop N Shop which is near Ultimate 
Fitness Gym. We had met up with Chris Overton, a kid I just met on Saturday. My dad drove 
all three of us back to my house, we got something to eat, I put on my Raider basketball 
sweat shirt and then the three of us walked to Medford train station. Once we got to the train 
station, we met with a larger group of friends, about fifteen in total and we were drinking 
beer. I had three beers and at one point I was play wrestling with a girl named Felicia who 
goes to school with me. We hung out at the Medford train station for about one and a half 
hours and then we all decided to go to Southaven Park. We drove in two cars. I was in 
Jordan Dasch’s S.U.V. with about ten people. I was with Jordan, Jose, Chris, Anthony 
Hartford, Kevin Shea, Nick Hausch and three girls, Felicia, Nicole and Michelle Cassidy. We 
all attend Patchogue-Medford High School. We were not at the park very long, maybe a half 
hour, when Anthony Hartford said, “Let’s fuck up some Mexicans.” The girls didn’t want any 
part of it Michelle said “No Chill,” meaning no not to do it (fuck up some Mexicans). The rest 
of us (all the boys) were in agreement to do it. The girls caught a ride with Jason who owns a 
dark blue car. We drove to Patchogue Village, knowing that’s where Spanish people hang 
out. We parked on a side street, near Main Street and go [sic] out and walked as a group. 
Everyone was pretty amped up and it was clear what we were going to do. We were only 
walking around for about ten [LINE CUT OFF] near the train station. They were older then us 
and as we walked up to them Anthony Hartford and Kevin Shea who we call “Kuvan” called 
the two guys “Beaners” and “Mexicans.” Chris and I were being quiet and I do not recall 
Jordan saying anything, but everyone else said shit like “Beaner” and “Fucking Mexicans.” 
At one point Kuvan who was talking the most shit said “I got a gun, give me your fucking 
money.” He had his right hand stuffed into his sweatshirt front pocket as if he was hiding a 
gun. At first Anthony Hartford and Kevin Shea were head up on them one on one, the rest of 
us walked up closer, knowing we were going to fight. One of the Spanish guys whistled 
towards a house, as if to call out to his people. One of the Spanish guys took his shirt off, 
removed his belt and started swinging it at us. Kuvan thought he had a nun-chuck, but I 
realized it was a belt. Kuvan yelled out surround them. I’m not sure where Jordan was, but 
the rest of us tried to surround the Spanish guy, but couldn’t because he was swinging the 
belt trying to keep us away. The other Spanish guy was there and was also holding his belt. 
I had already taken out my knife. Before the guy had even took his belt off Kuvan and 
Anthony Hartford had already snuffed him in the face and he was leaking blood from his 
nose pretty bad. Jose Pacheco was also up on the guy, body to [LINE CUT OFF] guy called 
him a nigger. The Spanish guy broke loose from them, and that’s when he took his belt off to 
keep us away. At one point I got hit on the head with the belt. The Spanish guy continued to 
swing his belt, and when we didn’t back down he swung the belt at Nicky and I went towards 
him with my knife in my right hand extended outward. His back was to me and as I ran 
towards him he turned to face me. He was about four or five feet from me, I continued to run 
towards him and stabbed him once in either his shoulder or chest. The physical altercation 
ended when I stabbed the guy. I said to Nicky “Oh shit I am fucked [I] stabbed him” as I 
showed him the blood on my knife.  
 
Marked structures identifying the beginning of new episodes (and therefore the closure of 
the previous episode) are highlighted in yellow, identifying 13 episodes introduced by 
adjuncts, subordinate clauses and presentative sentences as follows: 
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• Episode 1 - On Saturday, November 8, 2008  
• Episode 2 - then (sub-episode) 
• Episode 3 - Once we got to the train station 
• Episode 4 - at one point 
• Episode 5 - then (sub-episode) 
• Episode 6 - as we walked up to them 
• Episode 7 - At one point 
• Episode 8 - At first 
• Episode 9 - Before the guy had even took his belt off 
• Episode 10 - that’s when (presentative sentence) 
• Episode 11 - At one point 
• Episode 12 - when we didn’t back down 
• Episode 13 - as I ran towards him 
 
The witness statements used in this study were deconstructed similarly into their constituent 
episodes. Truthful Statements had all their episodes labelled as Truthful, while Deceptive 
Statements had their episodes labelled either Truthful or Deceptive based on the available 
evidence. Any information identified as deceptive in a single episode resulted in the entire 
episode being labelled Deceptive. Where the truth or falsity of information contained in an 
episode was unknown or could not be confirmed, the episode was labelled Truthful. This 
resulted in a truth bias being applied to the labelling of episodes. This application is not 
expected to impact on identifying deception cues as they are not expected to occur only 
during deception (and not anywhere else). Had this study been looking for veracity cues, 
creating a truth-bias would have had a material effect on analysis. 
 
There are three reasons for studying individual episodes. First, the small sample size of 
Statements (15 Statements for Group 1 test texts and 25 Statements for the Group 2 double 
blind study) can lead to problems with overfitting in statistical analysis. Overfitting occurs 
where a sample size is too small in relation to the number of variables (the cues) used to 
analyse it. This leads to over optimistic results because cues used in the analysis to predict 
deception reflect ambient noise instead of the underlying signals and the real relationship 
between cues and the Statements’ category. An easy solution to this problem would be to 
increase the sample size. However, given the difficulty in sourcing witness statements, this 
was not possible. Consequently, it was decided to treat every episode in individual 
statements as a separate portion in its own right and explore how cues are distributed at this 
level.   
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The second reason for studying individual episodes is to compare linguistic differences 
between the truthful and deceptive portions of the same Statement. In previous research, 
deceptive statements have been compared with other statements written by the same and/or 
different authors. Same-author comparison has been undertaken with CMC messaging and 
blogs, where the progression of deception is analysed by comparing responses by the same 
author (e.g. Zhou et al. 2004a). However, comparisons were made between a progression of 
same-author communication that were either consistently truthful or consistently deceptive, 
and not between same-author mixed truthful and deceptive communication. Episode 
analysis is a solution to the problem of treating deceptive statements as entirely deceptive, 
when they may be a mix of true and false information. This is particularly relevant when a 
statement may be largely true, with only a small part of it being deceptive. 
 
The third reason for examining episodes is to explore the progression of deception within a 
Statement. While whole communication analysis may not always exhibit indicators of 
deception, a sequence of continuous communication bundles on the same theme by the 
same author may highlight changes in language indicative of deception. It also enables 
analysis of the information management strategy adopted by the deceiver. Deceivers do not 
all lie in the same way. Some lie by leaving information out, others by adding false 
information, and yet others by changing small details; the language of deception may be 
vague, reticent, verbose, negative, subjective, or a combination of two or more. Episode 
analysis allows the mapping of linguistic strategy in a statement as the deception unfolds. 
 
Deception is not a single occurrence but a progression of events that happens over time 
(White & Burgoon, 2001). In their study into deception in email exchanges, Zhou, Burgoon & 
Twitchell (2003) describe how deceptive cues change over the course of the deception. 
Beginning with a relatively high number of cues at the starting phase of the deceptive 
communication, the cues increase further in the middle phase, and then end with hardly any 
cues at all in the final phase. Negative effect, for example, is significantly high during the first 
phase of the communication but then drops off in the second phase, while the use of self-
references, non-significant in phase 1, rises in phase 2.  
 
Zhou et al. are uncertain whether the change in cues occurs because the emails in their 
study are written on different days, or because they represent different stages of the 
deception. However, they also hypothesise that deceivers’ language may change as they 
adapt to the responses of their communication partners.  
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Burgoon & Qin (2006) also believe that cues change over time in the course of interactive 
deception. In their low stakes deception study in which interviewees alternate between 
truthful and deceptive responses (transcribed videotape), verbal deception cues show 
substantial variation across time and sequence of the responses. Deceptive profiles were 
very different in the first half of the interview to that in the second half, with deceivers 
becoming longer, simpler, less immediate, and more specific. 
 
Although written witness statements are textual monologues and do not have the interactive 
properties found in email messaging and interviewing, an analysis of successive episodes 
may reveal features of the linguistic development of deception not noticeable when analysed 
on a whole statement level.  
 
This within-statement categorisation of episodes provides a good opportunity to investigate 
number-of-words as a linguistic cue, as it allows for comparison between Truthful and 
Deceptive episodes. The association between number-of-words and deception appears 
uncertain as some studies suggest that deception is positively correlated with shorter 
responses (DePaulo et al. 2003; Newman et al. 2003; Burgoon et al. 2003), while others 
report that deceivers provide longer responses (Anolli & Ciceri, 1997; Anolli, Balconi & 
Ciceri, 2002; Zhou et al. 2004b; Hancock et al. 2005; Zhou & Zhang, 2007).  
 
Apart from the Anolli et al. group (who study face-to-face conversation), there appears to be 
a consensus among researchers into CMC messaging that deceivers generally provide 
longer responses when lying in writing in virtual conversations.29  
 
This study tests the association between number-of-words and deception with the 
hypothesis that Deceptive Statements will contain longer clauses than Truthful Statements. 
How this relates to the truthful and deceptive portions of Deceptive Statements is also the 
subject of investigation in this study, with the hypothesis put forward that deceivers will use 
more words in Deceptive episodes than in Truthful ones.  
  
                                                 
29 Burgoon et al. (2003) suggest that in CMC communication, time to prepare a deceptive response 
results in longer communication. 
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2.9. Problems Associated with Analysing the Witness Statements 
A number of issues associated with the analysis of these Statements were recognised early 
on in this study. 
 
2.9.1. Labelling Episodes 
Labelling individual episodes as Truthful or Deceptive is more problematic than identifying 
entire statements. In whole-statement analysis, the text is labelled Deceptive based on lies 
that may occur anywhere in the Statement. At the episode level, establishing baseline truths 
is difficult as investigating agents may not be able to establish correctly the truth or falsity of 
all the information contained in them. This was addressed by labelling all episodes as 
Truthful where the truth or falsity of the content was unknown. Consequently, the analysis of 
episodes has a truth bias. 
2.9.2. Temporal Extent of the Narrative 
While most of the Statements contain an account of the day wherein the incident took place, 
several authors extend the narrative to include events of the previous day in order to set the 
scene, or of the day after by way of explaining how they came to report the incident. One 
deceptive author (a statement in the Deceptive Category) chose to include the events of five 
days (Monday to Friday) in his narrative, although the incident occurred only on the 
Thursday. 
 
Covering such a long period can be problematic. Where the information provided in days 
other than the incident date is truthful, it likely to dilute the whole-statement and episode 
level values of the cues described. Consideration was given to editing the text in order to 
analyse only that portion of the narrative surrounding the events of the single day. However, 
the idea was abandoned as this would have meant editing other texts that include additional 
days in the narrative, which was likely to interfere with any information management strategy 
their authors might use, as well as lose indicators of cognitive and emotional arousal 
elsewhere in the text not immediately surrounding the incident. 
2.9.3. Quoted Discourse 
Consideration was also given as whether or not to exclude quoted discourse (with or without 
quotation marks) in the analysis. According to Caldas-Coulthard (1994), any reported 
speech is a form of quotation. Most of the Statements contain some form of quoted 
discourse; one Statement in particular (Statement 14 - belonging to the Truthful Category)  
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consists largely of reported speech which contains a significant number of linguistic features 
likely to affect the cue count of the Statement. 
 
Caldas-Coulthard reports that quoted discourse is provided mainly because of its 
significance for the individual providing the quote. However, given that it is impossible to 
remember verbatim what is said in a conversation, even if a record is made immediately 
after that conversation (Coulthard & Johnson, 2007), no great reliance can be put on the 
accuracy of the memory. Therefore, even though speech may be presented as someone 
else’s words, to a large extent they only represent the ideational meaning of what was said, 
and not the exact words used (Fairclough, 1988, as cited in Caldas-Coulthard, 1994). It 
would therefore prove difficult to differentiate between a third party being quoted correctly, or 
whether authors were conveying their own version of what was said, particularly when the 
use of quotation marks is irregular. For this reason, quoted discourse in any part of the 
narrative is not excluded from analysis. 
2.9.4. Identifying Clause Length 
The choice of the primary unit of analysis is one that deserves careful thought in language 
analysis. Consideration was given to using sentence length as a word quantity measurement 
to investigate differences between Deceptive and Truthful Statements. However, there are 
difficulties with this as the notion of a sentence differs from person to person, and relying on 
standard conventions of sentence demarcation using full stops and capitalisation is 
unsatisfactory. Indeed, authors’ sentence punctuation proficiency in the Statements vary, 
with run on sentences being common, as are long sentences linked together by and. This 
makes it difficult to determine where one sentence ends and the following begins, making 
accurate measurements impossible.  
 
Clause length, rather than sentence length, solves these problems. The boundary between 
clauses is more easily identified than in sentences and does not require reliance on authors’ 
knowledge of punctuation and grammatical construction. Indeed, in natural speech, clauses 
are more so the norm than complete sentences, and at the same time, the clause fits in with 
basic sentence structure, which overcomes problems when analysing reported speech in the 
text. Therefore, clause length is used as the primary unit of analysis. 
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2.10. Classification Approach 
The identification of deception in real life by law enforcement agencies30 has long been 
based on a qualitative approach, where analysts make truth-lie assessments based on their 
interpretation of the information. In other words, each analyst’s judgement is subjective, and 
there is no guarantee that one judgement will be the same as another on the same material. 
This makes it impossible to establish an accurate error rate and create a baseline which 
allows the application of the same conclusions to a general population. 
 
Some methodologies have attempted to standardise approach by providing sets of rules 
intended to make judgements more objective. However, problems remain with their use as 
there is little or no guidance as to which criteria to use, what weighting should be ascribed to 
them if not all the criteria are present, and how many criteria should be present in the 
material before deception is deemed to be identified. 
 
However, there is a place for a qualitative approach to deception detection alongside 
quantitative analysis. In the early stages of analysis, a qualitative approach allows for 
detailed description and subjective interpretation of the data within its context, something 
that the latter-stage counting-and-classification of quantitative analysis misses completely. 
While the conclusions derived from such qualitative analysis cannot be extended to a 
general population, they contribute to the creation of hypotheses which can be tested using 
quantitative/statistical methods.  
 
In this study, hypotheses are put forward for the qualitative analysis and predictions are 
made for the quantitative analysis. Hypotheses for the qualitative analysis are based on the 
findings of previous research into deception and verbal communication which is extended to 
this study into textual deception using written witness statements. This serves to not only 
guide the direction of the qualitative study, but also determine which features may be the 
most productive for quantitative testing. 
 
In other words, in addition to the presence of a particular feature and its percentage in 
relation to the total number of words in the episode and the statement overall, the number of 
clauses in which each feature occurs and its percentage as per the total clause count of 
each episode and statement is also calculated. The resulting values serve as the 
quantitative input for the qualitative and statistical classification analysis that follows. 
  
                                                 
30 Methodologies such as Behavior Analysis Interview (BAI), Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA), 
Polygraph, Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN), Voice Stress Analysis (VSA) etc. 
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The quantitative approach takes the form of statistical analysis with which to test the 
hypotheses. This identifies whether linguistic markers being analysed truly reflect the 
behaviour of deceptive language, or whether their presence in the Statements is merely the 
result of chance. This analysis statistically measures cues previously identified qualitatively 
in the Group 1 Statements and uses them to predict deception a priori in a blind study 
involving the Group 2 Statements. The Group 2 Statements are also analysed qualitatively, 
with predictions of deception made using subjective judgements of the cues, and the results 
of this compared with both the predictions and the actual Statement categories. 
 
Two classification methods are used in the statistical analysis, Discriminant Function 
Analysis and Logistic Regression, depending on how well the underlying data meet their 
analytical requirements. Logistic Regression not only makes less stringent requirements on 
the data than Discriminant Analysis, but it is also able to predict the probability of group 
membership of Statements, as well as asses the contribution value of individual cues in the 
prediction process. All classification algorithms are computed using SPSS15 software.  
 
Cues Hypothesis 
Amount of Words Positively correlated with deception 
First Person Singular Pronouns Negatively correlated with deception 
Third Person Pronouns Positively correlated with deception 
Vague Pronoun Reference Positively correlated with deception 
Verb Strings Positively correlated with deception 
Negation Positively correlated with deception 
Cognitive Verbs Positively correlated with deception 
Combined Cues Positively correlated with deception 
Figure 2: Summary of Cues and Hypotheses 
 
2.11. Conclusion 
In conclusion, an extensive review of previous research covering deception in a variety of 
media reveals that deception cues do not perform as consistently as research papers appear 
to suggest. While Vrij (2008) suggests that general trends exist for Negation, self-references, 
and generalising, consistent with theory as to how deceivers might behave, most findings 
arise out of research conducted using poor models of deception involving low stakes lying in 
laboratory environments. Given the lack of real world stimuli normally found in high stakes 
lying, this raises questions as to how valid cues identified so far really are. 
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This study not only addresses these criticisms, but moves textual deception analysis forward 
by analysing real world high stakes lying in the form of written witness statements.  
 
Furthermore, this study is innovative in that it proposes new approaches for: 
1. analysing Statements at the episode level (in addition to the Statement as a whole); 
2. viewing deception in narratives as a progression of episodes; 
3. mapping the linguistic strategies deceivers adopt to tell their deceptive narratives; 
4. comparing truthful and deceptive language within the same narrative. 
 
In addition, this study is unique in that it tests the effectiveness of cues and linguistic 
strategies identified in a test set of Statements to predict deception a priori in a second set of 
Statements in a double blind study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3. Data Set Description 
 
This study takes a contextualist stance in its qualitative analysis of witness statements. It 
involves describing the linguistic markers identified and attempts to explain and interpret the 
processes ongoing which suggest why a particular statement is identified as deceptive. The 
content of Group 1 and 2 Statements are first assessed for the cues previously identified, 
and then analysed for their frequency and density on a word and clause level for each 
Statement and episode within that Statement. Statement nos. 1-10 are Known Deceptive 
Statements, and Statement nos. 11-15 are Known Truthful Statements. Tables provide a 
summary of the data sets for each Statement. 
 
3.1. Frequency and Density of Cues – Known (Group 1) Statements  
3.1.1. Word, Clause and Episodes 
The Group 1 Statements consist of 15 narratives, varying in length between 75 words 
(Statement no. 12) and 884 words (Statement no. 6). The number of episodes within 
Statements vary between 1 (Statement no. 11 – the 2nd shortest statement) and 19 episodes 
(Statement no. 10 – the 5th longest statement). There does not appear to be any relationship 
between Statement length and the number of episodes contained in the narrative.  
 
Statement 
No. Words Clauses 
Average 
clause length Episodes 
1 598 105 5.7 8 
2 217 47 5.1 10 
3 255 39 6.8 12 
4 194 29 7.4 5 
5 252 44 6.6 8 
6 884 145 6.4 10 
7 248 34 7.2 5 
8 212 36 5.5 4 
9 614 95 7.5 13 
10 519 78 7.0 19 
11 83 18 4.6 1 
12 75 15 5.1 2 
13 220 44 5.1 5 
14 822 174 4.7 6 
15 353 63 5.6 2 
Figure 3: Known Statements - Word and Clause Measurements 
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The number of clauses in individual Statements range from 15 clauses (Statement no. 12 – 
the shortest Statement) to 174 clauses (Statement no. 14 – the 2nd longest Statement).  
The average clause length (number of words in a clause) for each Statement is calculated 
using the clause-length average of its episodes, and not the overall whole-statement 
average. This not only provides a more accurate picture of clause length, it also allows a 
view as to how it changes from episode to episode as the narrative progresses within the 
Statement. Average clause lengths range from 4.6 words per clause (Statement no. 11 – the 
2nd shortest Statement) to 7.5 words per clause (Statement no. 9 – the 3rd longest 
Statement). There does not appear to be any relationship between statement length and 
clause length. 
3.1.2. First Person Singular Pronouns  
All Statements use First Person Singular Pronouns, ranging from a minimum of 7 pronouns 
(Statement no. 12) to a maximum of 88 (Statement no. 6). Statement nos. 8 and 14 contain 
the lowest pronoun densities, with 3.3% and 5.8% of total word count respectively, while 
Statement nos. 1 and 2) have the highest pronoun count with 11% and 12.4% respectively.  
 
Statement 
No. Words 
First Person  
Singular 
Pronouns 
Word 
% I 
Word 
% Me 
Word 
% My 
Word 
% 
1 598 66 11.0 32 5.4 19 3.2 15 2.5 
2 217 27 12.4 13 6.0 4 1.8 10 4.6 
3 255 23 9.0 11 4.3 3 1.2 8 3.1 
4 194 14 7.2 10 5.2 1 0.5 3 1.5 
5 252 20 7.9 14 5.6 1 0.4 5 2.0 
6 884 88 10.0 39 4.4 24 2.7 25 2.7 
7 248 21 8.5 14 5.6 2 0.8 5 2.0 
8 212 7 3.3 3 0.9 2 1.4 1 0.5 
9 614 55 9.0 26 4.2 6 0.9 23 3.7 
10 519 40 7.7 30 5.8 0 0 10 1.9 
11 83 9 10.8 7 8.4 1 1.2 1 1.2 
12 75 7 9.3 5 6.7 0 0 2 2.7 
13 220 19 8.6 11 5.0 6 2.7 2 0.9 
14 822 48 5.8 41 5.0 4 0.5 3 0.4 
15 353 25 7.1 21 5.9 2 0.6 2 0.6 
Figure 4: Known Statements - First Person Singular Pronouns (Word) Measurements 
 
All Statements use the pronoun I, ranging from a minimum of 3 (Statement no. 8) to a 
maximum of 41 (Statement no. 14). Statement nos. 8 and 9 have the lowest I density, with 
0.9% and 4.2% of total word count, while Statement nos. 11 and 12 have the highest with 
8.4% and 6.7% respectively.  
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Thirteen Statements (87%) use the pronoun Me, ranging from a minimum of 1 (Statement 
nos. 4, 5 and 11) to a maximum of 24 (Statement no. 6); two Statements (nos. 10 and 12) do 
not use Me at all. Statement no. 5 has the lowest density with 0.4%, followed by Statement 
nos. 4 and 14 with 0.5%, while Statement nos. 1 and 13 have the highest with 3.2% and 
2.7% of total word count.  
 
All the Statements use My, ranging from a minimum of 1 (Statement nos. 8 and 11) to a 
maximum of 23 (Statement no. 9). Statement nos. 8 and 14 have the lowest densities, with 
0.5%, and 0.4%, while Statement nos. 2 and 9 have the highest with 4.6% and 3.7% of total 
word count respectively.  
 
Statement 
No. Clauses 
First Person 
Singular 
Pronoun 
Clause 
% I 
Clause 
% Me 
Clause 
% My 
Clause 
% 
1 105 62 59.0 32 30.5 18 17.1 15 14.3 
2 47 25 53.2 13 27.7 4 8.5 9 19.1 
3 40 15 38.5 11 28.2 3 7.7 6 15.4 
4 29 13 44.8 10 34.5 1 3.4 3 10.3 
5 43 17 39.5 14 32.6 1 2.3 4 9.3 
6 145 78 53.8 39 26.9 24 16.6 22 15.2 
7 34 19 55.9 14 41.2 2 5.9 5 14.7 
8 36 6 16.7 3 8.3 2 5.6 1 8.3 
9 95 48 50.5 26 27.4 6 6.3 23 24.2 
10 78 36 46.2 30 38.5 0 0 10 12.8 
11 18 8 44.4 7 38.9 1 5.6 1 5.6 
12 15 7 46.7 5 33.3 0 0 2 13.3 
13 44 18 40.9 11 25.0 6 13.6 2 4.5 
14 174 48 27.6 41 23.6 4 2.3 3 1.7 
15 63 25 39.7 21 33.3 2 3.2 2 3.2 
Figure 5: Known Statements - First Person Singular Pronouns (Clause) Measurements 
 
With regards to clause measurements, Statement nos. 8 and 14 have the lowest percentage 
of clauses containing First Person Singular Pronouns, with 16.7% and 27.6% respectively, 
while Statement nos. 1 and 7 contain the highest with 59% and 55.9%.  
  
The lowest use of I clauses are found in Statement nos. 8 and 14, with 8.3% and 23.6%,  
while Statement nos. 7 and 11 contain the highest, with 41.2% and 38.9% respectively. As 
for Me clauses, Statement nos. 5 and 14 contain the lowest percentage, with 2.3% each, 
while Statement nos. 1 and 6 contain the highest, with 17.1% and 16.6%. Finally, My 
clauses are used the least in Statement nos. 14 and 15, with 1.7% and 3.2% respectively, 
while Statement nos. 2 and 9 contain the highest percentage, with 19.1% and 24.2%. 
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3.1.3. Third Person Pronouns 
Apart from Statement no. 7, all Statements use Third Person Pronouns, from a minimum of 3 
(Statement no. 11) to a maximum of 102 (Statement no. 14). Statement nos. 5 and 10 
contain the lowest percentage of Third Person Pronouns, with 0.8% and 1.5% of total word 
count. The highest percentage of pronouns is found in Statement nos. 14 and 2, with 12.4% 
and 10.6% of word count respectively. 
 
Statement 
No. Words 
Third Person  
Pronouns 
Word 
% Clauses 
Third Person  
Pronouns 
Clause 
% 
1 598 23 3.8 105 22 21.0 
2 217 24 10.6 47 23 48.9 
3 255 11 4.3 40 10 25.6 
4 194 10 5.2 29 10 34.5 
5 252 2 0.8 43 2 4.7 
6 884 45 5.1 145 41 28.3 
7 248 0 0 34 0 0 
8 212 22 10.4 36 18 50.0 
9 614 12 2.0 95 12 12.6 
10 519 8 1.5 78 8 10.3 
11 83 3 3.6 18 3 16.7 
12 75 6 8.0 15 5 33.3 
13 220 18 8.2 44 16 36.4 
14 822 102 12.4 174 92 52.9 
15 353 12 3.4 63 12 19.0 
Figure 6: Known Statements - Third Person Pronouns Measurements 
 
Statement nos. 5 and 10 have the lowest usage of Third Person Pronoun clauses, with 4.7% 
and 10.3% of total clause count; Statement nos. 8 and 14 have the highest with 50% and 
52.9% of clauses. 
3.1.4. Vague Pronoun References  
Vague Pronoun References are found in only ten Statements, and usage is generally low in 
comparison to the other linguistic cues measured.  
 
Seven Statements use Vague Pronoun References at less than 1% of total word count, with 
Statement no. 9 being the lowest at 0.2%. Only three Statements have usage equivalent to 
1% of total word count or higher, with Statement no. 3 having the highest at 2%.  
 
The lowest percentage of clauses containing Vague Pronoun References are found in 
Statement nos. 9 and 14, with 1.1% of total clause count each, while the highest use is in 
Statement nos. 1 and 3, with 9.5% and 12.8% respectively.   
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Statement 
No. Words 
Vague Pronoun 
References 
Word 
% Clauses 
Vague Pronoun 
References 
Clause 
% 
1 598 10 1.7 105 10 9.5 
2 217 1 0.5 47 1 2.1 
3 255 5 2.0 40 5 12.8 
4 194 2 1.0 29 2 6.9 
5 252 1 0.4 43 1 2.3 
6 884 4 0.5 145 4 2.8 
7 248 1 0.4 34 1 2.9 
8 212 0 0 36 0 0 
9 614 1 0.2 95 1 1.1 
10 519 0 0 78 0 0 
11 83 0 0 18 0 0 
12 75 0 0 15 0 0 
13 220 0 0 44 0 0 
14 822 3 0.4 174 2 1.1 
15 353 1 0.3 63 1 1.6 
Figure 7: Known Statements - Vague Pronoun Reference Measurements 
 
3.1.5. Verb Strings 
By its nature, a Verb String is composed of more than one word. However, for the purpose of 
this measurement, a Verb String is counted as a single occurrence of the cue for the 
purposes of word count, irrespective of the number of words in the string. For example, in 
the clause and trying to grab arms, the three-word verb string trying to grab counts as a 
single cue. Verb Strings do not include auxiliary verbs as the aim is to capture ambiguity of 
action rather than subtleties of time and mood. In those cases where the auxiliary verb have 
is used to mean need (e.g. I had to [needed to] unlock the door), it is treated as a Verb 
String. 
 
Thirteen Statements used Verb Strings in their narratives, from a minimum of 2 (Statement 
no. 3) to a maximum of 12 (Statement no. 6), with 2 Statements (nos. 11 and 12) using none 
at all. Statement nos. 10 and 14 have the lowest use, with 0.4% and 0.7% of total word 
count, while Statement nos. 4 and 13 have the highest percentage of Verb Strings, with 
2.1% and 2.7% respectively. 
 
As regards clause count, Statement nos. 10 and 14 have the lowest percentage, with 2.6% 
and 3.4% respectively, while Statement nos. 4 and 13 have the highest with 13.8% and 
13.6%. 
  
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
89 
 
Statement 
No. Words Verb Strings 
Word 
% Clauses Verb Strings 
Clause 
% 
1 598 10 1.7 105 10 9.5 
2 217 4 1.8 47 4 8.5 
3 255 2 0.8 40 2 5.1 
4 194 4 2.1 29 4 13.8 
5 252 5 2.0 43 5 11.6 
6 884 12 1.4 145 12 8.3 
7 248 3 1.2 34 3 8.6 
8 212 3 1.4 36 3 8.3 
9 614 6 1.0 95 6 6.3 
10 519 2 0.4 78 2 2.6 
11 83 0 0 18 0 0 
12 75 0 0 15 0 0 
13 220 6 2.7 44 6 13.6 
14 822 6 0.7 174 6 3.4 
15 353 4 1.1 63 4 6.3 
Figure 8: Known Statements - Verb String Measurements 
 
3.1.6. Negation 
Eleven Statements use Negation, from a minimum of 1 (Statement no. 4) to a maximum of 
21 (Statement no. 14), while 4 Statements (nos. 3, 11, 12 and 13) do not use any. Four 
Statements have very low usage of less than 1% of total word count, with Statement no. 4 
having the lowest percentage at 0.5%. Statement nos. 8 and 14 have the highest percentage 
of Negation at 2.4% and 2.9% of total word count respectively. 
 
Statement 
No. Words Negation 
Word 
% Clauses Negation 
Clause 
% 
1 598 11 1.8 105 11 10.5 
2 217 2 0.9 47 2 4.3 
3 255 0 0 40 0 0 
4 194 1 0.5 29 1 3.4 
5 252 3 1.2 43 3 7.0 
6 884 10 1.1 145 10 6.9 
7 248 3 1.2 34 3 8.8 
8 212 6 2.8 36 6 16.7 
9 614 8 1.3 95 8 8.4 
10 519 3 0.6 78 3 3.8 
11 83 0 0 18 0 0 
12 75 0 0 15 0 0 
13 220 0 0 44 0 0 
14 822 24 2.9 174 19 10.9 
15 353 3 0.8 63 3 4.8 
Figure 9: Known Statements - Negation Measurements 
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Statement nos. 4 and 10 have the lowest percentage of Negation clauses, with 3.4% and 
3.8%, while Statement nos. 8 and 14 have the highest at 16.7% and 10.9% respectively. 
3.1.7. Cognitive Verbs 
Fourteen Statements contain Cognitive Verbs in their narratives, from a minimum of 1 
(Statement nos. 2, 3, 4, 8, 11 and 12) to a maximum of 14 (Statement no. 6). One Statement 
(no. 13) does not contain any Cognitive Verbs at all. Eight Statements use Cognitive Verbs 
at less than 1% of total word count, the lowest being Statement no. 3, with 0.4%. Statement 
nos. 6 and 9 have the highest percentage with 1.6% and 2.1% respectively.  
 
Statement 
No. Words 
Cognitive 
Verbs 
Word 
% Clauses 
Cognitive 
verbs 
Clause 
% 
1 598 9 1.5 105 9 8.6 
2 217 1 0.5 47 1 2.1 
3 255 1 0.4 40 1 2.6 
4 194 1 0.5 29 1 3.4 
5 252 3 1.2 43 3 7.0 
6 884 14 1.6 145 14 9.7 
7 248 3 1.2 34 3 8.8 
8 212 1 0.5 36 1 2.8 
9 614 13 2.1 95 13 13.7 
10 519 4 0.8 78 4 5.1 
11 83 1 0.5 18 1 5.6 
12 75 1 1.3 15 1 6.7 
13 220 0 0 44 0 0 
14 822 4 0.5 174 4 2.3 
15 353 3 0.8 63 3 4.8 
Figure 10: Known Statements - Cognitive Verb Measurements 
 
As for clauses containing Cognitive Verbs, Statement nos. 2 and 14 have the lowest usage 
of between 2.1% - 5.6% of clauses, while Statement nos. 6 and 9 have the highest at 9.7% 
and 13.7% respectively. 
3.1.8. Combined Cues Set (MoDs) 
The density of combined cues -- Vague Pronoun References, Verb Strings, Negation, and 
Cognitive Verbs, collectively referred to as MoDs (Markers of Deception) -- in the Statements 
is also measured. First Person Singular Pronouns were not included in the cue set as the 
pronouns are hypothesised to be indicators of truthfulness while MoDs are collectively 
associated with deception. Although Third Person Pronouns are also hypothesised to be 
positively correlated with deception, Newman et al. (2003) report that deceivers use them 
less than truth tellers. Given the uncertainty over their association, it was decided to exclude 
them from the cue set. 
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For word count, linguistic features which combine to create a single cue are counted 
according to the number of cues present. For example, the sentence I do not remember 
seeing headlights, which contains a Negation (not), a Cognitive Verb (remember), and a 
Verb String (remember seeing), is tagged three times. On the other hand, for clause count, 
clauses containing cues are tagged only once irrespective of the number of different cues in 
them. For example, the sentence I do not remember seeing headlights is tagged only once 
although it contains three cues. 
 
All Statements contain at least one feature from the MoDs set, ranging from a minimum of 1 
(Statement nos. 11 and 12) to a maximum of 40 (Statement nos. 1 and 6). Statement nos. 
11 and 12 have the lowest use, with 1.2% and 1.3%; Statement nos. 1 and 5 have the 
highest, with 6.7% and 7%. 
 
Statement 
No. Words MoDs 
Word 
% Clauses MoDs 
Clause 
% 
1 598 40 6.7 105 33 31.4 
2 217 8 3.7 47 8 17.0 
3 255 8 3.1 40 6 17.9 
4 194 8 4.1 29 7 24.1 
5 252 12 7.0 43 12 27.9 
6 884 40 4.5 145 34 23.4 
7 248 10 4.0 34 8 23.5 
8 212 10 4.7 36 9 25 
9 614 28 4.6 95 21 22.1 
10 519 9 1.7 78 8 10.3 
11 83 1 1.2 18 1 5.6 
12 75 1 1.3 15 1 6.7 
13 220 6 2.7 44 6 13.6 
14 822 34 4.1 174 31 17.8 
15 353 11 3.1 63 9 14.3 
Figure 11: Known Statements - Combined Cue Set Measurements (MoDs) 
 
In clause count, Statement nos. 11 and 12 have the lowest percentage of clauses that 
contain at least one feature from the MoDs cue set, with 5.6% and 6.7% respectively, while 
Statement nos. 1 and 5 contain the highest number of clauses at 31.4% and 27.9%. 
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3.2. Frequency and Density of Cues – Blinded (Group 2) Statements  
Group 2 consists of 25 Statements whose categories (Truthful or Deceptive) are unknown to 
the analyst and supervisors. Cues and linguistic strategies identified in the previous Group 
are used to predict deception in these Statements in a double blind study, the first time this 
has been undertaken in deception research.  
3.2.1. Word, Clause and Episodes 
The shortest Statement (no. 21) has 111 words in 19 clauses, while the longest (Statement 
no. 34) has 3,495 words in 631 clauses. Average clause length bears no relationship to 
statement length, the shortest average clause length being 4.7 words per clause (Statement 
no. 22), and the longest 7.5 words per clause (Statement no. 25).  
 
Similarly, episode numbers bear little relationship to statement lengths, with the lowest 
number of episodes in a Statement being only 2 (Statement no. 39), and the highest being 
97 episodes (Statement no. 34). 
 
Statement 
No.  Words Clauses 
Average 
clause length Episodes 
16 162 29 6.1 6 
17 420 78 6.1 16 
18 387 73 5.2 9 
19 884 172 6.0 17 
20 881 175 5.1 14 
21 111 19 6.2 6 
22 199 43 4.7 7 
23 1130 200 6.0 28 
24 486 72 7.0 11 
25 1147 163 7.5 14 
26 485 120 4.8 15 
29 208 41 5.2 6 
28 478 94 5.2 12 
29 1570 306 5.5 37 
30 511 104 4.8 7 
31 619 127 5.5 15 
32 566 109 5.5 15 
33 283 53 5.5 10 
34 3495 631 6.0 97 
35 427 81 6.2 10 
36 138 30 4.8 4 
37 492 87 5.8 11 
38 201 38 6.3 3 
39 363 75 4.9 2 
40 175 31 5.8 7 
Figure 12: Blinded Statements - Word and Clause Count 
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3.2.2. First Person Singular Pronouns 
All Statements use First Person Singular Pronouns, from a minimum of 5 (Statement no. 40) 
to a maximum of 288 pronouns (Statement no. 34). Statement no. 40 has the lowest 
pronoun use, with 2.9%, while Statement nos. 26 and 30 have the highest, with 14% and 
13.7% respectively.  
 
All Statements use the pronoun I, from a minimum of 3 (Statement nos. 21 and 40) to a 
maximum of 162 (Statement no. 34). Statement nos. 24 and 25 have the lowest I density, 
with 1.4%, while Statement nos. 26 and 30 have the highest, with 7.2% and 7.6% 
respectively.   
 
Statement 
No. Words 
First Person  
Singular 
Pronouns 
Words 
% I 
Words 
% Me 
Words 
% My 
Words 
% 
16 162 7 4.3 6 3.7 1 0.6 0 0 
17 420 45 10.7 22 5.2 11 2.6 12 2.9 
18 387 12 3.1 9 2.3 0 0 3 0.8 
19 884 58 6.6 38 4.3 13 1.5 5 0.6 
20 881 101 11.5 46 5.2 33 3.7 22 2.5 
21 111 6 5.4 3 2.7 1 0.9 2 1.8 
22 199 15 7.5 6 3 5 2.5 4 2.0 
23 1130 120 10.6 76 6.7 26 2.3 16 1.4 
24 486 15 3.1 7 1.4 6 1.2 2 0.4 
25 1147 98 3.1 37 1.4 17 1.2 42 0.4 
26 485 68 14.0 35 7.2 21 4.3 12 2.5 
29 208 25 12.0 17 8.2 6 2.9 2 1.0 
28 478 26 5.4 21 4.4 3 0.6 2 0.4 
29 1570 174 11.1 97 6.2 45 2.9 32 2.0 
30 511 70 13.7 39 7.6 16 3.1 15 2.9 
31 619 69 11.1 42 6.8 18 2.9 9 1.5 
32 566 57 10.1 25 4.4 20 3.5 11 1.9 
33 283 28 9.9 12 4.2 11 3.9 5 1.8 
34 3495 288 8.2 162 4.6 58 1.7 65 1.9 
35 427 19 4.4 16 3.7 0 0 3 0.7 
36 138 7 5.1 7 5.1 0 0 0 0 
37 492 30 6.1 22 4.5 7 1.4 1 0.2 
38 201 15 7.5 10 5.0 5 2.5 0 0 
39 363 30 8.3 27 7.4 1 0.3 1 0.3 
40 175 5 2.9 3 1.7 0 0 2 1.1 
Figure 13: Blinded Statements - First Person Singular Pronoun (Word) Measurements 
 
Twenty-one Statements use the pronoun Me, from a minimum of 1 (Statement nos. 16, 21 
and 39) to a maximum of 58 (Statement no. 34); four Statements (nos. 18, 35, 36 and 40) do 
not use any Me at all. Statement nos. 28 and 39 have the lowest pronoun density with 0.6% 
and 0.3% respectively, while Statement nos. 26 and 33 have the highest, with 4.3% and 
3.9% of total word count.   
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
94 
 
Twenty-two Statement use the pronoun My, from a minimum of 1 (Statement nos. 37 and 
39) to a maximum of 42 (Statement no. 25); 3 Statements (nos. 16, 36 and 38) do not use it 
at all. Statement nos. 37 and 39 have the lowest density, with 0.2% and 0.3% respectively, 
while Statement nos. 17 and 30 have the highest, with 2.9% each of total word count.  
 
Statement 
No. Clauses 
First Person 
Singular 
Pronouns 
Clause 
% I 
Clause 
% Me 
Clause 
% My 
Clause 
% 
16 29 7 24.1 6 20.7 1 3.4 0 0 
17 78 40 51.3 22 28.2 11 14.1 12 15.4 
18 73 10 13.7 9 12.3 0 0 3 4.1 
19 172 54 31.4 38 22.1 13 7.6 5 2.9 
20 175 94 53.7 46 26.3 33 18.9 22 12.6 
21 19 4 21.1 3 15.8 1 5.3 2 10.5 
22 43 14 32.6 6 14.0 5 11.6 4 9.3 
23 200 113 56.5 76 38.0 26 13.0 16 8.0 
24 72 15 20.8 7 9.7 6 8.3 2 2.8 
25 163 88 54.0 37 22.7 17 10.4 42 25.8 
26 120 62 51.7 35 29.2 21 17.5 12 10.0 
29 41 23 56.1 17 41.5 6 14.6 2 4.9 
28 94 25 26.6 21 22.3 3 3.2 2 2.1 
29 306 159 52.0 97 31.7 45 14.7 32 10.5 
30 104 66 63.5 39 37.5 16 15.4 15 14.4 
31 127 62 48.8 42 33.1 18 14.2 9 6.3 
32 109 55 50.5 25 22.9 20 18.3 11 10.1 
33 53 28 52.8 12 22.6 11 20.8 5 9.4 
34 631 271 42.9 162 25.7 58 9.2 65 9.2 
35 81 16 19.8 16 19.8 0 0 3 3.7 
36 30 7 23.3 7 23.3 0 0 0 0 
37 87 28 32.2 22 25.3 7 8.0 1 1.1 
38 38 15 39.5 10 26.3 5 13.2 0 0 
39 75 30 40.0 27 36.0 1 1.3 1 1.3 
40 31 4 12.9 3 9.7 0 0 2 6.5 
Figure 14: Blinded Statements - First Person Singular Pronoun (Clause) 
Measurements 
 
With clause counts, Statement nos. 40 and 18 have the lowest percentage of clauses 
containing First Person Singular Pronouns, with 12.9% and 13.7%, while Statement nos. 23 
and 30 have the highest, at 56.5% and 63.5% respectively.  
 
Statement nos. 24 and 40 have the lowest use of I clauses, with 9.7% each, while Statement 
nos. 23 and 29 have the highest, with 38% and 41.5%. As for Me clauses, Statement nos. 
28 and 39 have the lowest use, with 1.3% and 3.2%; Statement nos. 20 and 33 have the 
highest, with 18.9% and 20.8%. Finally, Statement nos. 37 and 39 contain the lowest 
percentage of My clauses, with 1.1% and 1.3% respectively, while Statement nos. 17 and 25 
use the most, with 15.4% and 25.8% of total clause count.  
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3.2.3. Third Person Pronouns 
All the Statements use Third Person Pronouns, from a minimum of 2 (Statement no. 16) to a 
maximum of 279 (Statement no. 34). Statement nos. 16 and 49 have the lowest use, with 
1.2% and 1.7% of total word count; Statement nos. 35 and 36 have the highest, with 11.9% 
and 16.7% respectively. 
 
Statement 
No. Words 
Third Person 
Pronouns 
Word 
% Clauses 
Third Person 
Pronouns 
Clause 
% 
16 162 2 1.2 29 2 6.9 
17 420 25 6.0 78 23 29.5 
18 387 23 5.9 73 21 28.8 
19 884 99 11.2 172 84 48.8 
20 881 93 10.6 175 88 50.3 
21 111 5 4.5 19 4 21.1 
22 199 8 4.0 43 8 18.6 
23 1130 76 6.7 200 71 35.5 
24 486 44 9.1 72 36 50.0 
25 1147 82 9.1 163 75 46.0 
26 485 30 6.2 120 29 24.2 
29 208 9 4.3 41 9 22.0 
28 478 33 6.9 94 30 31.0 
29 1570 172 11.0 306 147 48.0 
30 511 37 7.2 104 36 34.6 
31 619 48 7.8 127 46 36.2 
32 566 37 6.5 109 34 31.2 
33 283 31 11.0 53 23 43.4 
34 3495 279 8.0 631 265 42.0 
35 427 51 11.9 81 47 58.0 
36 138 23 16.7 30 21 70.0 
37 492 36 7.3 87 36 41.4 
38 201 18 9.0 38 17 44.7 
39 363 33 9.1 75 31 41.3 
40 175 3 1.7 31 3 9.7 
Figure 15: Blinded Statements - Third Person Pronoun Measurements 
 
Statement nos. 16 and 40 have the lowest percentage of Third Person Pronoun clauses, 
with 6.9% and 9.7% respectively, while Statement nos. 35 and 36 have the highest, with 
58% and 70% of clauses containing the pronouns.  
3.2.4. Vague Pronoun References  
Nineteen Statements use Vague Pronoun References, from a minimum of 1 (Statement nos. 
18, 21, 24, 30, 32 and 38) to a maximum of 20 (Statement no. 34); 6 Statements (nos. 22, 
31, 33, 35, 36 and 37) did not use any at all. Fourteen Statements make low use of Vague 
Pronoun References, with less than 1% of total word count; Statement nos. 24, 30 and 32 
have the lowest use, with 0.2% each. The highest use of the feature is found in Statement 
no. 40, at 1.7%. 
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Statement 
No. Words 
Vague  
Pronoun 
References 
Word 
% Clauses 
Vague  
Pronoun 
References 
Clause 
% 
16 162 2 1.2 29 2 6.9 
17 420 2 0.5 78 2 2.6 
18 387 1 0.3 73 1 1.4 
19 884 5 0.6 172 5 2.9 
20 881 5 0.6 175 5 2.9 
21 111 1 0.9 19 1 5.3 
22 199 0 0 43 0 0 
23 1130 3 0.3 200 3 1.5 
24 486 1 0.2 72 1 1.4 
25 1147 5 0.4 163 5 3.1 
26 485 6 1.2 120 5 4.2 
29 208 2 1.0 41 2 4.9 
28 478 2 0.4 94 2 2.1 
29 1570 6 0.4 306 6 2.0 
30 511 1 0.2 104 1 1.0 
31 619 0 0 127 0 0 
32 566 1 0.2 109 1 0.9 
33 283 0 0 53 0 0 
34 3495 20 0.6 631 20 3.2 
35 427 0 0 81 0 0 
36 138 0 0 30 0 0 
37 492 0 0 87 0 0 
38 201 1 0.5 38 1 2.6 
39 363 4 1.1 75 4 5.3 
40 175 3 1.7 31 3 9.7 
Figure 16: Blinded Statements - Vague Pronoun Reference Measurements 
 
As regards clause use, Statement nos. 30 and 32 contain the lowest concentration of the 
feature, comprising 0.9% and 1% of clauses, while Statement nos. 16 and 40 have the 
highest, with 6.9% and 9.7% of clauses respectively. 
3.2.5. Verb Strings 
Twenty-four Statements use Verb Strings in their narratives, from a minimum of 1 
(Statement nos. 16, 21, 22 and 38) to a maximum of 46 (Statement no. 34); 1 Statement (no. 
40) does not use the feature at all. Seven Statements use Verb Strings at less than 1% of 
total word count, the lowest being Statement nos. 17, 22 and 38, with 0.5% each, while 
Statement nos. 20 and 31 have the highest percentage of Verb Strings, with 4.2% and 3.7% 
respectively. 
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Statement 
No. Words 
Verb  
Strings 
Word 
% Clauses 
Verb  
Strings 
Clause 
% 
16 162 1 0.6 29 1 3.4 
17 420 2 0.5 78 2 2.6 
18 387 5 1.3 73 5 6.8 
19 884 15 1.7 172 15 8.7 
20 881 37 4.2 175 37 8.7 
21 111 1 0.9 19 1 5.3 
22 199 1 0.5 43 1 2.3 
23 1130 12 1.1 200 12 6.0 
24 486 4 0.8 72 4 5.6 
25 1147 18 1.6 163 18 11.0 
26 485 12 2.5 120 12 10.0 
29 208 6 2.9 41 6 14.6 
28 478 9 1.9 94 9 9.6 
29 1570 42 2.7 306 42 13.7 
30 511 5 1.0 104 5 4.8 
31 619 23 3.7 127 23 18.1 
32 566 10 1.8 109 10 9.2 
33 283 5 1.8 53 5 9.4 
34 3495 46 1.3 631 46 7.3 
35 427 7 1.6 81 7 8.6 
36 138 4 2.9 30 4 13.3 
37 492 3 0.6 87 3 3.4 
38 201 1 0.5 38 1 2.6 
39 363 4 1.1 75 4 5.3 
40 175 0 0 31 0 0 
Figure 17: Blinded Statements - Verb String Measurements 
 
As regards clause count, Statement no. 22 (2.3%) has the lowest concentrations of Verb 
String clauses, followed by Statement nos. 17 and 38, with 2.6% each; Statement nos. 29 
and 31 have the highest percentage of Verb Strings, with 14.6% and 18.1% respectively. 
3.2.6. Negation 
All 25 Statements use Negation, from a minimum of 1 (Statement nos. 16, 21 and 33) to a 
maximum of 28 (Statement no. 20). Six Statements have very low usage of less than 1% of 
total word count, Statement no. 33 being the lowest at 0.4%, followed by Statement nos. 17 
and 18, with 0.5% each. The highest use of Negation is found in Statement nos. 26 and 30, 
with 3.3% and 4.3% of total word count respectively. 
 
The lowest use of Negation clauses is found in Statement nos. 33 and 17, with 1.9% and 
2.6% respectively; Statement nos. 26 and 30 have the highest rates at 11.7% and 17.3%. 
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Statement 
No. Words Negation 
Word 
% Clauses Negation 
Clause 
% 
16 162 1 0.6 29 1 3.4 
17 420 2 0.5 78 2 2.6 
18 387 2 0.5 73 2 2.7 
19 884 14 1.6 172 14 8.1 
20 881 28 3.2 175 28 8.1 
21 111 1 0.9 19 1 5.3 
22 199 4 2.0 43 4 9.3 
23 1130 16 1.4 200 16 8.0 
24 486 5 1.0 72 5 6.9 
25 1147 11 1.0 163 11 6.7 
26 485 16 3.3 120 14 11.7 
29 208 3 1.4 41 3 7.3 
28 478 6 1.3 94 6 6.4 
29 1570 19 1.2 306 19 6.2 
30 511 22 4.3 104 18 17.3 
31 619 14 2.3 127 6 11.0 
32 566 6 1.1 109 6 5.5 
33 283 1 0.4 53 1 1.9 
34 3495 54 1.5 631 54 8.6 
35 427 4 0.9 81 4 4.9 
36 138 2 1.4 30 2 6.7 
37 492 8 1.6 87 8 9.2 
38 201 4 2.0 38 4 10.5 
39 363 9 2.5 75 8 10.7 
40 175 2 1.1 31 2 6.5 
Figure 18: Blinded Statements - Negation Measurements 
 
3.2.7. Cognitive Verbs  
Twenty-two Statements use Cognitive Verbs in their narratives, from a minimum of 1 
(Statement nos. 20, 21, 33 and 36) to a maximum of 63 (Statement no. 34). Three 
Statements (nos. 22, 38 and 40) do not use any Cognitive Verbs at all. Twelve Statements 
make very low use of the feature at less than 1% of total word count, the lowest being 
Statement nos. 20 and 25, with 0.1% and 0.3% respectively; Statement nos. 16, 21 and 34 
have the highest use, with 1.8% each.   
 
As for Cognitive Verb clauses, Statement nos. 33 and 17 have the lowest concentration, with 
1.9% and 2.6% respectively. The highest concentration is found in Statement nos. 16 and 
21, with 10.3% and 10.5%. 
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Statement 
No. Words 
Cognitive 
Verbs 
Word 
% Clauses 
Cognitive 
Verbs 
Clause 
% 
16 162 3 1.8 29 3 10.3 
17 420 2 0.5 78 2 2.6 
18 387 5 1.3 73 5 6.8 
19 884 14 1.6 172 14 8.1 
20 881 1 0.1 175 1 8.1 
21 111 2 1.8 19 2 10.5 
22 199 0 0 43 0 0 
23 1130 10 0.9 200 10 5.0 
24 486 2 0.4 72 2 2.8 
25 1147 4 0.3 163 4 2.5 
26 485 8 1.6 120 8 6.7 
29 208 3 1.4 41 3 7.3 
28 478 6 1.3 94 6 6.4 
29 1570 12 0.8 306 12 3.9 
30 511 6 1.2 104 6 5.8 
31 619 7 1.1 127 7 5.5 
32 566 4 0.7 109 4 3.7 
33 283 1 0.4 53 1 1.9 
34 3495 63 1.8 631 63 10.0 
35 427 4 0.9 81 4 4.9 
36 138 1 0.7 30 1 3.3 
37 492 5 1.0 87 5 5.7 
38 201 0 0 38 0 0 
39 363 3 0.8 75 3 4.0 
40 175 0 0 31 0 0 
Figure 19: Blinded Statements - Cognitive Verb Measurements 
 
3.2.8. Combined Cue Set (MoDs) 
The term MoDs (Markers of Deception) is used to refer collectively to features included in 
the Combined Cue set (Vague Pronoun References, Verb Strings, Negation, and Cognitive 
Verbs). All Statements contain at least one feature from the MoDs set, from a minimum of 4 
(Statement no. 21) to a maximum of 183 (Statement no. 34). At the lowest end, Statement 
nos. 22, 24 and 33 each contain MoDs accounting for 2.5% of total word count; Statement 
nos. 20 and 26 have the highest use, with 8% and 8.7% respectively.  
 
 
As for clause count, Statement nos. 22 and 33 have the lowest percentage of MoDs clauses, 
with 11.6% and 13.2%; Statement nos. 20 and 31 contain the highest, with 34.3% and 
31.5% respectively. 
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Statement 
No. Words MoDs 
Word 
% Clauses MoDs 
Clause 
% 
16 162 7 4.3 29 5 17.2 
17 420 22 5.2 78 18 23.1 
18 387 13 3.4 73 10 13.7 
19 884 48 5.4 172 40 23.3 
20 881 71 8.1 175 60 34.3 
21 111 5 4.5 19 3 15.8 
22 199 5 2.5 43 5 11.6 
23 1130 41 3.6 200 36 18.0 
24 486 12 2.5 72 11 15.3 
25 1147 38 3.3 163 37 22.7 
26 485 42 8.7 120 33 27.5 
29 208 14 6.7 41 11 26.8 
28 478 23 4.8 94 20 21.3 
29 1570 79 5.0 306 70 23.0 
30 511 34 6.7 104 24 23.1 
31 619 44 7.1 127 40 31.5 
32 566 21 3.7 109 21 19.3 
33 283 7 2.5 53 7 13.2 
34 3495 183 5.2 631 148 23.5 
35 427 15 3.5 81 12 14.8 
36 138 7 5.1 30 6 20.0 
37 492 16 3.3 87 16 18.4 
38 201 6 3.0 38 6 15.8 
39 363 20 5.5 75 12 16.0 
40 175 5 2.9 31 5 16.1 
Figure 20: Blinded Statements - Combined Cues Measurements (MoDs) 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
In summary, data regarding 8 selected features (word count, First Person Singular 
Pronouns, Third Person Pronouns, Vague Pronoun References, Verb Strings, Negation, 
Cognitive Verbs, and the MoDs Combined Cue set) were extracted from the 15 Known 
(Group 1) and 25 Blind Study (Group 2) Statements. 
 
In addition to frequency, the density of occurrence is calculated according to total number of 
words as well as total number of clauses in the Statement. In analysing frequency, the 
occurrence of a single cue is counted as one, even if the feature consists of more than one 
word (such as with Verb Strings). In analysing density, the same applies with regards to total 
word count. With respect to clause count density, any number of the same feature in a single 
clause (as with My, Third Person Pronouns, and MoDs) is counted as one. This data 
provides the basis for qualitative and statistical analyses in the forthcoming chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4. Descriptive and Qualitative Analysis of Known (Group 1) Statements 
 
4.1. Method 
Bearing in mind the results of previous deception studies, the analysis presented here seeks 
to establish, first, whether deception cues identified in verbal and CMC interactive 
communications also apply to written narrative statements; and second, whether cues in 
combination provide stronger differentiation between the categories than single cues. Third, 
the descriptive and qualitative analysis aims to describe the way the features are used 
during deception and truth telling, focusing on small (rather than statistically significant) 
differences between the Truthful and Deceptive Statements. Finally, the analysis explores 
the interaction between cues with the aim of identifying linguistic strategies adopted by 
deceivers in order to determine how they chose to structure their deception, in addition to 
their choice of words. 
 
This section deals with data from the Known (Group 1) Statements, where the truth or 
deceptiveness of the Statements are already known, and so are analysed post hoc. 
Deceptive cues and linguistic strategies identified from this set will be used to predict 
deception a priori in the blinded (Group 2) Statements. 
 
Following on from the data described in Chapter 3, linguistic features identified in Known 
Truthful (Statement nos. 1-10) and Deceptive (Statement nos. 11-15) Statements were 
compared to explore their behaviour, and reconcile their presence with the known 
identification of individual statements and episodes as Truthful or Deceptive.  
 
In addition to comparing the entire Statement, cues found in individual episodes of Deceptive 
Statements (Statement nos. 1-10) were further analysed according to whether the episode 
was categorised Truthful or Deceptive. This aims to explore how cue behaviour might 
change within the same Statement, depending on whether the author is lying or telling the 
truth. One Statement (no. 8) from the Deceptive category could not be partitioned into 
Truthful and Deceptive episodes as the narrative was identified as entirely Deceptive. 
Therefore, this Statement is excluded from episode analysis.  
 
It is hypothesised that the density of cues such as Third Person Pronouns (Knapp, Hart & 
Dennis, 1974; Knapp & Comadena, 1979; Hancock et al. 2005; DePaulo et al. 2003), Vague 
Pronoun References and Verb Strings (as markers of vagueness and ambiguity - - Knapp,  
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Hart & Dennis, 1974), Negation (Knapp & Comadena, 1979; Newman et al. 2003; Zhou et al. 
2004c; Adams & Jarvis, 2006; Toma & Hancock, 2010), and Cognitive Verbs (Sporer, 1997; 
Johnson & Raye, 1981; Hartwig et al. 2005; Vrij et al. 2008) are positively correlated with 
deception. Consequently, it is expected that cue distribution within Statements in the 
Deceptive category will also be concentrated within Deceptive episodes.  
4.2. Results 
The differences in cues in between Truthful and Deceptive Statements, as well as Truthful 
and Deceptive episodes belonging to individual Deceptive Statements, are described and 
visually represented using column graphs. In whole-statement analysis, Deceptive 
Statements (nos. 1-10) are coloured red, while Truthful Statements (nos. 11-15) are blue. In 
episode analysis (only of Deceptive Statements), Deceptive episodes are coloured red and 
Truthful episodes are blue. 
4.2.1. Hypothesis 1  
Hypothesis 1a is supported, with deceivers being more verbose (7 words/clause) than their 
Truthful counterparts (5 words/clause) (Figure 21). Six Deceptive Statements (nos. 3-5, 7, 9 
and 10) have longer clauses at ≥ 7 words/clause, than four Truthful Statements (nos. 11-14), 
with ≤ 5 words/clause. 
 
 
Figure 21: Known Statements - Average Clause Length (Statements) 
 
However, at the episode level (Hypothesis 1b), the association between longer clauses and 
deception is not supported.  
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Figure 22: Known Statements - Average Clause Length (Episodes) 
 
In 7 Deceptive Statements (nos. 1, 3, 5-7, 9 and 10), clauses are slightly longer in Truthful 
episodes and not in Deceptive episodes as hypothesised (Figure 22). It is unclear whether 
differences arise because deceivers elaborate more when telling the truth, or say less when 
lying. If the average clause length of 5 words/clause is taken as typical of truth tellers (as 
compared to 7 words/clause for Deceptive Statements), then truth tellers do not appear to be 
verbose generally. It may be that deceivers feel on safer ground when telling the truth, and 
therefore say slightly more to compensate for the reduction in information when they are 
lying. Anolli et al. (2003) describe a Cuttlefish Effect where deceivers hide their lies within a 
mass of truthful (albeit irrelevant) information, while Vrij (2008), DePaulo et al. (2003), and 
Hartwig et al. (2006) describe deceivers as being less forthcoming when lying. Clause length 
results suggest that the reality may be a combination of the two.  
 
However, liars appear to devote more of their statement to lying than truth telling. In all 
graphs except for one (Deceptive Statement no. 10), deception involves at least 60% of the 
total number of clauses used in the narratives (Figure 23).  
 
 
Figure 23: Known Statements - Clause Count (Episodes) 
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Only Statement no. 10 devotes more clauses to truth telling. However, this Statement differs 
from other Deceptive Statements in that it contains a five-day narrative, as its author 
chooses to include the events of four other days, in addition to the day of the incident central 
to the Statement. Consequently, the majority of clauses are devoted to truthful information, 
albeit irrelevant to the event. 
 
Statement 
No. Clauses Truthful 
Clause 
% Deceptive Clause% 
1 105 21 20 84 80 
2 47 9 19 38 81 
3 40 12 30 28 70 
4 29 8 28 21 72 
5 43 10 23 33 77 
6 145 32 22 113 78 
7 34 13 38 21 62 
8 36 0 0 36 0 
9 95 38 40 57 60 
10 78 58 74 20 26 
Figure 24: Known Statements Clause Count - Truthful and Deceptive Episodes 
 
This preference, to devote more of the Statement to lying, conflicts with previous findings 
described earlier (Anolli et al. 2003; DePaulo et al. 2003; Hartwig et al. 2006; Vrij, 2008). If 
deceivers prefer to say less when lying, it appears contradictory to spend more of the 
statement lying. One explanation may be that deceivers feel they have to justify their lie, and 
so spend more time explaining themselves. 
 
 
Figure 25: Known Statements - Number of Episodes 
 
Deceivers and truth tellers also appear to structure their Statements differently, with 
deceivers preferring to construct their narratives using shorter episodes than truth tellers, 
particularly during deception. This narrative break-up can only be identified using marked  
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sentence structures to identify episode boundaries, as the fragmentation is not reflected in 
the overt paragraph construction of Statements. In other words, deceivers construct smaller 
episodes within much larger paragraph structures. 
 
Seven Deceptive Statements (nos. 1-3, 5, 6, 9 and 10) contain more episodes than the most 
fragmented Truthful Statement (no. 14) (Figure 25). Seven Deceptive Statements (nos. 1-4, 
6, 7 and 9) also contain more Deceptive episodes than Truthful episodes, with one 
Statement (no. 8) having no Truthful episode at all (Figure 26).  
 
 
Figure 26: Known Statements - Number of Truthful and Deceptive Episodes 
 
Statement no. 5 has an equal number of Deceptive and Truthful episodes. However, while 
the Statement is divided into four Truthful and four Deceptive episodes, Deceptive episodes 
contain 77% of the Statement’s clauses. Only Statement no. 10 devotes more episodes to 
truth telling, again because of its extended narrative. However, when the episode structure 
of the one relevant day (ignoring the remaining four days included in the narrative) is 
examined, four out of the five episodes of the day are Deceptive. 
 
It may be that Deceptive Statements fragment into smaller (and more) Deceptive episodes 
because the events and timeline are not grounded in reality. Consequently, the narratives 
lack cohesion and continuity, which deceivers find themselves subconsciously signalling as 
they tell their stories. 
4.2.2. Hypothesis 2  
No support is found for Hypothesis 2a. Contrary to previous findings that deceivers use less 
self-references than truth tellers (Knapp, Hart & Dennis, 1974; Dulaney, 1982; Burgoon et al. 
1996a; Newman et al. 2003; Zhou et al. 2004c; Bond & Lee, 2005; Hancock et al. 2004; 
Hancock et al. 2005), no negative correlation is found between First Person Singular 
Pronouns and deception in the Known Statements.  
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Figure 27: Known Statements - First Person Singular Pronouns (Word) 
 
As a percentage of word count, there is little difference between deceivers’ and truth tellers’ 
use of First Person Singular Pronouns; self-references constitute 8.6% of words in Deceptive 
Statements, compared to 8.3% in Truthful Statements (Figure 27). However, 45.7% of 
clauses contain self-references in Deceptive Statements, compared to 39.9% in Truthful 
Statements (Figure 28). 
 
 
Figure 28: Known Statements - First Person Singular Pronouns (Clause) 
 
It is interesting to note that the only Deceptive Statement with any significant reduction in 
First Person Singular Pronouns is Statement no. 8, which is the entirely deceptive narrative. 
It may be that the fact the Statement is entirely deceptive, as opposed to a partially false 
narrative, may have had some bearing on the deceiver’s choice of linguistic strategy; 
however, no conclusion can be reached on the basis of a single statement 
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Figure 29: Known Statements - First Person Singular Pronouns in Episodes (Word) 
  
Neither is there any support for Hypothesis 2b, that Deceptive episodes will contain a lower 
rate of First Person Singular Pronouns than Truthful episodes. Eight Statements (nos. 1-7 
and 10) use more self-references in their Deceptive episodes than in their Truthful episodes 
(although the differences are marginal in Statement nos. 1, 3 and 6), with the pronouns 
overall constituting a slightly higher 9.7% of word count in Deceptive episodes, compared to 
8.3% in Truthful episodes (Figure 29).  
 
 
Figure 30: Known Statements - First Person Singular Pronouns in Episodes (Clause) 
  
Overall, Deceptive episodes also contain more clauses with self-references (50.5%) 
compared to Truthful episodes (44.9%). However, this result is influenced by large 
differences in Statement nos. 3, 4 and 7; otherwise, no general trend in either direction is 
identified (Figure 30). 
  
I, Me, and My were also analysed individually to explore any differences in loading between 
them, although no hypothesis was put forward regarding their performance. Overall, I 
constitutes 6.2% of words in Truthful Statements, compared to 4.7% in Deceptive  
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Statements (Figure 31). However, there is little difference in I clause use between them, with 
Truthful Statements containing only a marginally higher 30.8% compared to 29.5% in 
Deceptive Statements (Figure 32). Statement no. 8 has the lowest percentage of I use for 
both word and clause count of the Group 1 Statements, consistent with its very low usage of 
First Person Singular Pronouns. 
 
 
Figure 31: Known Statements - I Count (Word) 
 
 
Figure 32: Known Statements - I Count (Clause) 
 
No general trend emerges for the use of I in Truthful and Deceptive episodes. Overall, I 
constitutes 5.5% of words in Truthful episodes, compared to 5.3% in Deceptive episodes 
(Figure 33), while I clauses make up 34.7% of clauses in Truthful episodes, only slightly 
higher than 31.8% of I clauses found in Deceptive episodes (Figure 34). 
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Figure 33: Known Statements - I Count in Episodes (Word) 
 
 
Figure 34: Known Statements - I Count in Episodes (Clause) 
 
 
Figure 35: Known Statements - Me Count (Word) 
 
As for Me, there is little difference between Deceptive and Truthful Statements as a 
percentage of word count. Overall, Me constitutes 1.3% of words in Deceptive Statements, 
compared with 1% in Truthful Statements, with very high percentages in Statement nos. 1 
and 6 (compared to the rest of the Deceptive Statements) affecting measurements overall in 
that category, and likewise with Statement no. 13 within the Truthful narratives (Figure 35). 
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With clause measurements, 7.3% of clauses in Deceptive Statements contain Me, compared 
to 4.9% of clauses in Truthful Statements (Figure 36); as with word, spikes in Me clause use 
in Statement nos. 1, 6 and 13 influence results. However, even with these outliers removed, 
Me clauses in Deceptive Statements are still nearly twice that found in Truthful Statements. 
 
 
Figure 36: Known Statements - Me Count (Clause) 
 
At the episode level, a trend appears for increased use of Me during deception. Overall, Me 
has double the density of word count in Deceptive Statements at 1.5%, compared to Truthful 
episodes with 0.7% (Figure 37), as well as nearly double the density of Me clauses in 
Deceptive episodes at 8.3%, compared to 4.4% in Truthful episodes (Figure 38). In 3 of the 
8 Deceptive Statements (nos. 2, 4 and 5), Me occurs only in their Deceptive episodes, and is 
used more in the Deceptive episodes of Statement nos. 1, 6 and 9 than in their Truthful 
episodes. Statement no. 10 makes no use of Me at all, which is unusual, considering its 
length (500+ words).  
 
 
Figure 37: Known Statements - Me Count in Episodes (Word) 
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Figure 38: Known Statements - Me Count in Episodes (Clause) 
 
Contrary to previous findings, that liars tend to distance themselves from their lies by 
reducing their use of self-references (Weiner & Mehrabian, 1968; Knapp, Hart & Dennis, 
1974; Knapp & Comadena, 1979; Newman et al. 2003; Hancock et al. 2005), the results 
suggest that, at least in the context of written witness statements, deception does not follow 
that pattern.  
 
Deceivers’ personal presence in the events described, as evidenced by the level of First 
Person Singular Pronouns in Truthful and Deceptive Statements, do not decrease during 
deception; instead, self-references continue at more or less the same level throughout it. 
What changes is the role played by deceivers in their narratives, as defined by self-
references used. From an active role as agent of the action as identified by I, to a more 
passive presence with Me presenting themselves as recipients of the action, deceivers may 
become more involved or take a backseat approach as they deem necessary. However, at 
all times, they are present in one form or another in the event, as in the excerpt:  
I left to go back to work…I thought maybe I hit him…then he pushed me in my van and then 
made me drive, the he told me to stop crying. He told me to stop the van. (Statement no. 1) 
 
This move, from active agent to passive recipient, is reflected further in the analysis results 
for the possessive pronoun My. In Deceptive Statements, My constitutes 2.5% of words, 
double the 1.2% found in Truthful Statements (Figure 39). Nine Deceptive Statements (nos. 
1-7, 9 and 10) contain higher use of My than 4 Truthful Statements (nos. 1, 3-5). 
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Figure 39: Known Statements - My Count (Word) 
 
Furthermore, Deceptive Statements contain over double the use of My clauses at 14.3%, 
compared to Truthful Statements at 5.7%, with all 10 Deceptive Statements making more 
use of My clauses than 4 of the 5 Truthful Statements (nos. 1, 3-5) (Figure 40). 
 
 
Figure 40: Known Statements - My Count (Clause) 
 
At the episode level overall, My constitutes 2.9% of words in Deceptive episodes, marginally 
more than the 2.1% found in Truthful episodes. However, when looking at the distribution of 
the pronoun, My occurs only in the Deceptive episodes of 2 Statements (nos. 2 and 4), and 
is used more in the Deceptive episodes of 5 Statements (nos. 5 -7, 8 and 9) than in their 
Truthful counterpart (Figure 41).  
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Figure 41: Known Statements - My Count in Episodes (Word) 
 
Deceptive episodes make much more use of My clauses, with 16.3% compared to Truthful 
episodes with 12.1%. My clause distribution between Truthful and Deceptive episodes is 
similar to word with the exception of Statement no. 5, which is reversed, showing higher use 
of My clauses in its Truthful episodes (Figure 42). This is due to the inclusion of 2 pronouns 
in a single clause (4 occurrences of My in 3 clauses). 
 
 
Figure 42: Known Statements - My Count in Episodes (Clause) 
 
This anomaly is due to the dependent role of My, which qualifies nouns instead of replacing 
them, unlike I and Me. Whereas I or Me can only occur once in any given clause (the author, 
either as subject or object of the verb), My may appear any number of times in a single 
clause, as in the excerpt: 
 My wife, myself and my son came home today…then me, my wife and my son and our 
roommate Pete went upstairs. (Statement no. 3) 
 
Why use of My should increase during deception is not as easily explained as an increase in 
Me. My tends to focus readers’ attention on the minutiae of the author’s attributes and 
personal possessions, rather than on the author as an individual, as in the excerpt:  
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“…and one came back grabbed my hair lifted my head and cut my forehead…” (Statement 
1) 
“He took tape out and put it on my hands, and then he cut my lips…then put tape on my 
face. He cut my dress…he cut my hair…He locked my keys in my van.” (Statement no. 2) 
 
It may be that deceivers attempt to reinforce the credibility of their information by resorting to 
details about themselves or external objects, on which they stamp a personal association 
through the use of My. By repeatedly using the pronoun, deceivers may hope that their 
addressees perceive the provision of such details, and the deceivers’ willingness to claim 
ownership, as a marker of truthfulness.   
 
It is interesting to observe that, where Me and My clauses are used in a narrative, deceivers 
show a trend for higher use of My than Me (Figure 43). Of the 13 Known Group Statements 
(nos. 1-9, 11, 13-15) where I, Me, and My are used collectively, 7 Statements (nos. 2-5, 7-9), 
all belonging to the Deceptive category have higher use of My clauses than Me clauses.  
 
 
Figure 43: Known Statements - I, Me and My Interaction (Clause) 
 
It may be that differences in the use of Me and My clauses are associated with  deception as 
high use of My suggests that deceivers are focusing on things associated with them, rather 
than on themselves as individuals, even in a passive role using Me. The excerpt -- I felt 
something cold. He went to hit me again, and something cut the palm of my left hand 
(Statement no. 1) -- describes the different stages of distancing deceivers can achieve, as  
they move away from I (as agent of the action) to Me (as passive recipient of the action) to 
My (where the deceiver is completely absent as an individual, except for ownership of the 
hand).  
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4.2.3. Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3a is not supported. Contrary to previous findings that deceivers use more other 
person references than truth tellers (DePaulo et al. 2003; Hancock et al. 2004; Hancock et 
al. 2005), in this Known Group analysis, Third Person Pronouns are associated with truth 
telling.  
 
Third Person Pronouns constitute 7.1% of words in Truthful Statements, a higher percentage 
than the 4.4% found in Deceptive Statements (Figure 44). The pronouns also constitute a 
higher percentage of clauses in Truthful Statements, with 31.7% compared to 23.5% in 
Deceptive Statements (Figure 45). Even with the exclusion of Statement no. 14, whose high 
use of the pronoun influences upwards the Truthful category average, overall, Truthful 
Statements still make higher use of Third Person Pronouns than Deceptive Statements. 
 
 
Figure 44: Known Statements - Third Person Pronouns (Word) 
 
 
Figure 45: Known Statements - Third Person Pronouns (Clause) 
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This finding is consistent with Newman et al. (2003), Zhou et al. (2004c), and Bond & Lee 
(2005) but difficult to explain. Ickes et al. (1986) report that Machiavellian individuals are 
more likely to speak of themselves at the expense of others, resulting in more First Person 
Singular Pronouns than Third Person Pronouns, while high self-monitoring individuals are 
more likely to talk about others than themselves31 (Barnes & Ickes, 1979, as cited in Ickes et 
al. 1986), resulting in the opposite.  
 
No study has identified how much of an increase in the use of Third Person Pronouns, or 
what percentage of the pronouns as compared to First Person Pronouns is indicative of 
deception; or even if First Person Pronouns (or I) is always used more than Third Person 
Pronouns during truth telling. DePaulo et al. (2003) explain increases in Third Person 
Pronouns during deception as arising out of deceivers’ preference to move focus away from 
themselves and their own actions by referring to others more often.  
 
However, increased use of Third Person Pronouns appears to be more complex than simply 
being a case of deceivers deflecting attention away from themselves. Context matters. 
People use the pronouns to refer to what happened to someone else. It may be that in 
truthful statements, where witnesses are bystanders to an event or are emotionally more 
focused on a particular individual at the centre of the event (such as a child), they will 
concentrate on others more and include little of themselves in the narrative. This results in 
the use of higher third party references and less First Person Singular Pronouns. An 
example of this would be Statement no. 14, in which most of the Statement is taken up by 
the account of a remand prisoner as reported to the author of the Statement (another 
remand prisoner). Consequently, when analysing witness statements, it may be necessary 
to distinguish between statements where their authors are known to be largely bystanders, 
or whether they are actively involved in the event.  
 
Hypothesis 3b is supported. Within Deceptive Statements, deceivers use more Third Person 
Pronouns when lying. It is interesting to note that episode level analysis tells a different story 
to whole-statement analysis. Of the 7 Deceptive Statements in which they occur, Third 
Person Pronouns are used more in the Deceptive episodes of 6 Statements (nos. 1-4, 6 and 
9) than in Truthful episodes. These pronouns constitute 4.2% of words in Deceptive 
episodes, double that of Truthful episodes with 2% (Figure 46). Deceptive episodes also  
  
                                                 
31 Machiavellian and Self-Monitoring individuals seek to gain advantage by managing impressions of 
themselves. Machiavellians manage impressions by bringing the behaviour of others into line with 
their own goals, while Self-Monitoring individuals bring their own behaviour into line with others. 
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contain considerably more clauses containing the pronouns at 22%, compared to 13% of 
clauses in Truthful episodes (Figure 47).  
 
 
Figure 46: Known Statements - Third Person Pronouns in Episodes (Word) 
 
 
Figure 47: Known Statements - Third Person Pronouns (Clause) 
  
As with the use of My, word measurement presents a slightly different picture of Third 
Person Pronoun use compared to clause measurement, as clauses may contain more than 
one of the pronouns. In one Statement (Statement no. 6) its author regularly incorporates 
two Third Person Pronouns in individual clauses -- if he got his hands on the pistol he would 
take it away from me…because he turned his back. In another instance, the author of 
Statement no. 14 includes three-pronouns in a single clause -- and that he hooked his 
brother up with her sister. (Statement no. 14) 
 
It appears that although deceivers use less Third Person Pronouns than truth tellers in their 
witness statements generally, when they do use them, deceivers use the pronouns more 
when they are lying. Therefore, ultimately, the association between increased Third Person 
Pronoun use and deception appears to be maintained, but only in the context of existing 
deception.  
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Pronoun Frequencies 
The distribution of pronouns between Truthful and Deceptive episodes is provided in Figure 
48.  
 
Statement 
No. 
I 
(T) 
I 
(D) 
Me 
(T) 
Me 
(D) 
My 
(T) 
My 
(D) 
First 
Person 
Singular  
Pronouns 
(T) 
First 
Person 
Singular  
Pronouns 
(D) 
Third 
Person  
Pronouns 
(T) 
Third 
Person  
Pronouns 
(D) 
1 10 22 2 17 5 10 17 49 2 21 
2 5 8 0 4 0 10 5 22 0 24 
3 1 10 1 2 5 3 8 15 2 9 
4 2 8 0 1 0 3 2 12 2 8 
5 3 11 0 1 1 4 4 16 2 0 
6 13 26 3 21 3 21 19 69 9 36 
7 4 10 1 1 1 4 6 15 0 0 
8 - - - - - - - - - - 
9 14 12 2 4 8 15 24 31 2 10 
10 22 8 0 0 7 3 29 11 7 1 
Figure 48: Known Statements - Pronoun Frequency in Episodes 
 
4.2.4. Hypothesis 4 
 Hypothesis 4a is supported. Although Vague Pronoun References are used sparingly by 
both truth tellers and deceivers in the Known Group Statements (they occur only once in 
Statement nos. 2, 5, 7, 9 and 15), the cue constitutes a higher percentage of word count in 
Deceptive Statements with 0.7%, compared to 0.1% in Truthful Statements (Figure 49). 
Similarly, 4% of clauses contain the cue in Deceptive Statements, compared to 0.5% in 
Truthful Statements (Figure 50). 
 
 
Figure 49: Known Statements - Vague Pronoun References (Word) 
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Figure 50: Known Statements - Vague Pronoun References (Clause) 
 
It is interesting to note that truth tellers and deceivers appear to use Vague Pronoun 
References in different ways in this Group of Statements. In Truthful Statements, the cue is 
used only as a figurative reference in reported speech (Statement no. 14), or to a specific 
antecedent (Statement no. 15). In neither case are the authors being vague.  
I said he was somebody [important] to somebody, and he said you know what I mean like 
Ahmoud who killed that white girl. She was somebody [important] that’s why he got all that 
time. (Statement no. 14) 
I peeped through this crack in the tin. I saw this guy throwing wood in the burner. I told the 
others to be quiet because there was someone in there. (Statement no. 15) 
 
In Deceptive Statements, deceivers’ use of Vague Pronoun References involves being 
vague about a particular aspect of the event: 
He was hitting around my left side and I felt something cold. He went to hit me again and 
something cut the palm of my left hand…then someone grabbed my wallet… (Statement 
no. 1) 
He started driving and called someone… (Statement no. 2) 
When I unlocked the door, we could all smell something funny in the house. (Statement no. 
3) 
 
It would appear that, at least as far as this group of witness statements is involved, context 
also matters when examining the association between Vague Pronoun References and 
deception.  
 
Hypothesis 4b is also supported; at the episode level, a positive association is found 
between Vague Pronoun References and deception. The cue constitutes 0.9% of words 
used in Deceptive episodes, compared to 0.3% in Truthful episodes. Although these   
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differences are marginal, the distribution of the cue between episodes is more telling. Of the 
8 Deceptive Statements in which they are used, Vague Pronoun References occur only in 
the Deceptive episodes of 6 Statements (nos. 1, 2, 4, 5. 7 and 9) (Figure 51).  
 
 
Figure 51: Known Statements - Vague Pronoun References in Episodes (Word) 
 
 
Figure 52: Known Statements - Vague Pronoun References in Episodes (Clause) 
 
Differences in clause measurements were larger, with Deceptive episodes having 5.2% of 
clauses containing the cue, compared to 2.2% of Truthful episodes (Figure 52).   
 
In two Statements (nos. 3 and 6), Vague Pronoun References are used more in their Truthful 
episodes. In both statements, they occur in the closing lines of the narrative: 
A couple of minutes after that, someone yelled that there was smoke…And that is when 
someone called 911. Then everyone started showing up. (Statement no. 3) 
Everything happened in a fraction of a second. (Statement no. 6) 
 
Although the cue is embedded in truthful information, it continues to reflect the ambiguity 
found in deceptive portions of the narrative.  
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4.2.5. Hypothesis 5  
Hypothesis 5a is supported. On the whole-statement level in the Known Group analysis, 
Deceptive Statements contain more Verb Strings than Truthful Statements. Verb Strings 
constitute 1.4% of words in Deceptive Statements, compared to 0.9% of words in Truthful 
Statements (Figure 53). Clause measurement is a stronger differentiator, with 8.3% of 
clauses containing the cue in Deceptive Statements, compared with 4.7% of clauses in 
Truthful Statements (Figure 54). 
 
Verb Strings are used in all the Deceptive Statements, and in 3 of the 5 Truthful Statements, 
with none found in the 2 shortest Truthful Statements (nos. 11 and 12).  
 
 
Figure 53: Known Statements - Verb Strings (Word) 
 
 
Figure 54: Known Statements - Verb Strings (Clause) 
 
An interesting feature of some Verb Strings in Deceptive Statements is their incorporation of 
a Cognitive Verb (another cue investigated) in the string, e.g. 
I do remember seeing…what appeared to be… (Statement no. 1) 
…so the employee decided to just leave … (Statement no. 8) 
…I remember clearly going …I do recall speaking to … (Statement no. 9)  
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I expected to meet Sherron … (Statement no. 10) 
 
In addition to creating ambiguity through the conflation of verbs, incorporating a cognitive 
element into the Verb String introduces a further element of doubt by qualifying the 
information. Consequently, it is no longer a case of what happened, but what the author 
perceives happened.  
 
Hypothesis 5b is also supported, and more convincingly so than Hypothesis 5a, with Verb 
Strings being more strongly indicative of deception at the episode level than whole 
statements. In three Statements (nos. 2, 4 and 5), Verb Strings are found only in Deceptive 
episodes; in another four episodes, the cue is used more often in Deceptive episodes. Verb 
Strings constitute 1.7% of words in Deceptive episodes, compared to 0.5% of words in 
Truthful episodes (Figure 55). The cue is also found in 9.8% of clauses in Deceptive 
episodes, compared to 3.7% of clauses in Truthful episodes (Figure 56). 
 
 
Figure 55: Known Statements - Verb Strings in Episodes (Word) 
 
 
Figure 56: Known Statements - Verb Strings in Episodes (Clause) 
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4.2.6. Hypothesis 6  
Hypothesis 6a is supported, with Deceptive Statements making higher use of Negation than 
Truthful Statements. Like Verb String, Negation clauses are a stronger differentiator than 
word measurement. The differences between deceivers’ and truth tellers’ use of Negation, 
as a percentage of word count is marginal, with Negation constituting 1.1% of Deceptive 
Statements and 0.7% of Truthful Statements (Figure 57). However, the cue is found in 7% of 
Deceptive Statement clauses, more than double the 3.1% in Truthful Statement clauses 
(Figure 58). 
 
Figure 57: Known Statements - Negation (Word) 
 
 
Figure 58: Known Statements - Negation (Clause) 
 
On the whole-statement level, 9 of the 10 Deceptive Statements use Negation, compared to 
only 2 Truthful Statements. One Truthful Statement (no. 14) contains a high percentage of 
Negation clauses, only second to the highest Deceptive Statement usage (Statement no.8). 
However, on inspection of Statement no. 14, 18 of the 19 clauses containing Negation are to 
be found in reported speech, as in the excerpts:  
I said while in my cell you won’t kill nothing or let nothing die with your bitch ass! 
So then Jake said in his case that the state don’t have any evidence. I said they don’t have 
the gun. He said no I sold the gun to a friend.   
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I said that’s why you aint never going home, Sheffield don’t play that murdering people shit. 
(Statement no. 14) 
 
In contrast, in Deceptive Statements, most Negation involves describing the event in terms 
of what did not happen. 
I didn’t really know if he tapped me or not… (Statement no. 1) 
I wouldn’t talk to him… (Statement no. 4) 
I didn’t recognize the name…but I can’t remember them right now… (Statement no. 6) 
 
A few Negations also involve distinguishing between what is and what is not the case, as in 
the excerpts: 
I do remember seeing headlights behind me right before the curve …but not before then … 
(Statement no. 1) 
I thought maybe I hit him but I didn’t hit him. (Statement no. 2) 
It was similar to this but not exact. (Statement no. 6) 
 a female …tried to walk past me and not go through the metal detector … (Statement no. 8) 
 I expected to meet Sherron …Sherron did not show up … (Statement no. 10) 
 
Newman et al. (2003) suggest that deceivers use fewer exclusive words (e.g. but, except, 
without) which are used to distinguish between what is and what is not in a category, as 
deceivers would not normally have the cognitive resources to juggle such information. 
However, deceivers do regularly distinguish between what is and what is not the case in 
their Statements, and use Negation as part of the process. Deceivers appear to make this 
distinction in the context of what they think is the case, but it turns out that it is not. Perhaps 
using verbs to suggest an assumption or other cognitive function (e.g. thought, tried to, 
expected) which they then negate allows deceivers to justify a behaviour, even if it might 
later be found out to be incorrect. 
 
Hypothesis 6b is also supported, with Deceptive episodes having a higher percentage of 
Negation than Truthful episodes in 7 of the 8 statements where Negation is used; in 2 of 
those Statements (nos. 2 and 4), Negation is only used in their Deceptive episodes.  
 
Negation constitutes 0.9% of words found in Deceptive episodes, compared to 0.7% in 
Truthful episodes (Figure 59). The cue occurs in 6% of Deceptive episode clauses, 
compared to 4.9% of Truthful episode clauses (Figure 60). Negation clauses appear to be a 
stronger differentiator between deception and truth telling measured on a whole-statement  
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level, unlike Verb String clauses which are more strongly associated with deception at the 
episode level. 
 
Figure 59: Known Statements - Negation in Episodes (Word) 
 
 
Figure 60: Known Statements - Negation in Episodes (Clause) 
 
4.2.7. Hypothesis 7  
Hypothesis 7a is supported in the Known Group 1 analysis. Cognitive Verbs are used in all 
10 Deceptive Statements and in 4 Truthful Statements. Using word measurement, the 
difference between Deceptive and Truthful Statements is marginal. 
  
 
Figure 61: Known Statements - Cognitive Verbs (Word)  
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Neg(T)w% 
Neg(D)w% 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Neg(T)c% 
Neg(D)c% 
0 
5 
10 
15 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
CV(T)w% 
CV(D)w% 
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
126 
 
Cognitive Verbs constitute 1% of words found in Deceptive Statements, compared to 0.6% in 
Truthful Statements (Figure 61). As with earlier cues, the difference using clause 
measurement is larger, with 6.4% of clauses in Deceptive Statements containing the cue, 
versus 3.9% of clauses in Truthful Statements (Figure 62). 
 
 
Figure 62: Known Statements - Cognitive Verbs (Clause) 
 
Although both truth tellers and deceivers use Cognitive Verbs, they appear to use them 
differently. In the Known Group Statements, truth tellers use Cognitive Verbs on their own, 
e.g.  
I guess he got mad … I think he said … (Statement no. 14) 
he didn’t know … It looked like … (Statement no. 15) 
 
Deceivers use Cognitive Verbs on their own too, but also incorporate them into Verb Strings, 
a usage not found in the Group 1 Truthful Statements, e.g. 
I do remember seeing headlights …I drove what appeared to be 20ft to 30ft … (Statement 
no. 1) 
I recall walking … I remember walking … (Statement no. 7) 
I remember clearly going …and do remember paying most of my attention …Can not 
seem to decifer … (Statement no. 9) 
 
By assimilating the two cues, the information provided is identified as a personal impression, 
a product limited by memory or perception, which could turn out to be incorrect. For the most 
part, it also changes the tense of that portion of the narrative from past to present; it is no 
longer a case of what happened, but what the author believes at the time of the writing of the 
statement. The change in tense is a feature that statement analysis practitioners believe is 
indicative of deception, as in the excerpt -- I turned left into 31st and proceeded on through  
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town. I do remember seeing headlights behind me right before the curve by the Chagford 
trail crossing … (Statement no. 1) 
 
SCAN Analysis states that past events should be told in the past tense, and that changes in 
tense from past to present needs further investigation (Nahari et al. 2012). However, this is 
contradicted by research (Ebesu & Miller, 1994; Taylor, 2005) which reports that, in fact, 
deceivers use fewer present tense verbs than truth tellers.  
 
Hypothesis 7b is also supported. At the episode level, there is a positive correlation between 
Cognitive Verbs and deception. Cognitive Verbs are used exclusively in the Deceptive 
episodes of 5 Statements (nos. 2, 3, 4 and 7); in 2 other Statements, they are used more 
often in Deceptive than Truthful episodes. Cognitive Verbs constitute 1.3% of words in 
Deceptive episodes, compared to 0.7% in Truthful episodes (Figure 63). The cue is also 
found in 7.8% of Deceptive episode clauses versus 4.8% of Truthful episodes (Figure 64). 
 
 
Figure 63: Known Statements - Cognitive Verbs in Episodes (Word) 
 
Like Verb Strings, Cognitive Verbs appear to be a strong differentiator of truth and deception 
at the episode level. Given that Cognitive Verbs are sometimes incorporated into Verb 
Strings, it may be that a combination of the two could be a more productive cue than looking 
at the features individually. This multi-cue approach is explored in Hypothesis 8. 
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Figure 64: Known Statements - Cognitive Verbs in Episodes (Clause) 
 
4.2.8. Hypothesis 8  
Hypothesis 8a is very strongly supported, with Deceptive Statements containing a high 
percentage of MoDs compared to Truthful Statements. MoDs constitute 4.4% of words in 
Deceptive Statements, compared to 2.6% in Truthful Statements (Figure 65). The cues in 
combination are also found in 22.2% of clauses in Deceptive Statements, nearly twice the 
11.6% of clauses found in Truthful Statements (Figure 66). 
  
Compared to the other features analysed, MoDs are by far the largest differentiator between 
Deceptive and Truthful Statements, confirming DePaulo et al.’s (2003) suggestion that cues 
in combination are more productive deception markers than single cues. 
 
 
Figure 65: Known Statements - Combined Cues (Word) 
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Figure 66: Known Statements - Combined Cues (Clause) 
 
In this analysis, 2 Statements stand out from the rest in their categories, which merits closer 
inspection: Statement no. 10 (the 5-day narrative), which has very low use of MoDs in 
comparison to the other Statements in its Deceptive category, and Statement no. 14, which 
has high a level of MoDs compared to the other Statements in its Truthful category.  
 
Statement no. 10’s MoDs score is low because the author includes in the narrative the 
events of four days in addition to the day of the criminal incident. On the other hand, 
Statement no. 14’s score is very high because it contains a great deal of quoted discourse 
(with and without quotation marks) e.g. “I said…he said…so then I said…he said”, in which 
much of the cues analysed are found. The content of these two narratives influence cue 
measurements, resulting in lower than average values in the Deceptive group (for Statement 
no. 10), and higher than average values in the Truthful group (for Statement no. 14). 
However, the removal of these 2 Statements does not change the ultimate conclusions. 
 
Hypothesis 8b is also supported, with Deceptive episodes having nearly twice the use of 
MoDs than Truthful episodes. Of the 9 Deceptive Statements, higher percentages of clauses 
containing features from the MoD set are found in the Deceptive episodes of 7 Statements. 
MoDs constitute 4.8% of words in Deceptive episodes, double the 2.3% found in Truthful 
episodes (Figure 67); MoDs are also found in 25.1% of Deceptive episode clauses, 
compared to 12.9 of clauses in Truthful episodes (Figure 68).  
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Figure 67: Known Statements – Combined Cues in Episodes (Word) 
 
 
Figure 68: Combined Cues in Episodes (Clause) 
 
In 2 Statements (nos. 2 and 4), MoDs are found only in their Deceptive episodes, and occur 
more often in the Deceptive episodes of 5 other Statements (nos. 1, 5-7 and 10). 
 
Statement 
No. 
VPR 
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VPR 
(D) 
VS 
(T) 
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Negation 
(T) 
Negation 
(D) 
CV 
(T) 
CV 
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1 0 10 1 9 2 9 2 7 5 35 
2 0 1 0 4 0 2 0 1 0 8 
3 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 5 
4 0 2 0 4 0 1 0 1 0 8 
5 0 1 0 5 1 2 0 3 1 11 
6 1 3 1 11 2 8 2 12 6 34 
7 0 1 1 2 1 2 0 3 2 8 
8 - - - - - - - - - - 
9 0 1 3 3 2 6 9 4 14 14 
10 0 0 1 1 3 0 2 2 6 3 
Figure 69: Known Statements - MoDs Frequencies in Episodes 
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4.3. Discussion  
In this study, support is found for the hypothesis that deceivers use more words; however, 
there is no support for the hypothesis that deceivers use more words when lying. While 
whole-statement analysis suggests than deceivers are more verbose than truth tellers (as 
measured by clause length), episode level analysis suggests that this verbosity is 
concentrated around deceivers’ truth telling, and not their lying.  
 
Deceivers tend to break up their narratives into shorter episodes than truth tellers. This 
fragmentation becomes more severe for imagined events, resulting in a succession of very 
short episodes during deception. 
 
Support is found for an association between Vague Pronoun References, Verb Strings, 
Negation, Cognitive Verbs and deception. Some cues are more strongly associated with 
deception on the whole-statement level, while others work better at the episode level. Vague 
Pronoun References and Negation differentiate between deception and truth telling when 
analysed on the whole-statement level and taking the higher results. Verb Strings and 
Cognitive Verbs are more productive at the episode level, narrowing down the focus to 
where deception is occurring in the narrative. Vague Pronoun References also appear to be 
a good discriminator at the episode level. 
 
The hypothesis regarding MoDs is also supported, confirming DePaulo et al.’s (2003) report 
that looking for combined features is more productive in identifying deception than relying on 
individual cues. MoDs appear to be good discriminators at both the whole-statement (using 
the higher-end values) and episode level. 
 
There is no support for a negative correlation between deception and First Person Singular 
Pronouns, with Deceptive Statements using a slightly higher percentage of clauses 
containing the pronouns, contrary to previous studies. While there is little difference between 
truth tellers’ and deceivers’ use of I, deceivers use more Me and considerably more My than 
truth tellers. This suggests that individual First Person Singular Pronouns are not equally 
weighted, and that deceivers and truth tellers juggle their use of self-references differently. 
This subtle balancing of pronouns is more readily appreciated at the episode level, where 
Deceptive Statements make more use of Me and My in their Deceptive episodes. 
 
This complex scenario also applies to Third Person Pronouns. There is no support for a 
positive correlation between deception and the pronouns at the whole-statement level;  
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deceivers, it appears, use Third Person Pronouns less than truth tellers. This agrees with 
Newman et al.’s (2003) finding of a reduction in Third Person Pronoun use during deception. 
However, at the episode level, the situation is reversed; deceivers do use the pronouns more 
than truth tellers, thus maintaining the association between Third Person Pronouns and 
deception.  
 
To summarise, deceivers generally differ from truth tellers in that deceivers’ Statements are 
more verbose and more ambiguous. Deceivers maintain author involvement throughout their 
Statements largely to the same extent as their truthful counterparts, but subtly juggle their 
degree of involvement with the information they provide, resulting in increased passive 
participation in Deceptive episode while maintaining immediacy.    
 
Deceivers and truth tellers also construct their narratives differently. Deceivers create a 
succession of short episodic structures when lying, which are seen less in truthful narratives. 
Within Deceptive Statements, deceivers devote more episodes to the deception, although 
they construct longer clauses during truth telling. Deceptive episode also contain more self-
references Me and My, and Third Person Pronouns, as well as a higher percentage of 
MoDs.  
 
Not part of the analysis but an interesting point nonetheless is the inclusion in narratives of 
the events of more days than is relevant to the criminal incident. Johnson & Raye (1981) 
report in their Reality Monitoring studies that real memories tend to provide supporting 
information in the form of events before and after the incident being recalled, as opposed to 
fabricated memories. In the witness statements used in this study, the opposite is found. In 
the Known Group Statements, 4 of the 10 Deceptive Statements contain references to 
events the day(s) before and/or after the day of the incident, which does not happen in 
Truthful Statements. Johnson & Raye do not say how much time (whether hours or days) 
before and/or after the incident one can expect to be included in the memories. It may be 
that, in the case of these Statements, deceivers believe it may add to their credibility if they 
anchor the false events to truthful information beyond the incident day, while truth tellers 
concentrate on what they believe is important, the event itself. This is consistent with 
DePaulo et al. (2003), who report that deceivers tend to refer to events other than the main 
incident, as opposed to truth tellers, who concentrate on the event in question.   
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4.4. Linguistic Strategies for Deception 
If it is accepted that the linguistic style of deceivers differ from that of truth tellers (Knapp, 
Hart & Dennis, 1974; Knapp & Comadena, 1979; Kuiken, 1981; Vrij, 1995; Buller & Burgoon, 
1996; Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri, 2002; Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri, 2003), then it follows that 
deceivers may also linguistically structure the deceptive and truthful portions of their 
statements differently.  
 
It is in deceivers’ interest that their addressees assume they are being cooperative. 
Deceivers hope to appear cooperative (and by extension, truthful) by providing information in 
witness statements that addressees will think is material to the course of the investigation. 
Although deceivers must provide two types of information (truthful and deceptive), their 
intention is that addressees infers only a single truthful message populated with information 
relevant to the purpose of the statement. To achieve this, deceivers must manipulate both 
truthful and deceptive information to construct a seamless narrative, adjusting their language 
accordingly so that the story appears cohesive and credible. The boundary between truth 
and lies must be blurred so that the transition between one to the other is softened and the 
readers’ default assumption of continuity is maintained (Segal, Duchan & Scott, 1991).  
 
However, deceivers cannot use the same language for both truthful and deceptive content 
simply because they cannot provide the same detail of information for both. Thus, deceivers’ 
linguistic strategy must accommodate their intention to present deceptive information as if it 
were true, as well as appear sincere so that addressees will believe the message to be true. 
Deceivers want their addressees to believe that their lies are the truth without addressees 
realising they are being lied to. This requires that deceivers adopt a linguistic strategy that 
presents deceptive information in such a way that addressees consider it relevant and 
connect it with the rest of the information (both truthful and deceptive) in the statement; as a 
consequence, the whole statement should meet addressees’ expectations of truthfulness32 
(Wilson & Sperber, 2000; Wilson & Sperber, 2002). At the same time, should addressees not 
be convinced of the information’s relevance or truthfulness and become suspicious, then the 
linguistic strategy adopted might also allow deceivers leeway to excuse the misinformation 
as the result of confusion or lack of information. 
  
                                                 
32 Wilson & Sperber (2000) assert that “expectations of truthfulness are a by-product of expectations 
of relevance”, and not the other way around (p. 216). 
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Changes in linguistic style during deception have been observed in previous studies. 
Research into deceptive communication reports that there is no such thing as a single 
deceptive communication style and that deception is an adaptive strategy. Buller, 
Strzyzewski & Hunsaker (1991) explain the logistics of deceptive conversation as 
“characterised by a series of moves and countermoves, and deception’s ultimate success or 
failure is affected by the skill of both communicators to see through the multiple layers of 
meaning and react in ways which further their goal.”33 (p. 28) 
 
In his Information Manipulation Theory (IMT), McCornack (1992) proposes that deception is 
achieved through violation of Grice’s conversational maxims, and that deceivers can choose 
from any number of strategies that involve manipulating the amount, veracity, relevance, and 
clarity of the information as and when circumstances require it. In their Interpersonal 
Deception Theory (IDT), Buller & Burgoon (1994) also see deceptive communication as a 
constant tweaking of linguistic (and non-verbal) behaviour by deceivers in response to their 
addressees’ reactions. In both theories, the deception strategy is flexible as this ensures that 
maximum success may be achieved for the deception and, at the least, protect deceivers 
from being caught lying outright.  
 
Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri (2002) bring together a variety of deceptive strategies identified by 
other researchers under “one family of deceptive acts” in their Deceptive Miscommunication 
Theory (DeMiT). They suggest that the selection of a particular linguistic strategy at any one 
time is dictated by the context in which the deception occurs and whether it is pre-planned or 
spontaneous. In particular, the choice of strategy is influenced by addressees’ attitude 
towards their deceivers, whether addressees are silent or acquiescent recipients of the 
information, or questioning and suspicious. The ability to strengthen or weaken the message 
in response to addressees’ behaviour not only allows deceivers flexibility to protect 
themselves from discovery, but also allows them to meet addressees’ expectations as to 
what might constitute normal truthful communication (Dunbar, Ramirez & Burgoon, 2003).  
 
However much pre-planning may go into a deception, deceivers still have to evaluate every 
response in order to optimise their chances of success. Given that there are multiple 
strategies to choose from when telling the truth, never mind when lying, and given that 
deceiver may make any number of adaptations every time they take a turn, deceptive 
communication in a face-to-face or textual CMC messaging context can be a complicated 
affair.   
                                                 
33 Reproduced with permission from Taylor & Francis. 
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Communication theories such as IMT, IDT and DeMiT describe face-to-face deceptive 
conversation strategies, but none address linguistic strategies adopted by liars in written 
narratives such as found in witness statements. For a start, the witness statement is a 
written monologue; there is no turn taking and no opportunity for feedback. In theory, without 
the instant feedback resource available in face-to-face communication, there would not be 
the need or the incentive for deceivers to change their approach once they decided on a 
particular strategy and embarked on writing their statement. However, differences in the 
concentration of linguistic features within Truthful and Deceptive episodes found in this study 
suggest that deceivers do use language differently within a single statement when lying and 
telling the truth.  
 
Written deception may appear simpler than face-to-face deception because there is no 
addressee to adapt to; but it has its own complications. Deceptive witnesses may have 
thought out their story, but translating the false account into words on paper and seamlessly 
fitting it in with the known facts is not straightforward. Even with time to plan the narrative 
and produce the statement, deceivers still have to decide how to convey their false account 
in a way that will appear balanced and consistent with the known truths and therefore, 
convincing. Deceivers have to tread a fine line between providing enough information, 
without providing too much which might be verified easily. They have to provide a necessary 
minimum, which by itself might not be very convincing, but that minimal lie can be padded 
out with irrelevant truths and suitably ambiguous and difficult-to-confirm information, which 
would make deceivers at least appear to be trying to be helpful and, consequently, more 
likely to be believed. In addition, deceivers have to blur the boundary between truth and lies 
so that the transition between one to the other is softened and readers’ default assumption 
of continuity is maintained (Segal, Duchan & Scott, 1991). At the same time, deceivers 
prefer not be too closely associated with the lie as it might be stressful, or too dangerous; 
keeping personal association  with the false information in the narrative to a minimum, 
without being suspiciously absent, would help.  
 
4.4.1. Deception as a Progression 
Research in general has tended to examine deception as if it were black and white, a 
separate communication activity with specific identifiable characteristics which distinguish it 
from normal truth telling. Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri (2002) argue that this perception is a myth, 
that deceptive communication is no different from default truthful communication. What 
makes deception different is its internal gradient, the series of successive changes to the 
language that allows deceivers to design a strategy best suited to their particular situation.   
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Baumeister (1993) sees deception as arising out of a graduation of “possibilities, probable 
truths, working assumptions, leaps to conclusion” (p. 167), particularly with reference to self-
deception. Convincing oneself and others of the truth of shades of grey is easier than 
believing black to be white. 
 
Previous research has also tended to approach deceptive communication as if it consists of 
a single act, reflected in a single statement or a single interview. Literature and legislation 
often refer to an act of deception, as if it happens in a single moment. In fact, deception is a 
progression of acts over time (White & Burgoon, 2001), a continuous process rather than a 
one-time event (Zhou, Burgoon & Twitchell, 2003), where information is managed and 
manipulated to achieve a final deceptive presentation. When deception is examined as a 
single act, it would be easy to miss the more subtle behaviours that are more easily 
identifiable when the graduated process is examined.  
 
Consequently, if one subscribes to White & Burgoon (2001) and Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri 
(2002), it makes sense that deception cues will change over the progression of the 
deception. Indeed, evidence exists in support of this. Zhou, Burgoon & Twitchell (2003) 
report that deceptive cues vary over the time of the deception in quantity and type. In their 
study involving email exchanges between truthful and deceptive senders over three days, 
none of the cues are effective differentiators between truth and deception for all of the days, 
with some cues stronger at one particular stage of the deception than at others. In particular, 
Zhou et al. find that deceivers make significantly high use of negative effect on Day 1, which 
they surmise results from deceivers exhibiting more negative arousal and cognitive loading 
at the start of their deception. Zhou et al. also find that deceivers use significantly more 
verbs and modifiers than truth tellers on the first day of the deception, and they continue 
significantly high (albeit at a lower rate that Day 1) on Day 2. Self-references also become 
significant on Day 2. However, by Day 3, all the cues disappear, suggesting that deceivers 
may become accustomed to their addressees and/or increasingly confident with their 
deception as it progresses. Zhou et al. are unsure whether the time difference (over several 
days), or the stage of the deception, or a combination of the two influence the use of cues. 
Irrespective of this, what is important in their study is the linguistic analysis of an unfolding 
deception strategy.  
 
Unlike face-to-face and CMC messaging, in producing written statements, there is no turn 
taking which can be analysed independently of each other. However, individual narratives 
which are subdivided into episodes, and the progression of these episodes (through which 
the deception unfolds) does lends itself to analysis.   
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According to DeMiT (Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri, 2002), “focus is driven by intentions and guided 
by the route the communicator formulates to move through the field of thought”34 (p.84). In 
other words, language is influenced by the authors’ focus, and that in turn is managed by 
what those authors intend to do and how they intend to achieve it. In terms of deception, the 
finished product (the deception) is a compilation of deceivers’ intentions (to tell the truth or to 
lie) and choice of communication strategy to achieve that intent. Linguistic analysis of 
individual episodes allows us to map how deceivers move through their field of thought. At 
the very least, examining changes in language across different episodes in deceptive 
statements provides an opportunity to identify their authors’ linguistic strategies for deception 
building, and how they juggle cues (which may be associated with deception) within the 
statements.  
4.4.2. Strategic Association of Cues 
To examine the progression of deception within individual statements, the linguistic features 
in the 10 Deceptive Known Statements were analysed for their interaction with each other on 
a whole-statement and episode basis. Only cues with the very highest percentages (higher 
than percentages found in the Truthful Statements) were identified and any associations 
analysed; these form the basis of the linguistic deception strategies identified. 
 
The highest use of MoDs clauses (≥23%) (Statement nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) were 
associated with: 
• longest clauses (≥7 words per clause) (Statement nos. 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10); and 
• highest use of I clauses (≥30%) (Statement nos. 1, 4, 5, 7 and 10). 
 
Statements containing the highest use of First Person Singular Pronoun clauses (Statement 
nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9) were also associated with very high use of My clauses (≥15% of 
clauses) (Statement nos. 2, 3, 6, and 9; nos. 1 and 7 were 14% and 13% respectively).  
  
                                                 
34 Reproduced with permission of IOS Press and M. Balconi. 
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Statement 
No. 
I 
clause % 
Me 
clause% 
My 
clause% 
First Person 
Singular  
Pronoun 
clause% 
Third Person 
Pronoun 
clause% 
MoDs 
clause% 
Words/ 
clause 
1 30 17 14 59 21 31 5.7 
2 28 8 19 53 49 17 5.1 
3 27 7 15 37 25 17 6.7 
4 34 3 10 45 34 24 7.4 
5 33 2 9 39 5 27 7.1 
6 27 17 15 54 28 23 6.4 
7 41 6 15 56 0 23 7.2 
8 8 6 8 17 50 25 5.5 
9 27 6 24 50 13 22 7.5 
10 38 0 13 46 10 10 7 
Figure 70: Known Deceptive Statements - Frequency of Cues (Clauses)  
compared to: 
 
Statement 
No. 
I 
clause % 
Me 
clause% 
My 
clause% 
First Person 
Singular  
Pronoun 
clause% 
Third Person 
Pronoun 
clause% 
MoDs 
clause% 
Words/ 
clause 
11 39 6 6 44 17 6 4.6 
12 33 0 13 47 33 7 5.1 
13 25 14 4. 41 36 14 5.1 
14 24 2 2 28 53 18 4.7 
15 33 3 3 40 19 14 5.6 
Figure 71: Known Truthful Statements - Frequency of Pronouns (Clauses) 
 
The association between high levels of First Person Singular Pronoun clauses and My 
clauses suggests that it may be the increase in My levels that is pushing up the First Person 
Pronoun count to beyond Truthful levels. When the percentages of I, Me, and My clauses 
constituting First Person Singular Pronoun clauses were analysed, this was indeed the case. 
Of the 5 Statements with the highest My clause levels (Statement nos. 2, 3, 6, 7 and 9), 4 
Statements also contain the lowest I levels (Statement nos. 2, 3, 6 and 9).  
 
Two Statements (nos. 2 and 8) differed from the others in that they had the highest use of 
Third Person Pronouns (49% and 50% of clauses respectively) and the shortest clauses 
(≤5.5 words per clause), while 4 Statements (nos. 5, 7, 9 and 10) with the lowest use of the 
pronouns (≤ 28%) also contained the longest clauses (≥7 words per clause). 
 
Thus, two main deceptive strategies can be suggested through the association of cues 
analysed on a whole-statement basis (without having to look at the episodes individually). 
However, what the whole-statement analysis fails to communicate is how the deceptive 
strategies work; this requires episode analysis. 
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4.4.3. Strategy 1 - Prolix and Personal 
This strategy can be described as verbose, personal, and ambiguous. Their authors use 
many words and longer clauses. They use a high number of First Person Singular Pronouns, 
which ensure that the authors are normally present in one form or another in the narrative, 
probably intended to promote an appearance of immediacy. Distancing is achieved through 
high use of My and, at times, Me. Clauses containing I are more likely to be associated with 
MoDs, which tend to cluster together, acting as dubitative modifiers and creating ambiguity 
in the actions being described.  
 
In this strategy, the author’s intention is to be cooperatively vague, saying more than is 
necessary or relevant. Deceivers want to appear helpful by providing plenty of information in 
which they maintain a presence, but which is rendered safe through irrelevancy and 
ambiguity.  
 
This distancing strategy, whereby deceivers are verbose but noncommittal, is described in 
earlier literature by Knapp, Hart & Dennis (1974), Kuiken (1981), Dulaney (1982), Buller & 
Burgoon (1994), and Hancock et al. (2005). Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri (2002) suggest that this 
combination of verbosity and ambiguousness is the likely strategy adopted by deceivers 
facing non-responsive or acquiescent addressees. In a witness statement context, it may be 
that writing for a faceless and non-interactive addressee results in the same effect.  
 
Statement no. 1 is one example of this strategy (Figure 72). Overall, the Statement makes 
high use of First Person Singular Pronouns (59% of clauses), which is inflated through very 
high use of Me clauses (17%). I dominates in Episode 1, which sets the scene for the 
deception, (which progresses through the next six episodes). However, the author gradually 
increases his use of Me and My, until their combined use sidelines I, and the author 
effectively disappears as an active individual. Where I is present, it is largely associated with 
ambiguous activity and subjective information (created through the use of MoDs) which pad 
out the narrative without actually contributing anything relevant to it, as in the excerpt: 
next thing I remember it the driver on top of me punching me around my chest and I trying 
to grab arms. I held his right arm but he was still moving it like a punching motion. He was 
hitting around my left side and I felt something cold. He went to hit me again and 
something cut the palm of my left hand and it scared the hell out of me so I grabbed my 
side curled up and started yelling and screaming. (Statement no. 1) 
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Figure 72: Episode Progression of Cue Usage in Statement no. 1 
 
This juggling of pronouns and MoDs is captured in the following pie charts, one for every 
episode in Statement no. 1. The two very short episodes (Episodes 4 and 5) with only 2 and 
3 clauses each respectively, have been excluded as the small number of clauses create 
artificially high measurements. 
 
As the deception progresses (from Episode 1), I is overshadowed by increases in Me and 
My, and combined with increasing use of Third Person Pronouns to distance the author from 
active participation in the incident. MoD clauses remain as high as I clauses (as most MoDs 
clauses as associated with the author’s actions) or higher, suggesting action rather than   
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clearly defining it. The last episode (Episode 8 - Truthful) is a short unambiguous one of 4 
clauses, however, with the focus still directed away from the author. 
4.4.4. Strategy 2 – Impersonal  
Strategy 2 involves creating an impersonal context, a strategy previously identified by Buller 
& Burgoon (1994), and referred to by Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri (2002) as depersonalisation.  
 
In this impersonal strategy identified in the Known Group 1 Deceptive Statements, authors 
reject responsibility for the action by either ascribing it to someone else, or sharing it. The 
main characteristics of this strategy (as identified in Statements nos. 2 and 8) is the very 
high use of Third Person Pronouns, short clauses, and lower levels of MoDs; however, there 
are a number of variations to this strategy. 
 
In Statement no. 2, the author makes high use of self-references as well as Third Person 
Pronouns. However, the high numbers of self-references is due to a combination of high use 
of My and lower use of I (than in Strategy 1), which the author uses in conjunction with Me 
and Third Person Pronouns to create an increasingly other focus, as the deception 
progresses through the narrative: 
I started to check on him and he pushed me in my van and then made me drive then he 
told me to stop crying. He told me to stop the van. He took tape out and put it on my hands 
and then he cut my lips with his knife and then put tape on my face. (Statement no. 2) 
 
There is use of MoDs, but the cues tend to be isolated, without the clustering found in the 
previous strategy, probably because the author has no need of it. Ambiguity is not necessary 
as the author’s plan is not to blur the action but to be distanced from it by ascribing it to 
someone else.  
 
The changing balance of cues is mapped as the deception progresses through the episodes 
of Statement no. 2 (Figure 73). Episodes 1 to 3 provide a truthful introduction. The deception 
begins in Episode 4, which sees the first appearance of MoDs (all associated with I), as well 
as the beginning of a shift in focus away from the author as agent of the action (identified by 
use of I) to a more passive role (identified by increasing use of Me and My). Third Person 
Pronouns also make their first appearance in Episode 4 and proceed to dominate the rest of 
the narrative. 
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Figure 73: Episode Progression of Cue Usage in Statement no. 2 
 
Throughout the deception, the author juggles Me, My, and Third Person Pronouns, moving 
from one form of distancing to another. The narrative does not return to the truthful condition 
and remains other focused to the last episode. 
 
Statement no. 8 follows a different distancing approach (Figure 74). In this completely 
fictitious statement, Third Person Pronouns predominate and are found in 50% of clauses, 
compared to only 17% of First Person Singular Pronouns. Thus, the imbalance of pronouns 
identifies the depersonalised statement. Episode 1 starts impersonal, with high levels of 
Third Person Pronouns, which continues throughout the rest of the episodes, overshadowing 
any I presence, as in the excerpt: 
a female entered the building and tried to walk past me and not go through the metal 
detector. She told me she was an employee. I stated that she still had to go through the 
metal detector. When she was going through the metal detector she didn’t put her bags on 
the x-ray machine. She put her bags on the x-ray machine in a frantic manner. She jumped 
in front of another person and pushed to the desk. (Statement no. 8) 
  
Episode 9 
I 
me 
my 
3pp 
MoDs 
Other 
Episode 10 
I 
me 
my 
3pp 
MoDs 
Other 
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
145 
 
 
 
Figure 74: Episode Progression of Cue Usage in Statement no. 8 
 
A third variant of the strategy is used in Statement no. 3, which achieves depersonalisation 
through high use of First Person Plural Pronouns. These pronouns were not included in this 
study as their interpretation (immediacy or distancing) is heavily dependent on the context in 
which they are located. We and our can be interpreted as positive indicators of group identity 
by the author including himself in a group with others (Pennebaker & Lay, 2002). The author 
could also use plural self-self references to evade responsibility by sharing it, referring to 
himself acting in association with others, or they can even be used in a way that excludes 
the author from the group (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).  
 
However, high use of First Person Plural Pronouns has the same effect as Third Person 
Pronouns in that their use dilutes the author’s presence as an individual. In this Statement 
(no. 3), 40% of clauses contain either First Person Plural Pronouns or refer to the author 
acting together with someone else so that his actions are shared by another. The author 
hardly acts on his own, and the Statement’s focus is effectively a collective one. 
My wife, myself and my son came home today. We stopped and talked to our friend Alec 
downstairs. He was telling us …Then me, my wife, my son and our roommate Pete went 
upstairs. When I unlocked the door we could all smell something funny in the house. 
(Statement no. 3)  
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As in the first impersonal strategy, this variant also combines high use of My (15%) with 
lower use of I (27%). Together with First Person Plural Pronouns, the author maintains a sort 
of presence while at the same time creating an other focus. 
4.4.5. Narrative Fragmentation 
Episode fragmentation is not a linguistic strategy per se but a construction feature of 
narratives, subconsciously created by their authors to make it easier for their hearers or 
readers to follow the story. In this study, the fragmentation of sections of a narrative into 
short episodes appears to be associated with deception.  
 
Fragmentation occurs when a series of short episodes (defined in this study as episodes 
which contain 25 words or less) follow each other which interrupts the flow of the narrative. 
Episodic fragmentation does not appear to be associated with any particular deceptive 
linguistic strategy, occurring as much in depersonalised statements as in those following a 
prolix and ambiguous strategy.  
 
In this study, it is proposed that excessive narrative fragmentation may be indicative of the 
creation of an artificial timeline. When a sequence of events is confused or imagined, the 
continuity of the narrative breaks down; consequently, storytellers subconsciously create 
new episodes to deal with the mixed bundles of information. In an imagined event, where 
reported elements are unrelated to each other and not anchored in real time, narratives 
fragment simply because they are not anchored in real time. The stories lack cohesiveness, 
and so narratives break up into smaller episodes, reflecting those connective leaps that 
storytellers have to make between them.  
 
It may be too that narrative fragmentation arises from deception by omission, highlighting the 
existence of temporal lacunae. The easiest way to deceive safely is by telling the truth and 
omitting incriminating information. It is less risky than other deceptive strategies as deceivers 
do not have to provide false information which may be disproved or contradicted; if caught 
out, the deceiver could always claim to have forgotten that aspect of the event (Levine, 
Lapinsky, Banas, Wong, Hu, Endo & Anders, 2002). In their study into the prevalence of 
types of violation of Grice’s maxims, Levine et al. (2002) report that, by far, the most frequent 
manipulation of information was that of deception by omission -- violation of the Maxim of 
Quantity.   
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Statements nos. 2 and 3 are good examples of episodic fragmentation arising out of an 
artificial or heavily edited (timeline) version of events. Both Statements contain the lowest 
words per episode count of all Deceptive Statements (and lower than any Truthful 
Statement). Statement no. 2 contains 217 words divided into 10 episodes (averaging 22 
words/episode), with 7 of its 10 episodes marked by the use of “then”, as in the excerpts: 
then he told me to stop crying … and then he cut my lips … and then he put tape on my 
face. Statement no. 3 contains 255 words divided into 12 episodes (averaging 21 
words/episode), with 2 episodes marked by “then” and the rest by adverbial clauses 
stressing the importance of the time, as in the excerpts: when my wife myself and my son 
came home today; then me … went upstairs; when I unlocked the door; when I came home; 
a couple of minutes after that; then everyone started showing up. 
 
As corpus studies reveals, then is the second most frequently used temporal adverbial (the 
most frequent being now) (Biber, Johansson, Leech, Conrad & Finegan, 2000). The problem 
that arises in using then to tag a new episode is that the word has a variety of meanings. As 
a circumstance adverbial, it acts as a temporal expression anchoring the information in the 
clause to a particular place in time i.e. at that time, and to temporally ordering events i.e. 
after that time. As a linking adverbial, it serves to connect clauses without inferring any 
temporal value (Puscasu & Mitkov, 2006).  
 
Puscasu & Mitkov (2006) argue that only the at that time usage of then should be given a 
temporal value. However, in many cases in the Statements analysed in this study, it is 
difficult to determine in what temporal context the author uses the adverb. Then in the 
phrase he pushed me in my van and then made me drive then told me to stop crying could 
mean at that time, or after that time, or a combination of the two. What is significant is that 
the author chooses to uses then to introduce the next bundle of information when she could 
choose not to use the word at all, which she omits in the sentences that follow: He told me to 
stop the van. He took tape out and put it on my hands. This irregular use of then suggests it 
does not arise out of the author’s habitual use but is more likely to be a segmentation marker 
introducing a thematic shift. 
4.4.6. Compared with Truthful Strategies 
While much research has been conducted on the design of deceptive messages and how 
they differ from truthful messages, there has been little practical work undertaken on the 
template of truthful communication. Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri (2003) identify truthful linguistic 
style as being clear, explicit, relevant, and without the pauses and response latencies that 
characterise deceptive speech. In other words, it is everything that deceptive speech is not.   
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However, deceptive strategies describe deception at the linguistic level. At the inception and 
planning stage, there is little that distinguishes between truthful and deceptive 
communication (Levine & McCornack, 1996). As with deceptive messages, truth tellers have 
to tailor their messages with regard to context and to the responses of their addressee. Both 
truth tellers and deceivers must decide how much information is sufficient to convince 
addressees of their truthfulness without wasting cognitive resources on the over-provision of 
unnecessary information, a compromise proposed by Zipf’s speaker’s and auditor’s 
economies (1949, as cited in Horn, 2005). Grice describes this middle path requirement for 
effective communication in his Maxim of Quantity -- make your contribution as informative as 
is required. Horn (1984) later expands on this as being bounded by the upper-based R-
Implicature -- say no more than you must -- which requires the least effort from speakers, 
and the lower-based Q-Implicature -- say as much as you can -- which requires providing as 
much (relevant) information as is necessary to hearers in order to make messages as clear 
as possible. Both truth teller and deceivers, therefore, share the common goal of getting 
across their messages as efficiently as possible.  
 
Truth tellers and deceivers also use the same cognitive mechanisms to plan, produce, and 
deliver their communications. In low-consequence deception, deceivers use the same 
default cognitive mechanisms as truth tellers do to manage their messages (Anolli, Balconi & 
Ciceri, 2002). While deceivers’ cognitive efforts may increase as deception becomes more 
complex or the consequences of discovery more serious, cognitive loading is not always 
indicative of deception. Some truth tellers experience increased cognitive loading when 
telling difficult truths as compared to simple lies, while Machiavellian deceivers find serious 
lies easier to manage than naive liars (Ashton, Lee & Son, 2000 as cited in Anolli, Balconi & 
Ciceri, 2002).  
 
How is it then, that people are more successful at identifying truthful statements than lies? Is 
there something in the linguistic template of a truthful statement that distinguishes it from a 
lie? Levine et al. (1999) suggest that statements are more likely to be identified as truthful 
because people have a tendency to judge messages as truthful rather than deceptive (truth-
biased). In certain contexts, such as in face-to-face communication or when addressees are 
not forewarned to expect deception, expectations of being told the truth and, consequently, 
the identification of truthful messages, are even higher (Buller, Strzyzewski & Hunsaker, 
1991; McCornack & Parks, 1986, as cited in Levine et al. 2006).   
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Veracity base rates (the probability that a message within a given context is likely to be 
judged truthful, irrespective of whether it is truthful or not) appears to play a substantial part 
in predicting accuracy levels in identifying truthful statements, irrespective of deception cues 
(Levine et al. 2006). Accuracy in identifying truthful statements, therefore, appears to be 
based largely on individual expectations of truthfulness within a given context, and not on 
any linguistic strategy or information content that truth tellers might employ as distinct from 
deceivers. In fact, Park et al.’s (2002) study into how people detect lies reveals that less than 
2% of their subjects recall detecting deception based on verbal and nonverbal cues alone at 
the time the lie is told. Most lies are in fact discovered at a later date through the provision of 
third party information and other physical evidence. In short, there does not appear to be a 
standard linguistic strategy for truth telling that people draw on to determine whether 
someone is lying.   
 
However, what can be identified in this study is the way that truth tellers linguistically present 
themselves and structure their narrative when they were telling the truth, as distinct to when 
they are lying. In the Known Group 1 Statements at least, truth tellers use lower levels of My 
and MoDs, and their statements contain more words per episode and have less episode 
fragmentation compared to deceivers. In other words, truth tellers focus on themselves more 
as whole persons initiating the action, instead of having the action done to them or to bits of 
them, or referring to things in their possession. Their descriptions as to what happened are 
clearer and their narratives tend to be constructed in larger episode chunks, which suggest a 
more cohesively sequential story. 
4.5. Predicting Deception in the Blinded (Group 2) Statements 
The purpose of analysing the Known Statements was to identify and observe the behaviour 
of cues which differentiated between Truthful and Deceptive Statements, and then use those 
cues and behaviours to predict deception in the Blinded Statements. At this stage, the 
classification of the Blinded Statements remain unknown, and results will not be unblinded 
until these predictions (and the statistical predictions in the following chapter) are completed. 
 
Predictions regarding the Blinded Statements are made using the linguistic strategies their 
authors have adopted. This analysis ignores cues in isolation, instead making use of cues in 
combination, interaction, and their progression indicative of deceptive strategies at play as 
identified earlier. Features such as clause length and narrative fragmentation are also taken 
into account in the analysis, providing a holistic approach to deception detection. For this 
reason, predictions on the basis of informed expert opinion are only made for whole 
Statements and are not extended to episode analysis.  
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Statement 
No. 
Cat. 
T/D Description 
16 1  
This Statement (arson – 6 episodes) covers a few hours. It has a strong 
collective focus with high use of First Person Plural Pronoun (45% of 
clauses) and within the normal range use of First Person Singular 
Pronouns (24%) and MoDs (17%). There is no unusual cue interaction 
characteristic of a deceptive linguistic strategy and no unusual change 
in linguistic profile of episodes. No deception strategy is identified. 
17 2 
This Statement (rape – 16 episodes) covers a few hours. MoDs (23%) 
use is on the edge of being high, with much clustering, particularly in 
Episodes 2, 3, 7 & 8. The Statement contains very high use of First 
Person Singular Pronouns (51%) largely due to very high use of My 
(15%) and high use of Me (14%). The progression of individual self 
references indicates a gradual replacement of I by Me and My in the 
assault episodes (5-10). Me is introduced in Episode 4 and disappears 
after Episode 7 (main assault episode); My is introduced in Episode 5 
(start of assault) and disappears after Episode 12 (contiguous with 
assault and immediately after). Throughout the assault episodes, 
combined Me and My use exceed I, and I use is largely associated with 
MoDs (Verb Strings, Negation, and Cognitive Verbs). Between 
Episodes 7 & 11, the episodes are heavily fragmented, identifying 
thematic discontinuity in the narrative. The profile is consistent with a 
Prolix and Personal deception strategy. 
18 2 Ep.4 
This Statement (child abuse – 9 episodes) covers 4 days. Overall, there 
is low use of First Person Pronouns (14%) and MoDs (14%), and within 
the normal range use of Third Person Pronouns (29%). However, the 
linguistic profile of Episode 4 (Day 2) is materially different to that of the 
other episodes. The high use of My (14%) occurs in Episode 4 together 
with clustering of MoDs. The profile of Episode 4, as well as the distinct 
departure of Episode 4 from the profiles of the other episodes, indicates 
a Prolix and Personal deception strategy in use. 
19 1 
This Statement (child abuse – 17 episodes) covers an unknown period 
of months. Overall, its MoDs use (23%) is just within the normal range, 
with much clustering of cues and a high use of Third Person Pronouns 
(49%). However, there is no unusual First Person Pronouns cue 
interaction consistent with previously identified deceptive strategies and 
no unusual change in linguistic profile of episodes. No deception 
strategy is identified. 
20 2 
This Statement (rape – 14 episodes) covers one day. It makes high 
very use of First Person Singular Pronouns (54%) brought about by 
very high use of Me (19%) and high use of My (13%), the combined use 
of which exceeds I (26%). The Statement also contains the highest 
density of MoDs (34%) of all the Statements, and very high use of Third 
Person Pronouns (50%). This profile is consistent with a 
depersonalised deception strategy. 
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Statement 
No. 
Cat. 
T/D Description 
21 1 
This is a short Statement (murder/suicide – 6 episodes) covers less 
than an hour. It is fragmented (Episodes 1, 4 & 5), indicating a lack of 
cohesion between episodes. However, its use of First Person Singular 
Pronouns (21%) and Third Person Pronouns (21%) is within the normal 
range, and there is no unusual cue interaction characteristic of a 
deceptive linguistic strategy. No deception strategy is identified. 
22 2 
This is a short Statement (robbery – 7 episodes) covers several hours. It 
is fragmented (Episodes 1-6), indicating a lack of cohesion between 
episodes. First Person Singular Pronoun use is within the normal range 
(33%) but Me (12%) is high; combined Me and My (9%) use exceeds I 
(14%) which is low. The Statement becomes increasingly 
depersonalised as the episodes progress. Me first appears at Episode 5 
(start of robbery) and I disappears from Episodes 6 & 7 (robbery 
episodes). Me disappears after the 1st line of Episode 7 (main robbery 
episode); thereafter, the author is present only as My. Third Person 
Pronoun use is normal (17%) although other references predominate; 
the author prefers to refer to others by name rather than use Third 
Person Pronouns. This profile is consistent with a depersonalised 
deception strategy. 
23 2 
This is a long Statement (kidnapping/rape – 28 episodes) covering two 
days. Overall, it has very high use of First Person Singular Pronouns 
(56%), with very high I (38%) and high Me (13%) use. There is a 
change in linguistic profile of episodes between Episodes 14-20, 
coinciding with the abduction and rape. Episode 14 sees a sudden hike 
in I, My & MoDs, and I is largely associated with MoDs in those 
episodes. From Episode 14 to 16, I use reduces while Me use 
increases; in Episode 19, My & Me use is 7 times that of I; My use 
disappears after Episode 19. From Episode 21 onwards (second half of 
rape/kidnap account), the linguistic profile of episodes returns to that 
seen before the start of the kidnap/rape account (Episodes 1-13). This 
profile is consistent with a Prolix and Personal deception strategy. 
24 1 
This Statement (bank robbery – 11 episodes) covers a few minutes. It 
makes very high use of Third Person Pronouns (50%) and low use of I 
(10%), indicating an other focus. However, there is no unusual cue 
interaction characteristic of a deceptive linguistic strategy.  No deception 
strategy is identified. 
25 2 
This long Statement (assault – 14 episodes) covers a few minutes. It 
has long clauses (average 8 words/clause), within the normal range use 
of MoDs (23% - verging on the high end) and very high First Person 
Singular Pronouns (54%) driven up by very high use of My (26%). This 
profile is consistent with a Prolix and Personal deception strategy. 
26 2 
This Statement (murder – 15 episodes) covers several hours. It is highly 
fragmented between Episodes 3-10, indicating a lack of cohesion 
between episodes. It has high MoDs (27%), as well as very high First 
Person Singular Pronouns (52%) with very high Me (17%) and high My 
(10%). This profile is consistent with a Prolix and Personal deception 
strategy. 
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Statement 
No. 
Cat. 
T/D Description 
27 B1 
This short Statement (suicide – 6 episodes) covers several hours. It has 
high MoDs (27%), very high I (41%) and high Me (14% - on the edge of 
very high). This profile is consistent with a Prolix and Personal 
deception strategy; however, there is no clustering of MoDs. Uncertain 
of designation - probably truthful (as MoDs clustering is an integral part 
of the deceptive strategy). 
28 1 
This Statement (murder – 12 episodes) covers an evening. Its use of 
MoDs (21%) is within the normal range. There is no unusual cue 
interaction characteristic of a deceptive linguistic strategy.  No deception 
strategy is identified. 
29 2 
This long Statement (rape/threatening behaviour – 37 episodes) covers 
an unknown period of several months. Its use of MoDs is within the 
normal range (23% - on the edge of high), very high First Person 
Singular Pronouns (52%) with high I (32%), very high Me (15%) and 
high My (10%). This profile is consistent with a Prolix and Personal 
deception strategy. 
30 B2 
This Statement (arson – 7 episodes) covers 3 days. Its use of MoDs is 
within the normal range (23% - on the edge of high) with much 
clustering, very high First Person Singular Pronouns (63%) with very 
high I (37%) and Me (15%), and high My (14% - on the edge of very 
high). Most of the MoDs use is contained in reported speech, so 
uncertain of designation, although believed deceptive. 
31 2 
This Statement (rape – 15 episodes) covers an evening. It makes very 
high use of MoDs (31%) with clustering, and high use of First Person 
Singular Pronouns (49%), with high I (33%) and Me (14% - on the edge 
of very high). Episode 8 (start of the rape – covered in Episodes 8-12) 
sees the first appearance of My (Episodes 8, 11 & 12), increase in Me 
(Episodes 8-11) and a sudden jump in MoDs clustering (Episodes 8, 10 
& 11). This profile is consistent with a Prolix and Personal deception 
strategy. 
32 B1 
This Statement (sexual assault – 15 episodes) was written many 
months after the event, and covers an evening. It has very high use of 
First Person Singular Pronouns (50%) with very high Me (18%) and high 
My (10%). This profile is consistent with a Prolix and Personal deception 
strategy; however, MoDs (19%) use is within the normal range and 
there is no clustering. Uncertain of designation - probably truthful (as 
MoDs clustering is an integral part of the deceptive strategy). 
33 1 
This Statement reports rape (10 episodes) which takes place on two 
separate days. There is very high use of First Person Singular Pronouns 
(53%), driven up by very high use of Me (21%). However, I (21%) use is 
within the normal range and MoDs are low (13%). No deception strategy 
is identified. 
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Statement 
No. 
Cat. 
T/D Description 
34 1 
This long Statement (sexual assault - 97 episodes) covers many 
months. The actual day of the assault is covered in Episodes 41-97, the 
actual assault in Episodes 49-85. The Statement has within the normal 
range use of MoDs (23% - on the edge of high), high (43%) First Person 
Singular Pronouns, and within the normal range (9% - on the edge of 
high) use of Me and My. The author suffers Dissociative Identity 
Disorder (multiple personality) and this has influenced her language i.e. 
the actual assault is recounted by one of the author’s personalities and 
not the author herself (almost complete absence of I), and high use of 
cognitive verbs is consistent with an internally generated memory. 
However, there is no unusual cue interaction characteristic of a 
deceptive linguistic strategy.  No deception strategy is identified. 
35 1 
This Statement (child abuse – 10 episodes) covers two days. It makes 
use of very high Third Person Pronouns (58%). MoDs are low (15%) as 
is First Person Singular Pronouns (20%). No deception strategy is 
identified.  
36 2 
 This Statement (child abuse – 4 episodes) covers several hours. It has 
within the normal range use of MoDs (20%) and on the lower-side-of-
normal (23%) First Person Singular Pronouns; there is no use of Me or 
My. It has very high Third Person Pronouns (70%) and short clauses 
(4.8 words/clause). The Statement has a strong other focus.  Consistent 
with a depersonalised strategy. 
37 1 
This Statement (child abuse – 11 episodes) covers four days. It’s use of 
First Person Singular Pronouns (32%), individual self-references and 
MoDs is within the normal range, although Third Person Pronouns 
(41%) is high.  However, there is no unusual cue interaction 
characteristic of a deceptive linguistic strategy.  No deception strategy is 
identified. 
38 1 
This Statement (robbery – 3 episodes) covers less than an hour. It 
makes high use of First Person Singular Pronouns (39%), I (26%) and 
Me (13%) but MoDs (16%) are on the low edge of the normal range. No 
deception strategy is identified. 
39 1 
This Statement (murder – 2 episodes) recounts a conversation. It has 
high use of First Person Singular Pronouns (40%) and I (36%) but within 
the normal range use (1%) of Me and My.  No deception strategy is 
identified. 
40 1 This Statement (murder – 7 episodes) covers an evening. All features are within the normal range. No deception strategy is identified. 
Figure 75: Predictions for Blinded (Group 2) Statements  
 
In the table above (Figure 75), each blinded Statement is numbered, labelled, and the 
principal cues which form the basis of the prediction are described. A 4-way category has 
been devised to label Statement categories based on the level of certainty of the prediction: 
Truthful, Deceptive, Believed Truthful, and Believed Deceptive. 
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Statements are labelled Deceptive (2) on the basis that the presence of cues and their 
interaction with other cues are indicative of a deceptive strategy at work as previously 
identified (see Section 4.4); Statements are labelled Truthful (1) if the cue interactions 
required to identify a deceptive linguistic strategy are absent. No attempt is made to identify 
truthfulness; the category is predicted purely on absence of deception cues and not because 
there is no deception. Where a prediction is uncertain, the Statement is labelled with its 
‘Believed’ category accompanied by a B. Therefore, where a Statement is believed to be 
Truthful or Deceptive, but that prediction is of a lower certainty, the Statements is labelled B1 
or B2. Where deception in a particular episode is suspected, the episode number is provided 
alongside the 1 or 2 designation, or is mentioned in the description. All percentages in the 
‘Description’ refer to clause density. 
 
On the basis of overall cue strengths, the interaction of those cues, and linguistic profiles 
identified through episode analysis, it is predicted that: 
• Statement nos. 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29, 31 & 36 are Deceptive (2); 
• Statement nos. 16, 19, 21, 24, 28, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39 & 40 are Truthful (1); 
• Statement nos. 27 and 32 are believed Truthful (B1); Statement no. 30 is believed 
Deceptive (B2). 
 
At this stage, the results remain blinded further to additional analysis and predictions using 
statistical analysis in the following chapter. However, these categories become important at 
the point of unblinding (Chapter 6) as they also reflect the law enforcement source levels of 
certainty regarding the categorisation of Statements. 
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The qualitative and descriptive analysis of the Known Statements resulted in some 
surprising revelations. Having found that deceivers use more words than truth tellers, 
evidence from episode analysis of the Known Statements reveals that truthful portions of 
Deceptive Statements tend to have longer clauses than the deceptive portions. However, 
most Deceptive Statements devote the majority of their narratives to the deception. 
 
Individually, a general trend is found for an association between Vague Pronoun 
References, Verb Strings, Negation, Cognitive Verbs and deception; collectively (using the 
MoDs combined cues), the association is much stronger and the density of collective cues is 
a strong discriminator between Truthful and Deceptive Statements. Cues do not all have the  
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same weighting and their strength as deception predictors varies, with Verb Strings and 
Cognitive Verbs being stronger indicators at the episode level, and Vague Pronoun 
References and Negation at the whole-statement level. In other words, deceivers appear to 
use more Verb Strings and Cognitive Verbs in the immediate area of deception, while Vague 
Pronoun References and Negation occur even in the truthful language of Deceptive 
Statements.  
 
This voyage of discovery carries on into Pronoun analysis. No correlation is found between 
truth telling and First Person Pronouns. On the contrary, Deceptive Statements contain 
slightly more self-reference clauses than truth tellers. This association arises out of the 
increased use of Me and, particularly, My by deceivers. This is the first time that self-
references have been analysed individually and these findings suggest that I, Me, and My 
should no longer be grouped together when analysing for deception.  
 
Increased Third Person Pronoun use is associated with truth tellers, contradicting most 
previous literature. However, when one considers the context of the Statements, it makes 
sense that truthful witnesses will refer to the behaviour of others more often if they have no 
reason to believe they may be suspected of a crime and have to justify their own behaviour. 
These results suggest that the immediacy and distancing signalled by pronouns are 
influenced by context, and explains the role reversals of First Person Singular and Third 
Person Pronouns. 
 
Deceivers and truth tellers also construct their narratives differently. Deceptive narratives 
tend to fragment into shorter episodes, probably indicating a lack of cohesion. This may be 
because the stories are not anchored in real time, coupled with the increased cognitive load 
of putting together a false reality (either completely imagined, or selectively picking real 
events and pasting them on to a false timeline). 
 
A number of associations and interactions between cues, which were more likely to be found 
among Deceptive than Truthful Statements, are also identified. These suggest a deceptive 
linguistic strategy at work, of which two main strategies are identified: Prolix and Personal – 
described as immediate yet ambiguous, verbose, and with high use of self-references; and 
Impersonal – described as non-immediate, direct, and with selective use of self-references. 
In some Statements, these associations are apparent when measuring overall the overall 
density of cues; in others, they are more subtle, being identified only at the episode level 
through analysis of linguistic progression. 
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These cue interactions are used in a structured approach to predict the categories of the 
blinded Statements, resulting in 10 Statements predicted to be Deceptive and 12 Statements 
predicted to be Truthful; another 3 Statements have lower certainties of predictions, with 2 
Statements Believed Truthful, and 1 Statement Believed Deceptive. 
 
At this stage, the results remain blinded further to additional analysis and predictions using 
statistical analysis in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
5. Statistical Analysis of Known (Group 1) and Blinded (Group 2) Statements 
 
Having performed qualitative and descriptive analysis on the Known and Blinded 
Statements, quantitative analysis in the form of statistical testing of the data was undertaken 
to explore several question.  
 
First, is there a significant difference between linguistic cues found in the Truthful and 
Deceptive Statements; second, how strongly are the cues associated with Deceptive 
Statements; third, is there a significant difference between cues found in Truthful and 
Deceptive episodes within the same statement; and fourth, can deception be predicted on 
the basis of the presence of certain cues or combination of cues? 
 
The analysis design involves using various statistical tests in order to 1) test the difference 
between Means for Significance (Independent One Sample T-Test); 2) measure the strength 
of association between variables (Pearson Correlation), and 3) predict category membership 
(Discriminant Function Analysis & Binary Logistic Regression). 
5.1. Nature of Data 
The quantitative data involves scale measurements of 11 cues found in the combined 40 
Known and Blinded statements. These were analysed according to word and clause count 
(the occurrence of cues in relation to the total number of words or clauses in the Statement).  
 
Word count analysis was previously used by Pennebaker, Francis & Booth (2001) in their 
research to identify the mental health of authors of statements on the basis of their word 
choice. Previous studies into deceptive communication have used a variety of 
measurements such as total number of words (Anolli & Ciceri, 1997; Anolli, Balconi & Ciceri, 
2003; Newman et al. 2003; Zhou et al. 2004a; Zhou & Zhang, 2004) and number of words in 
a sentence (Zhou et al. 2004b), while others have used combinations of features such as 
word syllables, words and number of sentences (Burgoon et al. 2003) or words, verbs and 
number of sentences (Qin et al. 2005).  
 
In addition to word count, it was also decided to analyse variables on a clause basis to 
mitigate against irregular text length. To my knowledge, no one has used clause length as a 
unit of measurement. Using clause measurement overcomes difficulties in identifying 
sentence length due to poor grammar or the absence of punctuation, without losing 
meaning. For the purpose of this study, a clause is defined as having a subject (present or 
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implied) and a predicate (with other elements which complete the predicate). Described as 
the device of relevance (Winter, 1994), clauses are powerful units of communication and the 
smallest unit of meaning in a sentence. The lexical choices that go into clause construction 
are selected by authors for their perceived relevance to the message. In written witness 
statements, where every unit of information and the sequence of that information should be 
viewed as important, clause construction is vital to understanding the overall communication.   
 
The data for statistical testing consists of: 
• the test group of 15 Known Statements, of which 5 Statements contain truthful accounts 
and 10 Statements whose accounts are entirely or partially deceptive, nominally 
classified into Truthful (1) and Deceptive (2); and 
• the 25 Blinded Statements whose categories (Truthful or Deceptive) are unknown (to 
everyone except the law enforcement sources of the Statements). 
 
To summarise the data, all Statements are hand-written (except for 1 word-processed 
Statement) by their authors, narrating an event (serious crime) in which the authors were 
involved, either as perpetrators of the criminal activity, victims, or as witnesses to the event. 
The authors of the Known Statements are US American native-English speakers from 
diverse social and educational backgrounds, ranging in age from late teens to mid-50s. 
Details of the Blinded Statement authors are unknown other than they are US American 
native-English speakers. Thirty-eight Statements were written within a week of the events 
reported; 1 Statement refers to an event which occurred more than 6 months previously, and 
2 Statements cover events which span a number of months (period unknown). 
  
5.1.1. Linguistic Variables 
On the basis of the Known Statements’ qualitative analysis, 11 cues were analysed: 
1. MoDs (combined cue set which includes the cues*)    
2. I 
3. Me 
4. My 
5. First Person Singular Pronouns 
6. Third Person Pronouns 
7. Vague Pronoun References* 
8. Verb Strings* 
9. Cognitive Verbs* 
10. Negation*     
11. Clause Length  
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Cues 2-10 were selected on the basis of previous studies into deception detection, a 
discussion of which can be found in Chapters 1 and 2. Cue 5 (First Person Singular 
Pronouns) is the collective use of Variables 2 (I), 3 (Me), and 4 (My), as well as Myself and 
Mine. Newman et al. (2003) suggest that there might be a case for different weighting to be 
attributed to I and Me when considering distancing by authors towards the subject of their 
communication, as the former refers to the author as the agent, and the latter as the 
recipient of the action. For this reason, I, Me and My are analysed individually as well. 
Variable 1 (MoDs), the collective cue set made up of Vague References, Verb Strings, 
Cognition Verbs and Negation is included on the basis of previous findings that multiple cues 
are better for identifying deception (Vrij, 2000; DePaulo et al. 2003) than a single cue on its 
own. Variable 11, Clause Length, is the only variable not previously tested in the literature 
and replaces sentence length as a measurement of information content and verbosity.  
 
The Known Statements were analysed first. As category memberships of the individual 
Statements are already known, the results of their linguistic variable tests were used to 
predict membership of the Truthful or Deceptive categories in Blinded Statements. 
5.1.2. Means and Standard Deviation      
The Means and Standard Deviations of variables from the Truthful (5 Statements = T (5)) 
and Deceptive (10 Statements = D (10)) categories of the Known (Group 1) Statements 
were analysed (along with all other following statistical analyses) using SPSS 15 statistical 
software. 
 
The results are expressed in terms of the mean percentage of variables in relation to the 
total text word count. For example, My constitutes on average 1.12% of the total word count 
per Statement in the Truthful category, while averaging 2.45% of the total word count per 
Statement in the Deceptive category (Figure 76). 
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Figure 76: Known Statements - Means & Standard Deviation (Word) 
 
The same analysis was carried out on the Known Statements on a clause basis. The results 
are expressed in terms of mean percentage of clauses containing the variable in relation to 
the total clause count of the Statement. For example, My appears in 5.54% of clauses in the 
Truthful category and in 14.4% of clauses in the Deceptive category (Figure 77).  
 
Figure 77: Known Statements - Means & Standard Deviation (Clause) 
 
The Clause Length variable is calculated differently, with the results expressing the mean 
average number of words per clause. Therefore, clauses in the Truthful category (5 
Statements with 314 clauses in total) average 5 words per clause, while those in the 
Deceptive category (10 Statements with 651 clauses in total) average 7 words per clause. 
  
Variables   Mean T (5) 
Standard  
Deviation 
Mean 
D (10) 
Standard  
Deviation 
Mean 
(15) 
Standard  
Deviation 
MoDs* 2.48 1.23 4.36 1.56 3.73 1.68 
I 6.20 1.42 4.79 1.55 5.26 1.61 
Me 1.00 1.04 1.31 1.02 1.21 1.00 
My 1.12 0.96 2.45 1.16 2.01 1.24 
First Person Singular  
Pronoun 8.30 1.97 8.61 2.45 8.51 2.23 
Third Person Pronouns 7.12 3.74 4.37 3.69 5.29 3.81 
Vague Pronoun References* 0.14 0.19 0.67 0.69 .49 .62 
Verb Strings* 0.90 1.11 1.38 0.54 1.22 .77 
Cognitive Verbs* 0.62 0.48 1.03 0.58 .89 .57 
Negation* 0.68 1.13 1.10 0.68 .96 .84 
Variables Mean T (5) 
Standard  
Deviation 
Mean 
D (10) 
Standard  
Deviation 
Mean 
(15) 
Standard  
Deviation 
MoDs* 11.6 5.24 21.71 6.05 18.34 7.47 
I 30.82 6.40 29.86 8.90 30.18 7.93 
Me 4.94 5.24 7.73 5.68 6.80 5.52 
My 5.54 4.65 14.4 4.75 11.45 6.28 
First Person Singular  
Pronoun 39.74 7.65 46.02 12.27 43.93 11.09 
Third Person Pronouns 31.66 14.66 23.45 17.00 26.19 16.23 
Vague Pronoun References* 0.54 0.76 4.08 4.38 2.90 3.93 
Verb Strings* 4.66 5.65 8.28 3.13 7.07 4.30 
Cognitive Verbs* 3.88 2.71 6.38 3.83 5.55 3.60 
Negation* 3.38 5.30 6.70 4.00 5.59 4.57 
Clause Length 5.02 0.40 6.60 0.87 6.07 1.06 
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5.1.3. Independent Sample T-Test 
The sampling distribution of the difference between means of linguistic variables (for word 
and clause count) in the Known Statements was tested next. The data was checked for 
outliers and extreme values using the Descriptive Statistics function of SPSS 15.  
 
Outliers are defined as values being more than 1.5 times the interquartile range above the 
upper quartile or below the lower quartile, while extreme values are defined as values being 
more than three times the interquartile range above the upper quartile or below the lower 
quartile (Kinnear & Grey, 2008). These were identified in both word and clause analysis and 
the Statements deselected before running the Independent Sample T-Test. 
 
Ten variables (excluding clause length) were tested using word count, and unequal 
variances taken into account where required.  
5.1.4. Word Analysis 
As described above, cases identified as being outliers in the analysis of relevant variables 
are described below as being excluded from the analysis.  
 
Three variables are significant at the .05 level.  
• The scores of MoDs in the Deceptive group (M = 4.03; SD = 0.51) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 2.48; SD = 1.23): t(5) = 2.65; p = .05 (two-
tailed) after three cases are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 1.64, a large effect. 
There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate values being used.  
• The scores of My in the Deceptive group (M = 2.45; SD = 1.16) are significantly different 
from those of the Truthful group (M = 0.72; SD = 0.43): t(12) = 2.84; p = .02 (two-tailed) 
after one case is excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 1.97, a large effect.  
• The scores of Negation in the Deceptive group (M = 0.96; SD = 0.53) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 0.20; SD = 0.40): t(11) = 2.54; p = .03 
(two-tailed) after two cases are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 1.61, a large 
effect. 
5.1.5. Clause Analysis 
Eleven variables were tested using clause counts, and unequal variances taken into account 
where required. As described above, cases identified as being outliers in the analysis of 
relevant variables are described below as being excluded from the analysis. Five variables 
are found to be significant at the .01 and .05 level. 
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Three variables are significant at the .01 level.  
• The scores of MoDs in the Deceptive group (M = 21.71; SD = 6.05) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 11.6; SD = 5.24): t(13) = 3.17; p = .007 
(two-tailed). Cohen’s d = 1.79, a large effect.   
• The scores of My in the Deceptive group (M = 13.31; SD = 3.48) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 3.60; SD = 1.93): t(11) = 5.16; p = .0003 
(two-tailed) after two cases are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 3.45, a large 
effect.  
• The scores of Clause Length in the Deceptive group (M = 6.60; SD = 0.87) are 
significantly different from those of the Truthful group (M = 5.02; SD = 0.40): t(13) = 3.82; 
p = .0004 (two-tailed). Cohen’s d = 2.34, a large effect. There is not equality of variance 
in this case, with appropriate values being used. 
 
Two variables are significant at the .05 level. 
• The scores of Vague Pronoun References in the Deceptive group (M = 4.08; SD = 4.38) 
are significantly different from those of the Truthful group (M = 0.54; SD = 0.76): t(10) = 
2.48; p = .03 (two-tailed). Cohen’s d = 1.13, a large effect. There is not equality of 
variance in this case, with appropriate values being used.  
• The scores of Negation in the Deceptive group (M = 6.70; SD = 3.99) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 1.20; SD = 2.40): t(12) = 2.54; p = .03 
(two-tailed) after one case is excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 1.67, a large 
effect. 
 
These analyses identify clause count as being a more productive discriminator than word 
count between the Truthful and Deceptive categories. For this reason, only clause count 
variables were extended into Discriminant Analysis. 
 
For Discriminant Analysis to be successful, certain conditions need to be met by the data, 
namely that variables are normally distributed (Goodness-of-Fit), variances are roughly 
similar (Homogeneity of Variance), and sample text sizes are roughly similar. 
 
As the Statement population cannot be controlled for length, it is necessary to meet the 
requirements for Normality and Homogeneity of Variance. Accordingly, Goodness-of-Fit is 
tested using the One Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, and homogeneity of variance using 
Levene’s Test. 
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5.1.6. One Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
All the variables in Known Statements were tested for Goodness-of-Fit. This test for 
normality compares whether the actual distribution of variables conforms to the expected 
(hypothetical) distribution in that particular type of sample. 
 
The One Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Figure 78) provides no evidence against the null 
hypothesis, implying that the samples have been drawn from a normal population. The 
distributions of variables are found to be non-significant, indicating that they are within 
normal parameters.  
 
Variables K-S Z D (two-tailed) Exact Sig. 
MoDs .608 .157 .801 
I .567 .146 .859 
Me .638 .165 .752 
My .454 .117 .971 
First Person Singular 
Pronoun .811 .209 .465 
Third Person Pronouns .380 .098 .996 
Vague Pronoun References 1.162 .300 .108 
Verb Strings .563 .145 .865 
Cognitive Verbs .481 .125 .952 
Negation .604 .156 .806 
Clause Length .809 .209 .467 
Figure 78: Known Statements - One Sample K-S Test (Clause Analysis) 
 
5.1.7. Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variance 
All variables in the Known Statements were then tested for homogeneity of variance. This 
tests how spread out the distribution of a variable is within a population and whether this 
distribution is equal (Figure 79). 
 
Two variables, Vague Pronoun References and Clause Length (.023 and .033 respectively) 
show significantly different variance across the group. Consequently, these variables are 
dropped from Discriminant Analysis. 
 
Although clause length cannot be used in Discriminant Analysis, it is interesting to note that 
Pearson Correlation analysis identifies a strong correlation between Category and Clause 
Length r(15) = .727; p < .01. r² = 0.53, where Deceptive Statements contain longer clauses.  
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Variables F Sig. 
MoDs .002 .965 
I .038 .849 
Me .121 .734 
 My .042 .841 
First Person Singular  
Pronoun 
.881 .365 
Third Person Pronouns .322 .580 
Vague Pronoun References 6.587 .023 
Verb Strings 2.368 .148 
Cognitive Verbs 1.192 .295 
Negation .537 .477 
Clause Length 5.718 .033 
Figure 79: Known Statements - Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variance 
 
5.1.8. Discriminant Function Analysis 
Discriminant Function Analysis is used to determine whether any of the variables identified 
can successfully discriminate between Truthful and Deceptive Statements and, if so, which 
variable is the most successful discriminator. This information is then used to predict 
category membership in the Blinded Statements.  
5.1.9. Wilks’ Lambda 
This multi-variable measure of group Means shows that variables in combination 
successfully discriminate between Truthful and Deceptive Statements in the Known 
Statements (Wilks’ λ = 0.28, χ²(2) = 15.22, p < 0.0001).  
 
Variables  F(1,13) Sig. 
My* 11.62 .005* 
MoDs* 10.15 .007* 
Verb Strings 2.63 0.13 
Negation 1.87 0.19 
Cognition Verbs 1.68 0.22 
Total 1st Person S 1.04 0.32 
Total 3rd Person 0.84 0.37 
Me 0.84 0.38 
I 0.07 0.80 
Figure 80: Known Statements - F-ratios (Equality of Group Means) 
 
Ranking the F-ratios identifies the occurrence of My as the best single discriminator, with 
MoDs as a close second (Figures 80 and 81).  
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Figure 81: Known Statements - F-Ratio Graph 
 
Strictly, this combination of variables is non-independent as MoDs are a combination of 3 
other variables also tested (Verb Strings, Cognition Verbs and Negation), and First Person 
Singular Pronouns includes 3 other variables also tested: I, Me, and My. Consequently, a 
second analysis was carried out excluding MoDs and First Person Singular Pronouns. This 
second analysis shows that the variables in combination (I, Me, My, Third Person Pronouns, 
Verb Strings, Cognitive Verbs and Negation) still successfully discriminate between the 
Known (Group 1) Truthful and Deceptive Statements (Wilks’ λ = 0.37, χ²(2) = 11.90, p = 
0.003).  
5.2 Post Hoc Discriminant Function Analysis 
Two Discriminant Function Analyses were carried out on the Group 1 Statements: first, using 
the 9 variables (MoDs, I, Me, My, First Person Singular Pronouns, Third Person Pronouns, 
Verb Strings, Cognitive Verbs and Negation); second, the same variables but excluding 
MoDs and First Person Singular Pronouns. 
 
The variables Vague Pronoun References and Clause Length were omitted from both 
analyses as they do not satisfy the requirement for Homogeneity of Variance. MoDs and 
First Person Singular Pronouns were omitted as well in the second analysis as they 
collectively represent individual variables already being used in the analysis and results 
might be skewed by counting those variables twice.  
5.2.1. First Discriminant Function Analysis (post hoc - 9 variables) 
The Discriminant Function Analysis model using 9 variables successfully classified post hoc 
93.3% of Truthful and Deceptive category texts from the Known Statements, correctly   
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classifying 90% of Deceptive Statement and 100% of Truthful Statements. One Statement 
(no. 15) was misclassified as Truthful (Figure 82). 
 
Cross-validation was equally successful with this small group, with the leave-one-out 
classification method also seeing 93.3% of Statements correctly classified, although with a 
substantially lower certainty of classification than the full model. In both the full and cross-
validated model, the same Statement (no. 15) was misclassified as Truthful, with the 
certainty of misclassification in the cross-validated model substantially lower than in the full 
model. 
 
          Full Model     Cross-Validated Model 
Statement No. Actual Group Predicted Group P(D>d│G=g) Predicted Group P(D>d│G=g) 
1 1 1 .370 1 .202 
2 1 1 .468 1 .008 
3 1 1 .940 1 .000 
4 1 1 .870 1 .000 
5 1 1 .945 1 .958 
6 2 2 .161 2 .065 
7 2 2 .851 2 .001 
8 2 2 .539 2 .000 
9 2 2 .664 2 .000 
10 2 2 .949 2 .282 
11 2 2 .695 2 .033 
12 2 2 .755 2 .059 
13 2 2 .274 2 .000 
14 2 2 .056 2 .000 
15 2 1* .245 1* .036 
Figure 82: Known Statements - Discriminant Function Analysis (9 variables)  
 
The accuracy of Discriminant Analysis (how well it classified Truthful and Deceptive 
Statements) was analysed using a ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) Curve. ROC 
Curves plot sensitivity (identification of true-positives) against specificity (identification of 
false-positives rate), with the discrimination accuracy being measured as the area under the 
curve. Points on the curve represent decision thresholds where sensitivity/specificity values 
for that threshold are calculated. 
 
Using 9 variables (MoDs, I, Me, My, First Person Singular Pronouns, Third Person 
Pronouns, Verb Strings, Cognitive Verbs and Negation) to classify Deceptive Statements, 
the area under the ROC Curve is 1.000 (100%) (Figure 83). The optimal cut-off value for the 
probabilities of membership in the Deceptive category is .235, which represents a sensitivity 
of 1.000 (100%) with a 0.00 (0%) false positive rate (1 – Specificity). This indicates that the  
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variables are successful in correctly categorising statements in the Known Statements as 
Deceptive 100% of the time, with no false positives. 
 
 
Area Std. Error Asymptotic Sig.  95% LCL 95% UCL 
1.00 .000 .002 1.000 1.000 
 
Figure 83: Known Statements - ROC Curve Results (9 variables) 
 
The optimal cut-off value for the probability of membership in the Truthful category is .765, 
which represents a sensitivity of 1.000 (100%) with a 0.00 (0%) false positive rate (1 – 
Specificity). 
 
This success rate suggests there may be overfitting as a result of too small a training data 
set. It may be that while the cues are very well suited for the small sample set, they may not 
generalise to a larger set (i.e. the Blinded Statements).  
5.2.2. Second Discriminant Function Analysis (post hoc - 7 variables) 
Discriminant Function Analysis was repeated, this time using only 7 variables (dropping 
MoDs and First Person Singular Pronouns) in order to test the independent variables. Wilks’ 
Lambda shows that the 7 variables in combination successfully discriminate between 
Truthful and Deceptive Statements in the Known Group (Wilks’ λ = 0.37, χ²(2) = 11.90, p = 
0.003). This DFA Model also successfully classified post hoc 93.3% of the Known 
Statements (Figure 84). However, cross-validation was less successful, with the leave-one-
out classification method seeing 80% of Statements correctly classified.  
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One Statement (no. 3) was misclassified in the full model; the same Statement was identified 
as misclassified in the cross-validated model, as well as two additional Statements (nos. 2 
and 15). In two Statements (nos. 2 and 3), the certainty of classification in the cross-
validated model is substantially lower than in the full model. However, the certainty of 
classification of misclassified Statement no. 15 in the cross-validated model is twice that in 
the full model. 
 
          Full Model              Cross-Validated Model 
Statement No. Actual Group Predicted Group P(D>d│G=g) Predicted Group P(D>d│G=g) 
1 1 1 .385 1 .285 
2 1 1 .417 2* .079 
3 1 2* .237 2* .087 
4 1 1 .273 1 .374 
5 1 1 .814 1 .787 
6 2 2 .840 2 .944 
7 2 2 .286 2 .451 
8 2 2 .809 2 .727 
9 2 2 .905 2 .259 
10 2 2 .615 2 .415 
11 2 2 .859 2 .980 
12 2 2 .901 2 .990 
13 2 2 .184 2 .252 
14 2 2 .076 2 .015 
15 2 2 .164 1* .331 
Figure 84: Known Statements - Discriminant Function Analysis (7 variables) 
 
In the second Discriminant Analysis using the seven variables, the area under the ROC 
Curve was .960 (96%), the optimal cut-off value for the probabilities of membership in the 
Deceptive category being .830, representing a sensitivity of 0.800 (80%) with a 0.000 (0%) 
false alarm rate (1 – Specificity) (Figure 85). Thus, the probability of a Known (Group 1) 
Statement being correctly identified as Deceptive using the seven variables is 80%, with no 
false positives. 
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Area Std. Error Asymptotic Sig.  95% LCL 95% UCL 
.960 .049 .005 .863 1.057 
 
Figure 85: Known Statements - ROC Curve Results (7 variables) 
 
The optimal cut-off value for the probabilities of membership in the Truthful category is .513, 
representing a sensitivity of 0.800 (80%) with a 0.00 (0%) false alarm rate (1 – Specificity).  
5.3. A Priori Discriminant Function Analysis 
Discriminant Function Analysis was re-run using the same discriminant model to predict a 
priori the Blinded Statement categories. The Blinded texts consist of 25 Statements which 
were supplied by a law-enforcement source without identifying the Statements’ actual 
Truthful or Deceptive categories.  
 
Only one a priori prediction analysis was carried out on the Blinded Statements using the 
same 7 independent variables (I, Me, My, Third Person Pronouns, Verb Strings, Cognitive 
Verbs and Negation) measured on a clause basis as the second post hoc Discriminant 
Function Analysis. The analysis resulted in 15 Statements (nos. 16, 18, 19, 21-24, 28, 34-
40) being categorised as Truthful, and 10 Statements (nos. 17, 20, 25-27, 29-33) 
categorised as Deceptive (Figure 86). 
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Statement No. Predicted Group P(D>d│G=g) 
16 1 .143 
17 2 .409 
18 1 .958 
19 1 .889 
20 2 .752 
21 1 .241 
22 1 .718 
23 1 .449 
24 1 .652 
25 2 .003 
26 2 .520 
27 2 .362 
28 1 .896 
29 2 .885 
30 2 .523 
31 2 .971 
32 2 .442 
33 2 .376 
34 1 .209 
35 1 .767 
36 1 .724 
37 1 .220 
38 1 .107 
39 1 .404 
40 1 .501 
Figure 86: Blinded Statements - Discriminant Function Analysis (7 variables) 
 
5.4. Statistical Analysis of Episodes  
As well as statistically analysing the Known Statements on a whole-statement level, the texts 
were also analysed on an episode level, with each episode treated as an individual 
statement. This attempts to correct problems with overfitting given the small numbers of the 
Known Statements test group.  
 
The 15 Statements making up the Known Group comprised 110 individual episodes. Of 
those 110 episodes, 55 were classified as Truthful, and another 55 classified as Deceptive. 
This similarity in the number of episodes in the two categories was only identified at the start 
of the statistical analysis after the individual episodes had been tagged, and is not artificially 
contrived to even up the numbers.  
 
A number of limitations not present on the whole statement level apply to episode analysis: 
• Episode length – these differ considerably more than with whole statements, with some 
episodes being only one clause long (short episodes being ≤ 25 words), while others are 
over 30 clauses long (≥170 words). 
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• Short Episodes (≤25 words) – do not lend themselves to productive analysis as the 
presence of a single linguistic cue produces artificially high results because of the low 
number of words in the episode. 
• Category Uncertainty – there is no way of knowing (given their limited information 
content) whether some episodes are Deceptive or Truthful. This is particularly difficult 
with shorter episodes. Episodes were marked Truthful as long as their content was 
considered truthful, even though the information was suspect and they were within a 
known deceptive context.  
 
Given these limitations, the treatment of individual episodes as if they are whole statements 
was conducted partly to create a semblance of a larger body of texts (given the limited 
number of Statements overall), and partly to discover whether linguistic features that appear 
to identify deception on a whole-statement level operate equally well at the episode level.  
 
The same eleven variables (MoDs, I, Me, My, First Person Singular Pronouns, Third Person 
Pronouns, Vague Pronoun References, Verb Strings, Cognitive Verbs, Negation and Clause 
Length) were analysed on a clause and word basis, with word analysis excluding the Clause 
Length measurement. 
5.4.1. Linguistic Variables      
The Means and Standard Deviation of variables from the Truthful (55 episodes = T (55)) and 
Deceptive (55 episodes = D (55)) categories of Known Statements were analysed.  
 
The results are expressed in terms of the mean percentage of variables in relation to the 
total episode word count (Figure 87). For example, Me constitutes on average 0.68% of total 
word count of Truthful episodes, while averaging 1.91% of total word count of Deceptive 
episodes. 
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Figure 87: Known Statements - Means and Standard Deviation of Episodes (Word) 
 
The same analysis was carried out on the Known episodes on a clause basis. The results 
are expressed in terms of mean percentage of clauses containing the variable in relation to 
the total clause count of the episode (Figure 88). For example, I appears in 35.07% of 
clauses in Truthful episodes, and in 27.55% of clauses in Deceptive episodes.  
 
Figure 88: Known Statements - Means and Standard Deviation of Episodes (Clause) 
 
The Clause Length variable is calculated differently, with results expressing the mean 
average number of words per clause. Therefore, clauses in the Truthful category (55 
episodes with 515 clauses in total) average 5 words per clause, while those in the Deceptive 
category (55 episodes with 450 clauses in total) average 7 words per clause. 
  
Variables 
(Word Analysis) 
Mean 
T (55) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
D (55) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
(110) 
Standard 
Deviation 
MoDs 3.12 6.42 4.35 3.32 3.74 5.12 
I 5.63 4.14 5.27 5.74 5.45 4.99 
Me 0.68 1.66 1.91 3.48 1.29 2.78 
My 2.05 3.68 2.80 3.36 2.43 3.53 
First Person Singular  
Pronouns 8.39 6.33 9.47 5.25 8.93 5.82 
Third Person Pronouns 3.97 9.45 4.99 5.71 4.48 7.79 
Vague Pronoun References 0.70 3.29 0.88 1.95 .79 2.69 
Verb Strings 1.07 3.16 2.01 4.76 1.54 4.05 
Cognition Verbs 0.73 1.83 1.05 1.67 0.89 1.75 
Negation 0.65 1.33 1.52 5.76 1.08 3.51 
Variables 
(Clause Analysis) 
Mean 
T (55) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
D (55) 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
(110) 
Standard 
Deviation 
MoDs 12.98 23.42 22.29 16.53 18.14 20.60 
I 35.07 27.02 27.55 22.82 31.31 25.18 
Me 4.84 14.97 10.49 19.90 7.67 16.67 
My 12.81 23.53 18.78 25.63 15.79 24.68 
First Person Singular 
Pronouns 42.73 30.19 52.58 25.91 47.66 28.43 
Third Person Pronouns 15.14 20.04 25.59 26.14 20.36 23.77 
Vague Pronoun References 3.04 14.97 4.97 10.54 4.01 12.92 
Verb Strings 6.96 19.87 9.06 12.89 8.01 16.70 
Cognition Verbs 5.54 16.38 6.22 9.58 5.88 13.36 
Negation 4.06 8.97 5.41 9.03 4.73 8.98 
Clause Length 6.50 2.43 6.30 1.77 6.40 21.21 
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5.4.2. Independent Sample T-Test 
The sampling distribution of the difference between Means of linguistic variables for word 
and clause counts in the Known episodes was tested next.  
 
The data was checked for outlier and extreme values using the Descriptive Statistics 
function of SPSS 15. Outliers are defined as values being more than 1.5 times the 
interquartile range above the upper quartile or below the lower quartile; extreme values are 
defined as values being more than 3 times the interquartile range above the upper quartile or 
below the lower quartile (Kinnear & Grey, 2008). These were identified in both word and 
clause analysis and the episodes deselected before running the Independent Sample T-
Test. 
5.4.3. Episode Word Count Analysis 
Ten variables (excluding Clause Length) were tested using word count, and unequal 
variances taken into account where required. With extreme values removed, eight variables 
are significant at the .01 and .05 level. 
 
Seven variables are significant at the .01 level. 
• The scores of MoDs in the Deceptive group (M = 4.35; SD = 3.32) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 1.87; SD = 2.70): t(105) = 4.22; p = <.01 
(two-tailed) after three episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 0.82, a 
large effect.  
• The scores of Me in the Deceptive group (M = 1.28; SD = 1.97) are significantly different 
from those of the Truthful group (M = 0.08; SD = 0.35): t(54) = 4.31; p = <.01 (two-tailed) 
after fourteen episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 0.85, a large effect. 
There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate values being used. 
• The scores of My in the Deceptive group (M = 2.43; SD = 2.78) are significantly different 
from those of the Truthful group (M = 1.21; SD = 1.87): t(91) = 4.31; p = .010 (two-tailed) 
after six episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 0.51, a medium effect. 
There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate values being used. 
• The scores of Third Person Pronouns in the Deceptive group (M = 4.67; SD = 5.25) are 
significantly different from those of the Truthful group (M = 2.17; SD = 2.88): t(83) = 3.04; 
p = .003 (two-tailed) after five episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 
0.59, a medium effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate 
values being used. 
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• The scores of Vague Pronoun References in the Deceptive group (M = 0.36; SD = 0.71) 
are significantly different from those of the Truthful group (M = 0.00; SD = 0.00): t(49) = 
3.53; p = .001 (two-tailed) after twenty episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s 
d = 0.85, a medium effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate 
values being used. 
• The scores of Verb Strings in the Deceptive group (M = 1.14; SD = 1.52) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 0.16; SD = 0.60): t(66) = 4.26; p = <.01 
(two-tailed) after fourteen episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 0.85, a 
large effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate values being 
used. 
• The scores of Cognitive Verbs in the Deceptive group (M = 0.69; SD = 1.02) are 
significantly different from those of the Truthful group (M = 0.18; SD = 0.42): t(67) = 3.30; 
p = .002 (two-tailed) after nine episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 
0.66, a medium effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate 
values being used. 
 
One variable was significant at the .05 level. 
• The scores of Negation in the Deceptive group (M = 0.71; SD = 1.03) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 0.29; SD = 0.67): t(89) = 2.44; p = .017 
(two-tailed) after eight episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 0.48, a 
small effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate values being 
used. 
5.4.4. Episode Clause Count Analysis 
Eleven variables were tested using clause count, and unequal variances taken into account 
where required. With extreme values removed, eight variables are significant at the .01 level: 
• The scores of MoDs in the Deceptive group (M = 22.29; SD = 16.53) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 7.78; SD = 11.02): t(94) = 5.34; p = <0.01 
(two-tailed) after five episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 1.03, a large 
effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate values being used. 
• The scores of Me in the Deceptive group (M = 8.06; SD = 11.95) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 0.23; SD = 1.28): t(53) = 4.74; p = <.01 
(two-tailed) after fourteen episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 0.92, a 
large effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate values being 
used.  
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• The scores of My in the Deceptive group (M = 14.09; SD = 16.89) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 5.53; SD = 8.58): t(76) = 3.24; p = .002 
(two-tailed) after nine episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 0.64, a 
medium effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate values 
being used. 
• The scores of Third Person Pronouns in the Deceptive group (M = 25.59; SD = 26.24) 
are significantly different from those of the Truthful group (M = 13.00; SD = 16.96): t(93) 
= 2.98; p = .004 (two-tailed) after two episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s 
d = 0.57, a medium effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate 
values being used. 
• The scores of Vague Pronoun References in the Deceptive group (M = 1.74; SD = 3.66) 
are significantly different from those of the Truthful group (M = .000; SD = .000): t(48) = 
3.32; p = .002 (two-tailed) after eleven episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s 
d = 0.67, a medium effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate 
values being used. 
• The scores of Verb Strings in the Deceptive group (M = 6.89; SD = 9.30) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = .07; SD = .48): t(51) = 5.27; p = .000 (two-
tailed) after 16 episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 1.03, a large effect. 
There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate values being used. 
• The scores of Cognitive Verbs in the Deceptive group (M = 3.82; SD = 5.90) are 
significantly different from those of the Truthful group (M = .61; SD = 1.65): t(57) = 3.69; 
p = .001 (two-tailed) after fourteen episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 
0.74, a medium effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate 
values being used. 
• The scores of Negation in the Deceptive group (M = 4.20; SD = 6.12) are significantly 
different from those of the Truthful group (M = 1.57; SD = 3.39): t(82) = 2.70; p = .008 
(two-tailed) after eight episodes are excluded from the analysis. Cohen’s d = 0.53, a 
medium effect. There is not equality of variance in this case, with appropriate values 
being used. 
 
Analysis identifies both word and clause counts as productive discriminators between 
Truthful and Deceptive episodes. For this reason, both word and clause count variables are 
extended into the One Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. 
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5.4.5. One Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
All the variables in Known Group were tested for goodness-of-fit. This test for Normality 
compares whether the actual distribution of variables conforms to the expected 
(hypothetical) distribution in that particular type of sample. 
 
In word analysis, the two-tailed significance of 9 out of the 10 variables are extremely low, 
indicating that their actual distribution is significantly different from their expected distribution, 
and not within normal parameters. In only one variable, First Person Singular Pronouns, did 
the One Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of goodness-of-fit provide no evidence against 
the null hypothesis that the sample has been drawn from a normal population: D = 1.047; 
exact p = .208 (two tailed) (Figure 89). 
 
In clause analysis, the two-tailed significance of 9 out of the 11 variables are extremely low, 
again indicating that their actual distribution is significantly different from their expected 
distribution, and not within normal parameters. Only 2 variables meet the One Sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of goodness-of-fit, providing no evidence against the null 
hypothesis that the samples have been drawn from a normal population: I D = 0.082; exact p 
= .075 (two tailed) and  First Person Singular Pronouns D = 0.990; exact p = .263 (two 
tailed) (Figure 90). 
 
Variables K-S Z Sig. 
MoDs 2.443 .000 
I 1.556 .016 
Me 3.594 .000 
My 2.577 .000 
First Person Singular 
Pronouns 1.047 .223 
Third Person Pronouns 2.966 .000 
Vague Pronoun References 4.458 .000 
Verb Strings 3.687 .000 
Cognition Verbs 3.764 .000 
Negation 3.970 .000 
Figure 89: Known Statements - One Sample K-S Test of Episodes (Word) 
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Variables K-S Z Sig. 
MoDs 2.305 .000 
I 1.263 .082 
Me 3.575 .000 
My 2.738 .000 
First Person Singular 
Pronouns 0.990 .280 
Third Person Pronouns 2.523 .000 
Vague Pronoun References 4.518 .000 
Verb Strings 3.362 .000 
Cognition Verbs 3.500 .000 
Negation 3.727 .000 
Clause Length 1.353 .051 
Figure 90: Known Statements - One Sample K-S Test of Episodes (Clause) 
 
Only 2 variables meet the assumptions of Normality: First Person Singular Pronouns in the 
word analysis, and First Person Singular Pronouns and I in the clause analysis.  
5.4.6. Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variance 
Word and Clause variables in Known Group of episodes were tested for Homogeneity of 
Variance. In the word variable analysis, only one variable, Me (.001)* shows significantly 
different variance across the Group (Figure 91), while the remaining nine variables meet the 
test for equality. 
 
Variables F Sig. 
MoDs 1.701 .195 
I .925 .338 
Me* 11.536 .001* 
My .235 .629 
First Person Singular 
Pronouns .762 .385 
Third Person Pronouns .001 .978 
Vague Pronoun References .005 .943 
Verb Strings .895 .346 
Cognition Verbs .661 .418 
Negation 2.687 .104 
Figure 91: Known Statements - Levene’s Test of Episodes (Word) 
 
Likewise with the Clause variables, the same variable, Me (.031) also shows significantly 
different variance across the group (Figure 92), with the remaining ten variables meeting the 
test for equality. 
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Variables F Sig. 
MoDs .669 .415 
I .037 .848 
Me* 4.759 .031* 
My .951 .332 
First Person 
Singular Pronouns 1.143 .287 
Third Person Pronouns 3.079 .082 
Vague Pronoun References .494 .484 
Verb Strings .048 .827 
Cognitive Verbs .148 .701 
Negation .338 .562 
Clause Length 1.549 .216 
Figure 92: Known Statements - Levene’s Test of Episodes (Clause) 
 
5.5. Post Hoc Logistic Regression Episode Analysis 
As only two variables, First Person Singular Pronouns and I, meet the requirements of 
Normality, Discriminant Function Analysis is deemed not a suitable test to predict category 
membership. Instead, Logistic Regression is considered more appropriate as it makes fewer 
assumptions about the data than Discriminant Analysis.  
5.5.1. Episode Word Analysis 
Logistic Regression analysis was conducted to predict the category membership of 110 
episodes using the word count of the 8 independent variables (I, Me, My, Third Person 
Singular Pronouns, Vague Pronoun References, Verb Strings, Cognitive Verbs and 
Negation) as predictors. A test of the full model against a constant only model was not 
statistically significant (χ² = 13.450, p = .097 with df = 8), with prediction success overall 
being only 66.4% (72.7% for Truthful and 60.0% for Deceptive). The Wald criterion 
demonstrates that only Me makes a significant contribution to prediction, p = .039.  
 
The area under the ROC Curve is .716 (71.6%), the optimal cut-off value for the probabilities 
of membership in the Deceptive category being .508 representing a sensitivity of 0.600 
(60%) with a 0.218 (21.8%) false alarm rate (1 – Specificity) (Figure 93). Therefore, the 
probability of a Known Group text being correctly identified as being Deceptive using the 
eight variables is 60%, with a 22% chance of being a false positive. 
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Area Std. Error Asymptotic Sig.  95% LCL 95% UCL 
.716 .049 .000 .619 .813 
Figure 93: Known Statements - ROC Curve Results of Episodes (8 variables)(Word) 
 
5.5.2. Episode Clause Analysis 
Logistic Regression analysis was then conducted to predict the category membership of 110 
episodes using the clause counts of 9 independent variables (I, Me, My, Third Person 
Singular Pronouns, Vague Pronoun References, Verb Strings, Cognitive Verbs, Negation 
and Clause Length) as predictors. The predictions are contained in Appendix 1. 
 
A test of the full model against a constant only model was not statistically significant (χ² = 
15.020, p = .090 with df = 9), with prediction success overall being slightly down on the word 
count analysis, at 63.6% (63.3% for both Truthful and Deceptive). In this case, the Wald 
criterion demonstrates that only Third Person Pronouns makes a significant contribution to 
prediction, p = .041, with My following, p = .084.  
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Area Std. Error Asymptotic Sig.  95% LCL 95% UCL 
.722 .049 .000 .626 .817 
Figure 94: Known Statements - ROC Curve Results of Episodes (9 variables)(Clause) 
 
The area under the ROC Curve is .722 (72.2%), the optimal cut-off value for the probabilities 
of membership in the Deceptive category being .546 representing a sensitivity of 0.600 
(60%) with a 0.236 (23.6%) false alarm rate (1 – Specificity) (Figure 94). Therefore, the 
probability of a Known Group text being correctly identified as being Deceptive using the 7 
variables is 60%, with a 24% chance of being a false positive. 
                 
5.5.3. Post Hoc Prediction Results 
Logistic Regression analysis on 110 episodes using word count correctly identifies 40 (73%) 
of the 55 Truthful episodes, and 33 (60%) of the 55 Deceptive episodes (results are 
available in Appendix 1). Fifteen episodes are incorrectly identified as Deceptive (when they 
were Truthful), and 22 episodes are incorrectly identified as Truthful (when they were 
Deceptive). In total, 73 of the 110 episodes (66%) are correctly predicted.  
 
An analysis of the 15 episodes incorrectly identified as Deceptive reveals that: 
• Seven episodes (1, 67, 78, 79, 80, 81 & 91) were originally designated Truthful because 
their true category was unknown, but their veracity is suspect;  
• Three episodes (45, 46 & 49) relate to the same narrative and contain largely reported 
speech in which the markers are located, which may have affected analysis results; 
  
1 - Specificity
1.00.80.60.40.20.0
S
en
si
ti
vi
ty
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
ROC Curve
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
181 
 
• Five episodes (21, 30, 78, 79& 94) are short, containing ≤ 25 words. 
 
An analysis of the 22 episodes incorrectly identified as Truthful reveals that: 
• Eight episodes (36, 37, 68, 72, 74, 76, 84, & 85) are borderline Truthful/Deceptive 
(between .450 & .499);  
• Ten episodes (4, 17, 22, 26, 27, 28, 37, 55, 72 & 99) are short, containing ≤ 25 words. 
Logistic Regression analysis on 110 episodes using clause count correctly identifies 35 
(64%) of the 55 Truthful episodes, and 35 (64%) of the 55 Deceptive episodes. Twenty 
episodes are incorrectly identified as Deceptive (when they are Truthful), and 20 episodes 
incorrectly identified as Truthful (when they are Deceptive). In total, 70 of the 110 episodes 
(64%) are correctly predicted.  
 
An analysis of the 20 episodes incorrectly identified as Deceptive reveals that: 
• Seven episodes (78, 80, 81, 91 and 97) were originally designated Truthful because their 
true category was unknown, but their veracity is suspect; 
• Eight episodes (8, 33, 42, 58, 78, 81, 97 and 102) are borderline Truthful/Deceptive 
(between .500 and .550); 
• Four episodes (45, 47-49) relate to the same narrative and contain largely reported 
speech in which the markers are located, which may have affected analysis results; 
• Six episodes (21, 29, 30, 48, 78 and 102) are short, containing ≤ 25 words. 
 
An analysis of the 20 episodes incorrectly identified as Truthful reveals that 9 episodes (4, 
17, 22, 26, 27, 28, 55, 72 and 99) are short, containing ≤ 25 words. 
 
There is agreement between word and clause analysis in correctly predicting 30 Truthful 
episodes and 29 Deceptive episodes. There is also agreement between word and clause in 
incorrectly predicting 16 Truthful and 10 Deceptive episodes. There were 25 cases of 
disagreement between them, with word analysis being wrong in 11 cases (Episodes 1, 36, 
37, 46, 67, 74, 76, 79, 84, 85 and 94)  and clause analysis being wrong in 14 cases 
(Episodes 8, 20, 29, 33, 42, 47, 48, 51, 53, 56, 58, 70, 97 and 102).  
 
A closer look at these cases of disagreement reveals that: 
• Five word analysis cases (Episodes 36, 37, 74, 84 and 85 - Deceptive, misidentified as 
Truthful) are borderline Truthful/Deceptive; 
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• Two word analysis cases (Episodes 1 and 67 - Truthful, misidentified as Deceptive) were 
originally designated Truthful because their true category was unknown, but their 
veracity is suspect; 
• One word analysis case (Episode 46 - Truthful, misidentified as Deceptive) contains 
largely reported speech in which markers are located, which affects analysis results; 
• Six clause analysis cases (Episodes 8, 33, 42, 58, 97, and 102 - Truthful, misidentified 
as Deceptive) are borderline Truthful/Deceptive; 
• Two clause analysis cases (Episodes 47and 48 - Truthful, misidentified as Deceptive) 
contain largely reported speech in which markers are located, which affects analysis 
results. 
 
In the remaining 7 cases of disagreement, word analysis is wrong in 1 case (Episode 94 – 
Truthful, misidentified as Deceptive) and clause analysis is wrong in 6 cases (Episodes 20 
and 29 - Truthful, misidentified as Deceptive and Episodes 51, 53, 56, 70 - Deceptive, 
misidentified as Truthful). These disagreements appear to arise from the different weightings 
that Logistic Regression analysis gives to the linguistic variables used in the equation when 
conducting word and clause analysis. While the strongest variables for identifying deception 
in word analysis are Me (being the only significant variable) followed by Cognitive Verbs and 
My, in clause analysis they are Third Person Pronouns (being the only significant variable) 
followed by My and Me (Figure 95). 
 
Variables in Equation Word 
Sig. 
Clause 
Sig. 
I .272 .459 
Me .039 .146 
My .184 .084 
Third Person Pronouns .744 .041 
Vague Pronoun  
References 
.738 .178 
Verb Strings .681 .787 
Cognitive Verbs .166 .268 
Negation .223 .390 
Clause Length - .537 
Figure 95: Known Statements - Linguistic Variable Weightings in LR Analysis 
 
For example, in the disagreement between word and clause analysis for Episode 94 (word 
analysis - Truthful, misidentified as Deceptive), a single Cognitive Verb having a higher 
significance in word (.166) than clause analysis (.268) tips Logistic Regression results (.514) 
over the .500 cut off value into the Deceptive category. In Episode 29 (clause analysis - 
Truthful, misidentified as Deceptive), a single Vague Pronoun Reference occurring in a very  
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short episode (two clauses totalling 7 words), having a higher significance in clause (.178) 
than word analysis (.738) results in the episode being incorrectly designated as Deceptive. 
 
The majority of disagreements appear to arise from the use of Third Person Pronouns in 
Logistic Regression clause analysis, which the Wald criterion identifies as making the only 
significant contribution to the prediction. However, earlier qualitative analysis indicates that 
truth tellers make greater use of the pronouns than deceivers, although in Deceptive 
Statements, Third Person Pronouns tend to concentrate in Deceptive episodes. Therefore, 
given this limitation as well as overall results, it is safer to pick the word result over clause 
result in identifying deception, particularly when there is disagreement between word and 
clause prediction. 
 
5.5.4. Variable Cut-Off Values 
Further Logistic Regression analysis was conducted using variable cut-off values between 
.400 and .600 at .050 increments to determine whether a better fit was obtainable (Figure 
96).  
 
Word analysis using a cut-off value of .450 increases overall accuracy rates slightly to 67% 
(from 66%), while increasing the rate of correctly identified Deceptive episodes to 76% (from 
60%); however, accuracy rates for identifying Truthful episodes are reduced to 58% from 
73%. Clause analysis using a cut-off value of .550 increases overall accuracy even further to 
69% (from 64%), although this is largely due to an improvement in the identification of 
Truthful episodes (78%), while accuracy in identifying Deceptive episodes is reduced to 60% 
(down from 64%). 
 
Adjusting cut-off values down to .450 for word analysis predictions only results in 22 cases of 
disagreement, with word analysis being wrong in 9 cases (and clause analysis wrong in 13 
cases). The adjustment also changes the predicted category of 17 episodes, of which only 9 
change in the correct direction. 
 
Adjusting cut-off values up to .550 for only clause analysis results in 23 cases of 
disagreement, with clause analysis being wrong in 10 cases (and word analysis wrong in 13 
cases). The adjustment also changes the predicted category of 10 episodes, of which 8 
episodes change in the correct direction. 
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Cut-off value .400 Word Clause 
   
Episodes Correct Truthful 24 (44%) 22 (40%) 
Episodes Correct Deceptive 46 (84%) 44 (80%) 
Episodes Overall Correct 70 (64%) 66 (60%) 
 
Cut-off value .450 Word Clause 
   
Episodes Correct Truthful 32 (58%) 31 (56%) 
Episodes Correct Deceptive 42 (76%) 39 (71%) 
Episodes Overall Correct 74 (67%) 70 (64%) 
 
 
Cut-off value .500 Word Clause 
   
Episodes Correct Truthful 40 (73%) 35 (64%) 
Episodes Correct Deceptive 33 (60%) 35 (64%) 
Episodes Overall Correct 73 (66%) 70 (64%) 
 
Cut-off value .550 Word Clause 
   
Episodes Correct Truthful 46 (84%) 43 (78%) 
Episodes Correct Deceptive 27 (49%) 33 (60%) 
Episodes Overall Correct 73 (66%) 76 (69%) 
 
Cut-off value .600 Word Clause 
   
Episodes Correct Truthful 47 (85%) 48 (87%) 
Episodes Correct Deceptive 23 (42%) 27 (49%) 
Episodes Overall Correct 70 (64%) 75 (68%) 
Figure 96: LR Prediction Comparison with Variable Cut-Off Values 
 
Adjusting cut-off values for both word and clause analysis at the same time does not 
improve results, increasing disagreement in 26 episodes, with word analysis being wrong in 
14 episodes, and clause analysis in 12 episodes. 
 
Variable cut-off values do not improve the prediction accuracy of certain episodes, whose 
predicted categories remain unchanged. 
 
Word analysis 
• Truthful, incorrectly predicted Deceptive – Episodes 1, 21, 30, 39, 41, 45, 46, 49, 67, 78, 
79, 80, 81, 91 & 94. 
• Deceptive, incorrectly predicted Truthful – Episodes 4, 17, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 35, 55, 89, 
99, 100 & 103. 
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Clause analysis 
• Truthful, incorrectly predicted Deceptive – Episodes 20, 21, 29, 30, 39, 41, 45, 47, 48, 
49, 80 & 91.  
• Deceptive, incorrectly predicted Truthful – Episodes 4, 17, 22, 24, 26, 27, 35, 51, 53, 55, 
56, 68, 70, 72, 89, 99, 100, 101 & 103. 
Of the above 39 episodes, 6 episodes were originally labelled Truthful (although suspected 
to be Deceptive) because their true status was unknown; 5 Truthful episodes were predicted 
Deceptive because of their reported speech content; and 17 episodes have ≤ 25 words, too 
short to be meaningfully analysed.  
5.6. A Priori Logistic Regression (Group 2 Statements) 
Logistic Regression (LR) was also used to predict a priori the classification of the Blinded 
Statements (379 episodes) based on variables identified in the Known Statements analysis. 
The predicted probability was for membership of the Deceptive category, with a cut-off value 
of ≥ 0.500. LR word and clause analysis predicted the classification of 256 (67%) of the 379 
episodes identically.  
 
The Blinded Group’s episode predictions are shown in Appendix 2, each episode numbered 
individually with its word and clause value and the predicted category membership (1 = 
Truthful, 2 = Deceptive). The episodes are grouped according to the Statements to which 
they belong (shown alternately in bold and plain text) e.g. Episodes 111-116 in bold belong 
to one Statement, while Episodes117-132 belong to the next Statement, etc. Asterisks next 
to episode numbers identify disagreements between word and clause predictions. 
 
LR word analysis predicted 160 episodes to be Truthful and 219 episodes to be Deceptive, 
while LR clause analysis predicted 147 episodes to be Truthful and 232 episodes to be 
Deceptive. Word and clause analysis predictions disagree with each other in 123 episodes 
(32%). Of these, 54 episodes which word LR analysis predicted to be Deceptive were 
predicted to be Truthful using LR clause analysis; 69 episodes predicted to be Deceptive 
using LR clause analysis were predicted to be Truthful using LR word count.  
 
Adjusting word analysis cut-off values down to .450 results in 113 cases of disagreement 
with clause analysis results; adjusting clause analysis cut-off values up to .550 results in 123 
cases of disagreement with word analysis results. Adjusting both word and clause values at 
the same time results in 119 cases of disagreement between them. 
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5.7. Conclusion 
To summarise, statistical analysis of the Known Statements using clause count as a 
measurement (identified as more productive than word count by Independent Sample T-
Tests) was carried out using Discriminant Function Analysis and 9 variables (MoDs, I, Me, 
My, First Person Singular Pronouns, Third Person Pronouns, Verb Strings, Cognitive Verbs 
& Negation). This correctly classified 93% of Statements (90% of Deceptive Statements and 
100% of Truthful Statements. A second analysis conducted using 7 variables (removing 
MoDs and First Person Singular Pronouns as their individual components were already 
being tested) also resulted in an overall accuracy rate of 93% (this time correctly classifying 
100% of Deceptive Statements and 80% of Truthful Statements). These 7 variables were 
extended to predicting deception in the Blinded Statements, which resulted in 15 Statements 
(nos. 16, 18, 19, 21-24, 28, 34-40) being categorised as Truthful, and 10 Statements (nos. 
17, 20, 25-27, 29-33) categorised as Deceptive.  
 
To get around the problem of overfitting associated with the small test size, individual 
Statements from the Known Group were divided into their constituent episodes, with each 
episode being treated as one ‘Statement’. Discriminant Function Analysis being unsuitable 
for analysis (with only First Person Singular Pronouns and I meeting the requirement for 
Normality), Logistic Regression was used instead. Both word and clause measurements 
were deemed suitable for Logistic Regression analysis, with Me identified as a significant 
discriminator using word prediction, and Third Person Pronouns for clause prediction. One 
hundred and ten episodes from the Known Statements were predicted post hoc, with word 
analysis successfully categorising 60% of Deceptive Statements, achieving an overall 
accuracy rate of 66%; clause analysis had an overall accuracy rate of 64%, successfully 
identifying 64% of Deceptive Statements.   
 
Although the episode results were not as successful as those of the whole-statement level, 
they show that the 7 variables (I, Me, My, Third Person Pronouns, Verb Strings, Cognitive 
Verbs & Negation) in combination are able to detect deception successfully well above 
chance, at least in the Known (Group 1) Statements. Episode prediction accuracy could not 
be expected to be as high as that of whole Statements given the small text size of many 
episodes. Short episodes magnify the weightings of single variables in them, compared to a 
longer episode, so future analysis might consider removing such episodes from analysis. 
 
Discriminant Analysis identifying My as being the most significant deception indicator at the 
whole-statement level confirms qualitative analysis findings. This is significant in deception  
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research, not having been identified or even considered by other researchers previously, as 
is the identification of Me as a deception cue for episode word analysis. Both these findings 
re-write the view that all First Person self-references are ‘honesty’ indicators. 
 
The question at this stage arises whether the same variables will perform as well when 
extended to a larger group of Statements. At this stage, the actual categories of the 
Statements remain unknown. Results of predictions made for the Blinded Group follow in the 
next chapter when the Statements are unblinded.  
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CHAPTER 6 
6. Double Blind (Group 2) Statement Predictions 
 
6.1. Unblinding the Results 
In this chapter, the categories of the Blinded Group Statements are revealed, and compared 
to those predicted by informed expert opinion and by Discriminant Function Analysis. The 
categories of episodes are also revealed and are compared to the predictions made using 
Logistic Regression (using word and clause measurement). However, as with the Known 
episodes analysis, informed expert opinion made no predictions as to episode categories.  
 
Up to this point in the study, the actual categories of the Blinded Group 2 Statements remain 
hidden, and all predictions regarding the categories of Statements and their episodes were 
made blinded. As stated earlier, this is the first time that research into linguistic cues of 
deception has been undertaken using a blind study, with the only other previous study into 
high stakes textual deception analysing texts retrospectively (already knowing whether they 
were truthful or deceptive). Only after the completion of qualitative, descriptive and statistical 
analyses and the predictions of Statement categories were the actual categories of the 
Blinded Statements revealed.  
 
At the point of unblinding, however, it became apparent that the law enforcement sources 
were less certain about the truth or deceptiveness of some Statements than others. This 
makes the level of certainty regarding the categories of the unblinded Statements poorer 
than that of the Known Statements. The level of certainty is high in the case of 13 
Statements, and less certain in the case of 12 Statements. As a consequence, the 4-way 
category developed for the Blinded Statement predictions (In Chapter 4) is extended here to 
reflect these varying levels of certainty: 
 
• Statements known by the law enforcement source to be truthful or deceptive are labelled 
Truthful (1) or Deceptive (2). In these cases, the truth or falsehood of the information is 
undoubted, established by investigation, witness or forensic evidence, authors’ 
admissions, and court judgments, and the files closed.  
o 7 Truthful  Statements (Statement nos. 16, 19, 21, 24, 27, 28 & 35); 
o 6 Deceptive Statements (Statement nos. 18, 20, 23, 26, 30 & 36);  
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• Statements relating to cases where the files remain open (for various reasons), but the 
law enforcement source has a strong view as to the truth or falsehood of the Statements, 
are labelled Believed Truthful (B1) or Believed Deceptive (B2). For example, one 
Statement relates to a report of a third party murder which the author subsequently 
admitted was false; the file on this murder, however, remains open and the Statement is 
labelled Believed Deceptive (B2).  
o 5 Believed Truthful Statements (Statement nos. 32, 33, 34, 37 & 40) 
o 7 Believed Deceptive Statements (Statement nos. 17, 22, 25, 29, 31, 38 & 39) 
 
6.2. Unblinded Whole Statements  
In the table below (Figure 97), each Unblinded Statement is identified by its number and the 
category as predicted by informed expert opinion, Discriminant Function Analysis, and as 
identified by the law enforcement source.  
 
Statement 
No. 
Informed Expert 
Prediction 
a priori  
DFA Prediction 
Unblinded 
Category 
16 1 1 1 
17 2 2 B2 
18 2 1 2 
19 1 1 1 
20 2 2 2 
21 1 1 1 
22 2 1 B2 
23 2 1 2 
24 1 1 1 
25 2 2 B2 
26 2 2 2 
27 B1 2 1 
28 1 1 1 
29 2 2 B2 
30 B2 2 2 
31 2 2 B2 
32 B1 2 B1 
33 1 2 B1 
34 1 1 B1 
35 1 1 1 
36 2 1 2 
37 1 1 B1 
38 1 1 B2 
39 1 1 B2 
40 1 1 B1 
Figure 97: Statements Results compared with Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis 
Predictions 
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Expert informed opinion based on overall cue count, cue interaction, and the identification of 
linguistic strategy, achieved the best results in predicting the category of the Unblinded 
Statements: 
• 5 Deceptive Statements and 5 Believed Deceptive Statements were predicted 
Deceptive; 
• 1 Deceptive Statement was predicted Believed Deceptive; 
• 2 Believed Deceptive Statements were predicted Truthful; 
• 6 Truthful Statements and 4 Believed Truthful Statements were predicted Truthful; 
• 1 Truthful Statement and 1 Believed Truthful Statement were predicted Believed Truthful; 
 
 
 Truthful Believed T Deceptive Believed D 
Truthful 6 1 0 0 
Believed T 4 1 0 0 
Deceptive 0 0 5 1 
Believed D 2 0 5 0 
Figure 98: Confusion Matrix for Informed Expert Opinion Predictions 
 
Considering only the outright predicted Truthful or Deceptive results, informed expert opinion 
correctly identified 77% of Deceptive Statements and 83% of Truthful Statements, achieving 
an overall 80% accuracy with no false positives. If predictions of Believed Truthful or 
Believed Deceptive are taken to mean Truthful or Deceptive, then an even higher 85% 
accuracy was achieved in predicting deception, with 100% of Truthful Statements identified, 
and an overall accuracy rate of 92%.  
 
Discriminant Function Analysis (using 7 independent variables: I, Me, My, Third Person 
Pronouns, Verb Strings, Cognition Verbs and Negation) achieved overall 64% accuracy 
identifying 54% of Deceptive Statements and 75% of Truthful Statements, with 3 false 
positives.   
• 3 Deceptive Statements and 4 Believed Deceptive Statements were predicted 
Deceptive; 
• 3 Deceptive Statements and 3 Believed Deceptive Statements were predicted Truthful;  
• 6 Truthful Statements and 3 Believed Truthful Statements were predicted Truthful; 
• 1 Truthful Statement and 2 Believed Truthful Statements were predicted Deceptive. 
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 Truthful Believed T Deceptive Believed D 
Truthful 6 0 1 0 
Believed T 3 0 2 0 
Deceptive 3 0 3 0 
Believed D 3 0 4 0 
Figure 99: Confusion Matrix for DFA Predictions 
 
Both informed expert opinion and statistical analysis correctly identified the same 7 
Deceptive and 9 Truthful Statements, and misidentified as Truthful the same 2 Statements 
(nos. 38 and 39) believed Deceptive by the law enforcement source. Given that both 
analyses are largely based on the same cues (or their absence), this is not surprising. 
However, compared to the success of the post hoc Known Statement predictions, the a priori 
Blinded predictions are a poor result (Figure 98).  
 
Group 1 Statements  
Predictions 
 Group 2 Statements  
Predictions 
 
Correct Truthful  80% Correct Truthful 75% 
Correct Deceptive 100% Correct Deceptive 54% 
Overall Correct 93% Overall Correct 64% 
Figure 100: Known and Blinded Statements DFA Prediction Results 
 
Although Discriminant Analysis correctly predicted a high number of Truthful Statements in 
the Unblinded Group, this appears to arise from missing the deception cues in Deceptive 
Statements. Therefore, while it appears that Discriminant Analysis is correctly identifying 
Truthful Statements, in fact, it is incorrectly identifying Deceptive Statements as Truthful as 
the cues so successfully used in the Known Statements post hoc predictions to identify 
100% of Deceptive Statements do not quite fit with the Blinded set. The one good thing that 
can be said for the Blinded Statement predictions is that the number of false positives is low. 
 
6.3. Unblinded Episodes 
The level of uncertainty regarding 13 of the 25 Blinded Statements presents difficulties with 
episode analysis. To compensate for the uncertainty, a wider truth bias was applied to the 
labelling of individual episodes. Statements that the law enforcement source identified as 
Truthful or Believed Truthful have all their episodes labelled Truthful; Statements identified 
as Deceptive or Believed Deceptive have only the episodes that cover the criminal event  
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labelled Deceptive (2), with all other episodes labelled Truthful (1). Consequently, it is 
expected that Deceptive episodes have been incorrectly labelled Truthful. It is also inevitable 
that some Truthful episodes will be incorrectly labelled Deceptive, as very short episodes 
may contain truthful information but have been labelled Deceptive as they fall within the 
deceptive criminal event reported. However, it is hoped that this has been kept to a 
minimum.  
 
Episodes belonging to Statement no. 34 (episodes 356-452), written by the individual with a 
psychological disorder, were excluded from the analysis as the language in the narrative 
would be heavily influenced by the author’s unusual condition and is not realistically 
representative of the wider population.  
 
This leaves 282 episodes in total, of which 157 episodes are labelled Truthful and 125 are 
labelled Deceptive. The Table containing the Unblinded results is found at Appendix 3. 
 
6.3.1. Episode Word Prediction 
Word measurement analysis correctly predicted 185 of the 282 episodes (66%):  
• 92 Truthful episodes (59%); 
• 93 Deceptive episodes (74%).  
 
Ninety-seven episodes (34%) were incorrectly predicted: 
• 32 episodes incorrectly predicted Truthful; 
• 65 episodes incorrectly predicted Deceptive. 
 
 
 Truthful Deceptive 
Truthful 92 65 
Deceptive 32 93 
Figure 101: Confusion Matrix for LR Predictions (Word) 
 
An analysis of the 65 Truthful episodes incorrectly predicted Deceptive identified that: 
• 28 episodes are short episodes (≤ 25 words);  
• 8 episodes (of which 2 episodes are also short episodes) are borderline Deceptive (.500-
.550); and, 
• in 18 episodes, their clause counterparts were correctly predicted to be Truthful. 
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An analysis of the 32 Deceptive episodes incorrectly predicted Truthful identified that: 
• 15 episodes are short episodes (25 words or less);  
• 10 episodes (of which 2 episodes are also short episodes) are borderline Deceptive 
(.450-.499); and,  
• in 9 episodes, their clause counterparts were correctly predicted to be Deceptive. 
 
6.3.2. Episode Clause Predictions 
Clause measurement alone correctly predicted 155 of the 282 episodes (55%): 
• 75 Truthful episodes (48%); 
•  80 Deceptive episodes (64%).  
 
One hundred twenty-seven episodes (45%) were incorrectly predicted: 
• 45 episodes incorrectly predicted Truthful; 
•  82 episodes incorrectly predicted Deceptive. 
 
 
 Truthful Deceptive 
Truthful 75 82 
Deceptive 45 80 
Figure 102: Confusion Matrix for LR Predictions (Clause) 
 
An analysis of the 82 Truthful episodes incorrectly predicted Deceptive identified that: 
• 35 episodes are short episodes (25 words or less);  
• 20 episodes (of which 7 episodes are also short episodes) are borderline Deceptive 
(.500-.550); and, 
•  in 38 episodes, their word counterparts were correctly predicted Truthful.  
 
An analysis of the 45 Deceptive episodes incorrectly predicted Truthful identified that: 
• 20 episodes are short episodes (25 words or less); 
• 9 episodes are borderline Deceptive (.450-.499); and, 
• in 28 episodes, their word counterparts were correctly predicted to be Deceptive. 
 
Both word and clause measurement agree with each other in correctly predicting the same 
120 episodes (43%), 54 being Truthful (34%) and 66 being Deceptive episodes (53%). 
There is also agreement in incorrectly predicting the same 60 episodes (21%), with 19 
episodes incorrectly predicted Truthful and 41 episodes incorrectly predicted Deceptive.  
A
ct
ua
l 
Predicted 
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
194 
 
6.4. Discussion 
6.4.1. Whole Statement Predictions 
Informed expert opinion was the most successful in predicting truth or deception in the 
Blinded Statements. Predicting deception of the basis of analysing overall cue interaction 
and identifying the deceptive linguistic strategy at work achieved an overall 80% accuracy, 
identifying correctly 77% of Deceptive Statements, with no false positives. If correct Believed 
predictions are taken into account, an overall 92% accuracy was achieved, correctly 
predicting 85% of Deceptive Statements and 100% of Truthful Statements. It has to be 
stressed that in this study, strategy analysis only predicts Truthfulness in the absence of the 
right balance of cues to suggest deception. In that respect, there is a truth bias to the 
analysis. 
 
Quantitative analysis using Discriminant Function Analysis achieved an overall 64% 
accuracy, correctly identifying 54% of Deceptive Statements, with 3 false positives (12%).  
 
Group 2 Statements 
Predictions 
Informed Expert Opinion 
 Group 2 Statements  
Predictions 
Discriminant Analysis 
 
Correct Truthful  83 (100)% Correct Truthful 75% 
Correct Deceptive 77 (85)% Correct Deceptive 54% 
Overall Correct 80 (92)% Overall Correct 64% 
Figure 103: Blinded Statements Prediction Results 
 
It is interesting to note that informed expert opinion and quantitative analysis both correctly 
predicted the same 7 Deceptive and 9 Truthful Statements, and misidentified as Truthful the 
same 2 Deceptive Statements. However, Discriminant Function Analysis misidentified a 
further 7 Statements. Expert opinion predicted two of these Statements (nos. 27 and 32) as 
Believed Truthful on the basis of inconsistency in cue interactions in keeping with a 
deceptive strategy, which Discriminant Analysis identified as Deceptive. The cues were there 
(which Discriminant Analysis picked up) but the balance was wrong (which Discriminant 
Analysis did not). 
 
Expert opinion predicted deception in another Statement (no. 18) because of cue clustering 
in a single episode, which Discriminant Analysis did not detect as the Statement was largely 
truthful and the amount of truthful language (which contained minimal deception cues) 
masked the weightings of cues found in that one episode. Similarly, Discriminant Analysis 
identified a further 3 Statements (nos. 22, 23 and 36)  as Truthful because cues were not 
present in large enough numbers overall, although informed expert opinion identified them   
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as Deceptive based on cue interaction. For example, Statement no. 22 was labelled as 
Truthful because of low cue numbers, although the increasing depersonalised nature of the 
language in its last three episodes (with the author largely absent except through the use of 
My) identified the Statement as Deceptive.  
 
Discriminate Analysis was caught out by the classic scenario of cues wrongly misinterpreted 
as indicating deception. Discriminant Function analysis incorrectly identified certain 
Statements as Deceptive based on the cues they contained, although the cues that arose 
from the context of the situation did not indicate deception but uncertainty arising out of real 
confusion. In Statement no.27, the author tries to make sense of what she hears going on in 
an adjoining room (a suicide), which results in much uncertainty on her part, leading to high 
use of MoDs. However, although the ambiguity cues were present, the unusual pronoun 
interactions expected to accompany those cues as part of a deceptive strategy were not. 
Discriminant Analysis also incorrectly identified another Statement (no. 33) as Deceptive due 
to the high incidence of Me; however, expert opinion identified the Statement as Truthful 
because a high incidence of Me was the only unusual feature, and associated unusual cue 
interactions were lacking. This suggests that, in this respect, deceptive strategy analysis is 
less likely to be caught out by deception misjudgements such as the Othello Error.  
 
The failure of Discriminant Analysis to match the high success prediction rates it achieved in 
the Known Group is probably the result of overfitting. Cues that discriminated so successfully 
between Truthful and Deceptive Statements in the small test group did not perform as 
successfully in a wider population. Whereas Discriminant Analysis correctly identified all 
Deceptive Statements in the Known Group, it managed to identify only just over half the 
Deceptive Statements in the Unblinded Group.  
 
This does not mean that the cues are invalid as deception predictors. Several of the same 
cues were used by the informed expert to analyse the Blinded Statements, with good results. 
This strengthens the argument for the importance of placement and interaction of cues, 
which statistical analysis was unable to take into consideration when making its predictions.   
 
6.4.2. Episode Predictions 
Logistic Regression analysis was used to predict the categories of the Blinded episodes, but 
no predictions were made using informed expert opinion. As with episodes from the Known 
Group, such predictions would have involved looking at cues in isolation within episodes 
instead of cue interaction and linguistic strategy in progression. Therefore, only Logistic 
Regression predictions using word and clause as measurements were carried out.  
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The contradictory results between word and clause analysis is an example of the difficulties 
associated with trying to identify the Pinocchio’s nose of linguistic deception. If under 
different measurements cues cannot be consistent, what hope is there for cross-context 
predictions? 
 
The identification by Logistic Regression of Third Person Pronouns as a significant predictor 
of deception (using clause measurements) conflicts with Discriminant Function Analysis, 
which ranks the pronouns fifth out of 7 variables (My, Verb Strings, Negation, Cognition 
Verbs, Third Person Pronouns, Me & I). It also conflicts with qualitative analysis findings in 
the Known Statements that truth tellers make greater overall use of Third Person Pronouns 
than deceivers. However, one possible explanation for this selection by Logistic Regression 
is the finding in the qualitative analysis of episodes (in the Known Group) that Third Person 
Pronouns tend to concentrate in the Deceptive episodes of Deceptive Statements. It may be 
that Logistic Regression identified this feature during its analysis. Consequently, while the 
pronouns may be helpful in identifying Deceptive episodes in Deceptive Statements, they 
incorrectly label episodes as Deceptive in Truthful Statements, leading to poor clause 
analysis results.  
 
Surprisingly, the overall accuracy rate using word analysis of the predicted Unblinded 
episodes is identical to that of the Known Group episodes, at 66%. As with the Known 
episodes results, Logistic Regression analysis using word as a measurement is a better 
predictor than clause measurement; the results are more often correct when word and 
clause results conflict and they are better at identifying deception.  
 
Group 1 Episodes  
post hoc predictions 
Word Clause 
Correct Truthful 73% 64% 
Correct Deceptive 60% 64% 
Overall Correct 66% 64% 
 
Group 2 Episodes 
a priori predictions 
Word Clause 
Correct Truthful 59% 48% 
Correct Deceptive 74% 64% 
Overall Correct 66% 55% 
Figure 104: Comparison of Group 1 and Group 2 Logistic Regression Analysis - 
Episodes Prediction Results 
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Why should word as a measurement at the episode level be a better predictor than the 
clause, when clause measurements were more productive at the whole Statement level? It 
may be that it is not the measurement preference but the cues they capture. There can only 
ever be one Me in any one clause, although there can be any number of Third Person 
Pronouns. Therefore, heavy use of Third Person Pronouns would not have the same impact 
when being measured on a clause basis, compared to its use against total word count. 
 
A limitation in the study exists in that the certainty of categories of the Unblinded episodes is 
much lower than that of the Known (Group 1) episodes. Additional weaknesses also lie in 
the fact that both word and clause predictions rely on a single predictor to make a significant 
contribution for each measurement. Short episodes also magnify the weighting of individual 
cues contained within them, which at times leads to incorrect Deceptive designations on the 
basis of a single cue, as was found in the post hoc predictions of the Known Group 
episodes. For example, the very short episode -- about five minutes later he leaned back 
over and kissed me again -- was incorrectly labelled Deceptive by both word and clause 
analysis because of the presence of a single cue which is heavily weighted in their 
respective analysis. Although both word and clause analysis agreed (incorrectly) in this 
case, disagreements between them in predicting truth or deception arise because of the 
different weighting given by Logistic Regression analysis to the linguistic cues used in the 
equations. In another example, the extremely short Truthful episode -- but if it got worse to 
take her to the ER -- was predicted to be Truthful by word measurement (because there 
were no cues present which word Logistic Regression analysis considered significant) but 
Deceptive by clause count because of the Third Person Pronouns it and her.  
 
One option would be to remove all short episodes from future analysis to reduce incorrect 
predictions generally. Twenty-eight of the 65 episodes incorrectly predicted to be Deceptive 
by Logistic Regression word analysis are short episodes, as are 35 of the 82 episodes 
incorrectly predicted to be Deceptive using clause measurement. In both cases, 43% of 
incorrectly predicted episodes have 25 words or less. 
 
In the Known episodes, correct predictions were higher for Truthful than Deceptive 
Statements; this is reversed for the Unblinded Statements. The accuracy rate for predicting 
deception in the Unblinded episodes (74%) is higher than that for the Known episodes 
(60%), which might be considered a good result were it not for the high false positive rate of 
23% (compared to 14% false positive rate in the Known episode predictions). Thus, Logistic 
Regression predictions identified more Deceptive episodes correctly because it identified  
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more episodes overall to be deceptive (incorrectly), resulting in a low Truthful prediction of 
59%. 
 
These results agree with previous research in suggesting that Third Person Pronouns are 
inconsistent predictors of deception. The same applies to Me, although this study is the only 
one to have examined the pronoun (as with the self-references I and My) individually to date. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the categories of the 25 Blinded Statements were finally revealed after being 
kept hidden since the beginning of this study. However, once the Statements were 
unblinded, it was apparent that the level of certainty of classification was much lower than 
that in the Known Group. This constitutes a limitation of this study.  
 
The cues, which appeared so promising at identifying deception in the small test set did not 
perform as well with the larger group of Unblinded Statements, identifying deception at just 
above chance. This does not mean that the cues identified in the Known Group were wrong; 
after all, the structured approach used by informed expert opinion used the same cues with 
much greater success. It is probably the case that the test group was too small, and cue 
behaviour too specific to that group to be extended to a wider population. Therefore, the 
cues are neither proved nor disproved. 
 
Having said that, a look at the strength of cues in the wider group of Statements (40 
Statements - combined Known and Unblinded Statements) reveal that some of the 
conclusions arrived at from analysing cues in the Known Group remain valid for the 
Statements as a whole. However, their validity as predictors of deception appears to be 
linked to their association with other cues, and not on an individual basis. 
 
Self-references are indeed not weighted all the same and some of them are associated with 
deception, contrary to previous research. Overall results for Me and My not only confirm the 
earlier qualitative analysis, but strengthen it, as do results for Verb Strings, Negation and the 
combined cue MoDs set. However, the earlier finding in the Known Statements of a positive 
correlation between deception and increased use of Vague Pronoun References and 
Cognitive Verbs is less clear. On average, in the Unblinded Statements, these cues are used 
more by truth tellers than deceivers. The contradictions continue in the case of Third Person 
Pronouns, whose increased use was a feature of truth telling in the Known Statements; this 
is reversed in the unblinded Statements, and deceivers use more of them. However, this  
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does not disprove their effectiveness as deception cues, as earlier episode analysis 
indicated that these cues tended to be located in the Deceptive episodes of Deceptive 
Statements; so their distribution may be more important than their numbers. It would help to 
be able to analyse the distribution of these cues between Truthful and Deceptive episodes in 
the Unblinded Deceptive Statements; unfortunately, given the uncertainty surrounding the 
classification of the Unblinded episodes, such a study is not practical. This is left to a further 
study to explore in the future. 
 
Given the overall low accuracy rates for episode predictions in both the Known and 
Unblinded Groups, treating episodes as if they are Statements in their own right is probably 
not a viable option for a number of reasons. First, by their nature, many episodes will be too 
short for effective analysis, even if they are longer than the “short episodes” (≤ 25 words) in 
this study. As Deceptive Statements tend to fragment into shorter episodes, this makes 
analysing for deception impractical at the episode level in Deceptive Statements. Second, 
predicting deception with only a single cue making a significant contribution to the 
identification is akin to pretending it is the Pinocchio’s nose for episode analysis. There is no 
way of knowing at this stage how well a single predictor such as Me extends to an even 
wider population of episodes; this remains to be tested. In a future study using a larger 
sample set, statistical analysis may find additional features so as to use cues in interaction to 
predict deception also at the episode level. 
 
The success of the deception predictions using cue interaction and progression is very 
interesting. Its high success rates of 80% (92%) -- correctly identifying 77% (85%) of 
Deceptive Statements and 83% (100%) of Truthful Statements -- were completely 
unexpected. However, its superiority to statistical analysis should not come as a surprise, 
but it does not necessarily mean that informed expert opinion is better than a machine at 
identifying deception. A statistical model is only as good as the data that is put in and the 
analysis it is trained to conduct. It merely means that in this study, man and machine 
approached deception detection differently.  
 
Perhaps referring to the structured approach of identifying strategic interactions as ‘informed 
expert opinion’ is a misnomer. As much as possible, decisions were made objectively and 
deception was identified on the interaction and balance of I, Me, My, Third Person Pronouns, 
MoDs, prolixity, and episode fragmentation. A small degree of subjective decision-making 
was necessary to accommodate the flexibility of deceptive language adaptation to contexts; 
but otherwise, ‘opinion’ was kept out of the analysis. In fact, ‘opinion’ proved to be a  
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weakness. Expert ‘opinion’ did not always agree with that of the structured approach in 
deciding whether a Statement was deceptive or not; but in every case of disagreement, the 
structured approach won. Given that a structured approach is what it claims to be, a 
machine can probably be trained to do it better than a human. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7. Conclusion 
 
7.1. Innovations and Findings of the Study 
This study originally set out to discover a unified theory for deception detection and a 
structured approach for textual analysis. In the process, it discovered that perhaps it may be 
beyond the ability of a unified theory to describe the complexity of deceptive linguistic 
behaviour; nevertheless, an innovative approach to analysing deceptive textual narratives is 
proposed, which takes deception analysis in a new direction.  
 
7.1.1. Major Innovations Summary 
The major innovations of this study include: 
• the use of material from real life high stakes textual deception; 
• the individual analysis of I, Me and My and their association with deception; 
• a cue interaction-centred approach to deception detection; 
• an episode progression approach to identifying deceptive linguistic strategy; 
• testing the effectiveness of cues by predicting deception in a double blind study; 
• pitting informed expert opinion against statistical analysis to test the effectiveness of 
respective analysis techniques in a double blind study.  
 
7.1.2. Major Findings Summary 
This study contains three major findings: 
• Deception is more effectively identified by the linguistic strategy at work, than by a 
Statement’s linguistic profile. This study provides empirical evidence which shows that 
the predictive value of linguistic cues lies in the way they are used, and depends on the 
presence or absence of other cues. Cue placement and interaction matters. 
• The use of First Person Pronouns as indicators of honesty (as found in previous 
deception research) does not apply to deception in written witness statements. The 
pronouns are not all equally weighted and My is an effective deception predictor. 
• Narrative fragmentation into many short episodes is linked to deception. 
 
7.2. The Research Design 
Previous deception research has been guided by theoretical perspectives as to how 
language might behave under deceptive conditions. However, a weakness of much research 
has been the reliance on poor models of deception and low stakes lying. To date, there has  
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been much contradiction in research findings, with no Pinocchio’s nose, which raises 
questions regarding the validity of cues identified and their applicability to real world high 
stakes deception, particularly in textual deception analysis. 
 
Witness Statements were selected as a medium for this study because they met the 
fundamental requirements for innovative and serious deception analysis: firstly, textual 
monologue is a largely unexplored medium; secondly, the Statements concern real people in 
real world events; thirdly, they involve high stakes deception. The consequences of being 
caught lying would have serious implications for their authors’ reputation, liberty, and even 
life. The motivation for deceivers to succeed with their lies could not get much higher. This, 
according to theory, would maximise the impact of deception on language and create 
linguistic deception cues that are less faint. 
 
However, the flexibility of deceptive language and the lack of consistency in cue findings to 
date make a complete rethink of the fundamentals of deception necessary in order to identify 
a new more productive approach to analysis. It may not be the case that deception produces 
weak cues, but rather a new approach is needed to find them. 
 
The design of this study commenced with a return to the origins of deception – in evolution – 
to rethink a new theoretical approach. The success of deception, like evolution, lies in its 
variation. Consistency equates to a predictable pattern of response, which is unlikely to 
enhance liars’ chances of success. Thus, looking for consistency and the obvious in 
deception cues is not likely to produce results. 
 
The second issue lay in redefining the research definition of deception. The view of 
deception as a single act at a single point in time has dictated the way deceptive language 
has been analysed in the past. If this is not producing results, then two possibilities exist: the 
first is that deceptive language is indeed infinitely variable and inconsistent; the second is 
that there are problems with its definition (and the methodological approach to capturing it).  
 
The solution to this issue lies in the nature of the Witness Statement material itself. Telling a 
story involves constructing a timeline. Lying in a narrative involves creating an alternative 
reality that has to be fitted into the storyline and anchored in real time and place. Thus, 
deception in narratives involves a sequence of lies to make the false reality credible and fit in 
with the known and real facts; consequently, deception has to be a progression. 
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Analysing a progression requires a different approach to that of analysing overall cues. 
Techniques for partitioning narratives employed by statement analysts have inherent 
weaknesses which make its use unsatisfactory. Again, a new approach is required. 
 
This approach was identified in the chance reading of a paper on the discourse nature of 
ordered events. When creating narratives, storytellers create linguistic signposts to identify 
the beginning of new thematic bundles (and the closure of old ones). In effect, narratives are 
composed of a succession of such bundles – each one identifying a change in the focus of 
authors as they tell their stories. Such episodes provide the vehicle for analysing deception 
as a progression in written narratives. 
 
The deconstruction of narratives into their constituent episodic sequences, identifying the 
linguistic profile of each episode, and analysing the changing pattern of cue use in the 
language in order to identify the author’s deceptive linguistic strategy is a major innovation of 
this study. Without episode analysis, identifying linguistic strategy would be extremely 
difficult. To some extent, this is possible by analysing cues on a whole-statement level and 
identifying how the cues relate to each other. However, this only provides a snapshot of the 
overall picture, which may not be a correct reflection of what is going on within the 
statement, particularly if it is largely truthful, in which case the language will mask that of the 
deceptive strategy at work. 
 
7.3. The Main Findings 
7.3.1. Linguistic Strategies 
Two main linguistic strategies associated with deception were identified based on overall cue 
levels and their interaction with other cues. These strategies were identified as a result of 
mapping sequentially the linguistic profiles of individual episodes in witness statements. 
 
The first strategy, termed Prolix and Personal, is a verbose approach with high immediacy 
and ambiguity. In this strategy, deceivers are cooperatively vague; they are verbose yet 
subjective or non-committal. Statements make high use of First Person Singular Pronouns, 
where the deceiver is normally present (I) yet maintains degrees of non-immediacy through 
manipulation of Me and My.  
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The second strategy takes an Impersonal approach. Deceivers becoming increasingly other 
or jointly oriented, resulting in high use of Third Person or collective pronouns. Deceptive 
authors prefer to be absent, replacing I with Me or My. Ambiguity is not as high as in the 
Prolix and Personal strategy, as being impersonal achieves distancing by ascribing the 
action to others almost entirely, or diluting involvement by acting in concert with others.  
 
Identification of linguistic strategies proves to be an effective discriminator between Truthful 
and Deceptive Statements, achieving an overall accuracy rate of 92%, and identifying 85% 
of Deceptive Statements, far more successful that Discriminant Analysis, which only 
identified 54% of Deceptive Statements and achieved an overall 64% accuracy. 
 
7.3.2. Self-References and Deception 
This study found that self-references, analysed individually for the first time, are not all 
weighted equally and not always associated with truth telling, challenging previous research 
findings on the traditional association between self-references and honesty. High levels of 
First Person Pronouns are strongly associated with deception, depending on the balance of 
individual pronouns within Statements. My proves to be the strongest individual deception 
discriminator of all the cues studied, a major finding previously unreported in deception 
research. 
 
7.3.3. Narrative Fragmentation 
Another result arising from the innovation of episode analysis is the finding that Deceptive 
Statements are more likely to fragment into many and smaller episodes. No previous study 
addresses this, although discourse research suggests some answers. Given that the marked 
sentences which function to signpost episode boundaries also serve as discontinuity 
markers, episodic fragmentation may signal a lack of cohesion between the events 
described; it may also arise from the fact that imagined events are not anchored in real time 
and place or to other real events in the narrative.  
 
7.4. Difficulties and Limitations 
There were three main difficulties associated with this study, which has resulted in 
limitations, here described. 
 
First, there were difficulties obtaining suitable Statements for analysis. Surprisingly, it proved 
harder to obtain entirely truthful narratives involving serious consequence crime than 
Deceptive Statements. This resulted in the imbalance between Truthful and Deceptive  
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Statements in the Known Group, and its small sample size this in turn led to problems with 
overfitting in statistical analysis, most probably responsible for the low accuracy rate in 
identifying deception using Discriminant Function Analysis. 
 
Collecting a larger test set would have much improved this study, but difficulties with 
obtaining author-written witness statements in the UK meant that they had to be sourced 
from the USA instead. Episode analysis was meant to compensate for the small test sample, 
but the identification by Logistic Regression analysis of only a single significant cue predictor 
for each measurement model (word and clause) meant that the predictions would likely not 
extend well to a wider population. Having said that, the 74% rate for correctly identifying 
Deceptive episodes using word count as a measurement means that the single cue (Me) 
does successfully identify deception at the episode level. 
 
Additionally, there were difficulties with establishing the truth of information within Deceptive 
Statements in order compare Truthful and Deceptive episodes. This was addressed by 
applying a truth bias to the labelling of episodes in the Known Statements, and an even 
heavier truth bias to the unblinded episodes. 
 
There was also the difficulty of establishing a baseline to which deceptive and truthful 
language could be compared. There is much literature which describes deceptive language, 
but little which describes truthful language. In the end, a decision was made to use the 
language found in Truthful Statements as the baseline against which to compare deceptive 
language. 
 
Finally, this study sought to identify valid linguistic generalisations differentiating between 
truthful and deceptive witness statements written by American-English native speakers in the 
USA, irrespective of age, gender, education and social background. Therefore, the lack of 
sociolinguistic consideration is not considered a limitation in this study when applying the 
findings to US witness statements of the same vein. However, concentrating on American-
English writers is a limitation of this study as it means that the findings cannot automatically 
be extended to other English variants, such as UK or Australian English speakers. 
 
7.5. Implications of Findings 
The implications of the findings in this study for deception research are potentially huge.  
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In the first instance, the view of deception as a progression has implications for the way 
deceptive language is analysed in the future. This view is not new. Burgoon & Qin (2008) 
and Zhou et al. (2004) have conducted studies on deception as a progression in interactive 
communication, but none have considered deception as a progression within individual 
communication. The success of strategy analysis hopefully will encourage researchers to 
adopt a progression view of deception, and consider the view that cues in interaction make 
better predictors than cues in combination or isolation. 
 
For those investigating deception in a narrative context (which applies to verbal as well as 
textual deception), the use of episode analysis to deconstruct a storyline down into its 
constituent episodes also has enormous implications. Those who wish to subdivide a 
narrative into before, during, and after the event portions can now do it using the narrators’ 
own linguistic signposting, instead of relying on analysts’ subjective view of where the 
partitions lie. Episode partition provides an alternative to whole-statement analysis, allowing 
cues to be analysed on two levels. Furthermore, episode partition enables the mapping of 
linguistic cues in progression, without which identifying deceptive linguistic strategy at work 
would not be possible. Episode construction also has implications for the identification of 
deception by omission, given that new episode structures signal discontinuity in some form.  
 
The finding of different weightings in roles between self-references, and the strong 
association between deception and My leads deception research in a new direction. No 
longer can it be assumed that First Person Pronouns are equally weighted or that they are 
automatically associated with truth telling. At least in the context of high stakes textual 
deception, this does not apply. What this study has not established is whether these findings 
are unique to the context of witness statements, or are a consequence of high stakes 
deception. This is something to be addressed by future research. 
 
Equally important, this study raises a number of questions as to features regularly cited and 
addressed by deception research (including this one) in identifying cues. Two main issues 
arise, which are interrelated: first, is cue leakage as a result of emotional and cognitive 
burden valid for cue identification? Second, is Negation as an emotion leakage valid for cue 
identification? While deceivers did indeed use high levels of Negation in both Groups of 
Statements, so did several truthful authors. The success of this study in using cue interaction 
and strategy analysis to predict deception suggests that linguistic leakage plays little 
discernible part in textual deception, at least in the context of written witness statements. 
Cues such as Negation and Cognitive Verbs may serve to provide difficult-to-verify  
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subjective information which pad out narratives, but it is only a small part of a wider strategy 
at work.  
 
7.6. Contribution to Deception Research 
This study fills a number of gaps in deception research. First, it examines high stakes lying in 
a real world context; second, it addresses an alternative view of deception as a progression; 
third, it takes an innovative approach to analysing deception using episode construction; and 
finally, it makes a material contribution to the increasing knowledge base of deceptive 
language in general, and textual narrative deception in particular.  
 
This study makes no claim to having identified the Pinocchio’s nose, or indeed, a unified 
theory of deception detection for which the deception detection world has been waiting. On 
the contrary, this study shows that deception is so complex, such a discovery appears 
unlikely. If the results of this study could be summed up in a single sentence, it is this – that 
the diagnostic value of individual cues is not static, but depends on their association and 
interaction with other cues. Evolution indeed favours the flexible liar. 
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APPENDIX 1  
Logistic Regression Predictions (Group 1 - Episodes Word & Clause Analysis) 
 
 
Episode Actual Group 
Word Count  
Predicted 
Predicted  
Group 
Clause 
Count Predicted 
Predicted  
Group 
1 1 .534 2* .445 1 
2 2 .686 2 .619 2 
3 2 .758 2 .739 2 
4 2 .367 1* .299 1* 
5 2 .675 2 .595 2 
6 2 .817 2 .794 2 
7 2 .639 2 .665 2 
8 1 .458 1 .546 2* 
9 1 .211 1 .233 1 
10 1 .222 1 .251 1 
11 1 .272 1 .219 1 
12 2 .596 2 .642 2 
13 2 .976 2 .791 2 
14 2 .848 2 .841 2 
15 2 .639 2 .937 2 
16 2 .675 2 .845 2 
17 2 .286 1* .428 1* 
18 2 .516 2 .668 2 
19 1 .441 1 .275 1 
20 1 .445 1 .571 2* 
21 1 .931 2* .925 2* 
22 2 .321 1* .483 1* 
23 2 .556 2 .582 2 
24 2 .358 1* .343 1* 
25 2 .712 2 .792 2 
26 2 .205 1* .372 1* 
27 2 .365 1* .473 1* 
28 2 .407 1* .490 1* 
29 1 .466 1 .630 2* 
30 1 .671 2* .776 2* 
31 1 .393 1 .407 1 
32 1 .405 1 .445 1 
33 1 .397 1 .536 2* 
34 1 .319 1 .377 1 
35 2 .409 1* .483 1* 
36 2 .475 1* .682 2 
37 2 .482 1* .743 2 
38 2 .600 2 .566 2 
39 1 .657 2* .574 2* 
40 1 .367 1 .291 1 
41 1 .507 2* .607 2* 
42 1 .366 1 .548 2* 
43 1 .316 1 .294 1 
44 1 .455 1 .464 1 
45 1 .503 2* .594 2* 
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46 1 .507 2* .475 1 
47 1 .403 1 .602 2* 
48 1 .388 1 .561 2* 
49 1 .614 2* .748 2* 
50 1 .183 1 .170 1 
51 2 .512 2 .366 1* 
52 1 .403 1 .459 1 
53 2 .540 2 .319 1* 
54 1 .375 1 .427 1 
55 2 .344 1* .244 1* 
56 2 .509 2 .426 1* 
57 1 .486 1 .379 1 
58 1 .482 1 .530 2* 
59 2 .650 2 .604 2 
60 2 .668 2 .666 2 
61 2 .739 2 .694 2 
62 2 .734 2 .725 2 
63 2 .518 2 .538 2 
64 2 .609 2 .634 2 
65 2 .698 2 .663 2 
66 1 .323 1 .292 1 
67 1 .541 2* .435 1 
68 2 .464 1* .406 1* 
69 1 .430 1 .314 1 
70 2 .529 2 .419 1* 
71 2 .654 2 .675 2 
72 2 .466 1* .362 1* 
73 2 .992 2 .686 2 
74 2 .486 1* .615 2 
75 2 .746 2 .758 2 
76 2 .464 1* .603 2 
77 1 .490 1 .439 1 
78 1 .702 2* .505 2* 
79 1 .719 2* .447 1 
80 1 .806 2* .724 2* 
81 1 .657 2* .514 2* 
82 2 .626 2 .575 2 
83 2 .722 2 .645 2 
84 2 .472 1* .622 2 
85 2 .469 1* .555 2 
86 2 .560 2 .522 2 
87 2 .651 2 .730 2 
88 2 .585 2 .554 2 
89 2 .436 1* .364 1* 
90 1 .416 1 .403 1 
91 1 .559 2* .565 2* 
92 1 .326 1 .128 1 
93 1 .288 1 .271 1 
94 1 .514 2* .388 1 
95 1 .312 1 .224 1 
96 1 .403 1 .442 1 
97 1 .355 1 .519 2* 
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98 1 .367 1 .277 1 
99 2 .304 1* .179 1* 
100 2 .370 1* .295 1* 
101 2 .454 1* .389 1* 
102 1 .471 1 .526 2* 
103 2 .423 1* .436 1* 
104 1 .304 1 .237 1 
105 1 .367 1 .338 1 
106 1 .367 1 .284 1 
107 1 .318 1 .250 1 
108 1 .205 1 .160 1 
109 1 .459 1 .461 1 
110 1 .362 1 .362 1 
 
Truthful (1)/Deceptive (2)/*Misclassified Statements 
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APPENDIX 2 
 Logistic Regression Blind Predictions (Group 2 - Episodes Word & Clause Count) 
 
 
Episode 
No. 
Word 
Count 
Predicted 
Predicted 
Group 
Clause 
Count 
Predicted 
Predicted 
Group 
111 .320 1 .246 1 
112 .425 1 .344 1 
113 .367 1 .263 1 
114 .379 1 .455 1 
115 .441 1 .406 1 
116 .748 2 .777 2 
117* .337 1 .633 2 
118* .411 1 .706 2 
119 .651 2 .635 2 
120* .688 2 .387 1 
121* .957 2 .498 1 
122 .645 2 .699 2 
123 .807 2 .565 2 
124 .556 2 .727 2 
125 .723 2 .766 2 
126 .401 1 .352 1 
127* .400 1 .534 2 
128 .439 1 .391 1 
129 .205 1 .160 1 
130* .305 1 .590 2 
131 .157 1 .180 1 
132 .367 1 .277 1 
133* .459 1 .557 2 
134* .558 2 .412 1 
135 .314 1 .309 1 
136 .504 2 .651 2 
137 .367 1 .283 1 
138 .312 1 .283 1 
139 .367 1 .322 1 
140 .373 1 .378 1 
141 .578 2 .672 2 
142 .302 1 .308 1 
143 .579 2 .757 2 
144* .532 2 .496 1 
145 .504 2 .645 2 
146 .946 2 .973 2 
147 .840 2 .595 2 
148 .639 2 .650 2 
149* .393 1 .507 2 
150* .405 1 .781 2 
151* .510 2 .465 1 
152* .466 1 .580 2 
153* .469 1 .573 2 
154* .420 1 .748 2 
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155 .880 2 .635 2 
156 .501 2 .700 2 
157 .571 2 .600 2 
158 .625 2 .725 2 
159* .511 2 .496 1 
160* .521 2 .428 1 
161 .615 2 .576 2 
162 .976 2 .693 2 
163 .844 2 .769 2 
164 .702 2 .648 2 
165 .873 2 .902 2 
166 .655 2 .791 2 
167 .800 2 .708 2 
168 .795 2 .679 2 
169 .771 2 .811 2 
170 .695 2 .674 2 
171 .328 1 .330 1 
172 .864 2 .754 2 
173* .472 1 .889 2 
174 .401 1 .472 1 
175 .384 1 .442 1 
176* .517 2 .326 1 
177 .367 1 .291 1 
178 .781 2 .632 2 
179 .736 2 .598 2 
180 .311 1 .393 1 
181 .824 2 .664 2 
182 .379 1 .407 1 
183* .793 2 .387 1 
184* .815 2 .302 1 
185* .503 2 .454 1 
186 .349 1 .406 1 
187* .320 1 .545 2 
188 .631 2 .698 2 
189 .328 1 .493 1 
190* .580 2 .325 1 
191 .229 1 .209 1 
192 .511 2 .723 2 
193* .801 2 .299 1 
194 .230 1 .145 1 
195 .316 1 .407 1 
196 .367 1 .277 1 
197 .458 1 .425 1 
198* .472 1 .585 2 
199 .488 1 .462 1 
200 .567 2 .504 2 
201 .724 2 .619 2 
202* .474 1 .560 2 
203 .541 2 .579 2 
204 .891 2 .534 2 
205 .641 2 .601 2 
206* .547 2 .361 1 
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207 .688 2 .803 2 
208 .549 2 .648 2 
209 .157 1 .180 1 
210* .589 2 .478 1 
211 .418 1 .400 1 
212* .332 1 .646 2 
213 .222 1 .150 1 
214 .465 1 .318 1 
215 .447 1 .482 1 
216 .472 1 .337 1 
217 .681 2 .531 2 
218* .475 1 .610 2 
219* .436 1 .636 2 
220* .389 1 .638 2 
221* .720 2 .483 1 
222 .378 1 .480 1 
223* .480 1 .725 2 
224 .553 2 .706 2 
225 .540 2 .534 2 
226 .638 2 .761 2 
227* .452 1 .827 2 
228* .427 1 .651 2 
229 .563 2 .684 2 
230* .602 2 .446 1 
231 .571 2 .843 2 
232 .367 1 .236 1 
233 .550 2 .626 2 
234* .647 2 .458 1 
235* .519 2 .464 1 
236 .648 2 .800 2 
237 .823 2 .964 2 
238 .747 2 .921 2 
239* .511 2 .471 1 
240* .816 2 .473 1 
241* .791 2 .195 1 
242 .906 2 .817 2 
243 .974 2 .979 2 
244 .377 1 .414 1 
245* .635 2 .415 1 
246 .930 2 .896 2 
247 .941 2 .759 2 
248* .722 2 .465 1 
249 .903 2 .592 2 
250 .484 1 .469 1 
251 .613 2 .514 2 
252* .669 2 .493 1 
253* .999 2 .338 1 
254* .662 2 .385 1 
255* .382 1 .693 2 
256 .785 2 .813 2 
257* .592 2 .398 1 
258 .387 1 .292 1 
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259 .279 1 .264 1 
260 .270 1 .275 1 
261* .382 1 .525 2 
262* .575 2 .456 1 
263* .504 2 .482 1 
264* .370 1 .507 2 
265 .566 2 .781 2 
266 .542 2 .620 2 
267 .567 2 .628 2 
268* .409 1 .755 2 
269 .336 1 .352 1 
270* .606 2 .285 1 
271 .267 1 .322 1 
272 .506 2 .555 2 
273 .592 2 .590 2 
274 .526 2 .620 2 
275 .153 1 .397 1 
276* .487 1 .653 2 
277* .393 1 .640 2 
278 .268 1 .468 1 
279 .323 1 .338 1 
280 .543 2 .578 2 
281 .635 2 .687 2 
282* .485 1 .578 2 
283 .666 2 .707 2 
284 .908 2 .763 2 
285* .739* 2 .354 1 
286 .774 2 .690 2 
287 .703 2 .633 2 
288* .583 2 .297 1 
289 .774 2 .803 2 
290* .724 2 .366 1 
291 .647 2 .569 2 
292 .832 2 .527 2 
293* .490 1 .741 2 
294 .707 2 .820 2 
295 .659 2 .661 2 
296* .412 1 .503 2 
297 .872 2 .629 2 
298 .369 1 .213 1 
299 .349 1 .414 1 
300 .665 2 .783 2 
301 .504 2 .552 2 
302* .628 2 .495 1 
303 .205 1 .160 1 
304* .712 2 .415 1 
305 .825 2 .781 2 
306* .483 1 .552 2 
307 .651 2 .606 2 
308 .775 2 .739 2 
309 .607 2 .630 2 
310 .678 2 .558 2 
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311 .807 2 .608 2 
312 .840 2 .786 2 
313* .778 2 .393 1 
314 .927 2 .729 2 
315 .620 2 .541 2 
316 .367 1 .223 1 
317* .735 2 .402 1 
318 .205 1 .160 1 
319* .308 1 .516 2 
320 .604 2 .588 2 
321* .631 2 .405 1 
322 .450 1 .264 1 
323 .649 2 .739 2 
324* .897 2 .433 1 
325 .900 2 .607 2 
326 .769 2 .534 2 
327 .540 2 .640 2 
328 .328 1 .480 1 
329* .456 1 .508 2 
330* .554 2 .408 1 
331 .431 1 .459 1 
332* .394 1 .619 2 
333 .901 2 .590 2 
334* .613 2 .427 1 
335* .569 2 .449 1 
336* .383 1 .534 2 
337 .743 2 .639 2 
338 .952 2 .624 2 
339 .786 2 .534 2 
340 .642 2 .940 2 
341 .719 2 .502 2 
342 .616 2 .605 2 
343 .617 2 .693 2 
344 .412 1 .423 1 
345* .508 2 .389 1 
346 .284 1 .207 1 
347* .392 1 .589 2 
348 .720 2 .510 2 
349 .639 2 .787 2 
350* .470 1 .538 2 
351* .751 2 .445 1 
352* .397 1 .587 2 
353 .847 2 .661 2 
354 .816 2 .729 2 
355 .257 1 .231 1 
356* .296 1 .574 2 
357* .360 1 .581 2 
358 .542 2 .716 2 
359 .811 2 .651 2 
360 .613 2 .708 2 
361 .855 2 .604 2 
362 .762 2 .562 2 
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363* .744 2 .233 1 
364 .761 2 .610 2 
365 .751 2 .693 2 
366 .544 2 .585 2 
367 .628 2 .537 2 
368* .402 1 .775 2 
369* .405 1 .781 2 
370* .448 1 .514 2 
371 .519 2 .561 2 
372 .468 1 .335 1 
373* .473 1 .747 2 
374 .674 2 .659 2 
375 .568 2 .613 2 
376 .867 2 .584 2 
377 .575 2 .851 2 
378 .773 2 .768 2 
379 .566 2 .574 2 
380 .532 2 .561 2 
381 .664 2 .626 2 
382 .839 2 .696 2 
383 .766 2 .632 2 
384 .932 2 .587 2 
385 .872 2 .629 2 
386 .529 2 .828 2 
387 .673 2 .823 2 
388 .904 2 .751 2 
389 .837 2 .775 2 
390* .365 1 .652 2 
391 .634 2 .701 2 
392 .683 2 .669 2 
393 .264 1 .445 1 
394 .534 2 .592 2 
395 .769 2 .699 2 
396 .976 2 .651 2 
397 .534 2 .788 2 
398 .272 1 .269 1 
399* .387 1 .556 2 
400* .397 1 .650 2 
401 .798 2 .832 2 
402 .615 2 .714 2 
403* .323 1 .518 2 
404 .559 2 .513 2 
405 .367 1 .217 1 
406 .860 2 .820 2 
407 .377 1 .447 1 
408 .375 1 .395 1 
409 .367 1 .236 1 
410 .476 1 .452 1 
411 .643 2 .716 2 
412* .397 1 .762 2 
413 .600 2 .847 2 
414 .668 2 .720 2 
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415* .524 2 .483 1 
416 .667 2 .624 2 
417 .692 2 .610 2 
418 .825 2 .861 2 
419 .293 1 .250 1 
420 .504 2 .654 2 
421 .574 2 .726 2 
422 .709 2 .921 2 
423* .575 2 .437 1 
424 .766 2 .726 2 
425* .409 1 .766 2 
426 .336 1 .495 1 
427 .613 2 .910 2 
428* .585 2 .324 1 
429 .573 2 .871 2 
430 .510 2 .866 2 
431 .406 1 .444 1 
432* .397 1 .587 2 
433* .402 1 .775 2 
434 .668 2 .737 2 
435 .701 2 .714 2 
436* .480 1 .612 2 
437 .377 1 .331 1 
438 .808 2 .871 2 
439 .373 1 .362 1 
440 .775 2 .665 2 
441 .297 1 .240 1 
442* .583 2 .432 1 
443 .265 1 .117 1 
444* .657 2 .434 1 
445* .561 2 .491 1 
446 .856 2 .553 2 
447 .171 1 .175 1 
448* .415 1 .532 2 
449 .481 1 .345 1 
450 .102 1 .197 1 
451 .166 1 .220 1 
452 .279 1 .213 1 
453 .367 1 .263 1 
454 .424 1 .280 1 
455* .436 1 .692 2 
456* .469 1 .674 2 
457* .480 1 .783 2 
458 .359 1 .445 1 
459* .464 1 .534 2 
460* .379 1 .794 2 
461* .440 1 .662 2 
462 .367 1 .277 1 
463* .469 1 .615 2 
464 .515 2 .773 2 
465* .380 1 .665 2 
466* .387 1 .600 2 
Cues to Deception in a Textual Narrative Context 
Isabel Picornell 
 
233 
 
467 .598 2 .542 2 
468* .371 1 .543 2 
469 .367 1 .307 1 
470* .622 2 .494 1 
471 .447 1 .466 1 
472 .349 1 .477 1 
473* .421 1 .548 2 
474 .609 2 .549 2 
475 .562 2 .871 2 
476 .502 2 .639 2 
477 .586 2 .504 2 
478 .349 1 .354 1 
479* .547 2 .484 1 
480 .542 2 .647 2 
481* .408 1 .575 2 
482* .496 1 .579 2 
483 .367 1 .263 1 
484 .367 1 .307 1 
485* .327 1 .550 2 
486 .396 1 .300 1 
487 .471 1 .458 1 
488* .668 2 .480 1 
489 .406 1 .473 1 
Truthful (1)/Deceptive (2)/*Misclassified Statements 
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APPENDIX 3 
Group 2 Episodes: Logistic Regression Blind Predictions Compared to Unblinded Category 
 
 
Episode  
No. 
Actual/Believed  
Status 
Word 
Count  
Predicted 
Predicted  
Group 
Clause 
Count  
Predicted 
Predicted  
Group 
111 1 .320 1 .246 1 
112 1 .425 1 .344 1 
113 1 .367 1 .263 1 
114 1 .379 1 .455 1 
115 1 .441 1 .406 1 
116 1 .748 2 .777 2 
117 1 .337 1 .633 2 
118 1 .411 1 .706 2 
119 2 .651 2 .635 2 
120 2 .688 2 .387 1 
121 2 .957 2 .498 1 
122 2 .645 2 .699 2 
123 2 .807 2 .565 2 
124 2 .556 2 .727 2 
125 2 .723 2 .766 2 
126 2 .401 1 .352 1 
127 2 .400 1 .534 2 
128 1 .439 1 .391 1 
129 1 .205 1 .160 1 
130 1 .305 1 .590 2 
131 1 .157 1 .180 1 
132 1 .367 1 .277 1 
133 1 .459 1 .557 2 
134 1 .558 2 .412 1 
135 1 .314 1 .309 1 
136 2 .504 2 .651 2 
137 1 .367 1 .283 1 
138 1 .312 1 .283 1 
139 1 .367 1 .322 1 
140 1 .373 1 .378 1 
141 1 .578 2 .672 2 
142 1 .302 1 .308 1 
143 1 .579 2 .757 2 
144 1 .532 2 .496 1 
145 1 .504 2 .645 2 
146 1 .946 2 .973 2 
147 1 .840 2 .595 2 
148 1 .639 2 .650 2 
149 1 .393 1 .507 2 
150 1 .405 1 .781 2 
151 1 .510 2 .465 1 
152 1 .466 1 .580 2 
153 1 .469 1 .573 2 
154 1 .420 1 .748 2 
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155 1 .880 2 .635 2 
156 1 .501 2 .700 2 
157 1 .571 2 .600 2 
158 1 .625 2 .725 2 
159 2 .511 2 .496 1 
160 2 .521 2 .428 1 
161 2 .615 2 .576 2 
162 2 .976 2 .693 2 
163 2 .844 2 .769 2 
164 2 .702 2 .648 2 
165 2 .873 2 .902 2 
166 2 .655 2 .791 2 
167 2 .800 2 .708 2 
168 2 .795 2 .679 2 
169 2 .771 2 .811 2 
170 2 .695 2 .674 2 
171 2 .328 1 .330 1 
172 2 .864 2 .754 2 
173 1 .472 1 .889 2 
174 1 .401 1 .472 1 
175 1 .384 1 .442 1 
176 1 .517 2 .326 1 
177 1 .367 1 .291 1 
178 1 .781 2 .632 2 
179 2 .736 2 .598 2 
180 2 .311 1 .393 1 
181 2 .824 2 .664 2 
182 2 .379 1 .407 1 
183 2 .793 2 .387 1 
184 2 .815 2 .302 1 
185 2 .503 2 .454 1 
186 1 .349 1 .406 1 
187 1 .320 1 .545 2 
188 1 .631 2 .698 2 
189 1 .328 1 .493 1 
190 2 .580 2 .325 1 
191 2 .229 1 .209 1 
192 2 .511 2 .723 2 
193 2 .801 2 .299 1 
194 2 .230 1 .145 1 
195 2 .316 1 .407 1 
196 2 .367 1 .277 1 
197 2 .458 1 .425 1 
198 2 .472 1 .585 2 
199 2 .488 1 .462 1 
200 2 .567 2 .504 2 
201 2 .724 2 .619 2 
202 2 .474 1 .560 2 
203 2 .541 2 .579 2 
204 2 .891 2 .534 2 
205 2 .641 2 .601 2 
206 2 .547 2 .361 1 
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207 2 .688 2 .803 2 
208 2 .549 2 .648 2 
209 2 .157 1 .180 1 
210 2 .589 2 .478 1 
211 2 .418 1 .400 1 
212 1 .332 1 .646 2 
213 1 .222 1 .150 1 
214 1 .465 1 .318 1 
215 1 .447 1 .482 1 
216 1 .472 1 .337 1 
217 1 .681 2 .531 2 
218 1 .475 1 .610 2 
219 1 .436 1 .636 2 
220 1 .389 1 .638 2 
221 1 .720 2 .483 1 
222 1 .378 1 .480 1 
223 1 .480 1 .725 2 
224 1 .553 2 .706 2 
225 2 .540 2 .534 2 
226 2 .638 2 .761 2 
227 2 .452 1 .827 2 
228 2 .427 1 .651 2 
229 2 .563 2 .684 2 
230 2 .602 2 .446 1 
231 2 .571 2 .843 2 
232 1 .367 1 .236 1 
233 2 .550 2 .626 2 
234 2 .647 2 .458 1 
235 2 .519 2 .464 1 
236 2 .648 2 .800 2 
237 2 .823 2 .964 2 
238 2 .747 2 .921 2 
239 2 .511 2 .471 1 
240 2 .816 2 .473 1 
241 2 .791 2 .195 1 
242 2 .906 2 .817 2 
243 2 .974 2 .979 2 
244 2 .377 1 .414 1 
245 2 .635 2 .415 1 
246 2 .930 2 .896 2 
247 2 .941 2 .759 2 
248 2 .722 2 .465 1 
249 2 .903 2 .592 2 
250 2 .484 1 .469 1 
251 2 .613 2 .514 2 
252 2 .669 2 .493 1 
253 1 .999 2 .338 1 
254 1 .662 2 .385 1 
255 1 .382 1 .693 2 
256 1 .785 2 .813 2 
257 1 .592 2 .398 1 
258 1 .387 1 .292 1 
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259 1 .279 1 .264 1 
260 1 .270 1 .275 1 
261 1 .382 1 .525 2 
262 1 .575 2 .456 1 
263 1 .504 2 .482 1 
264 1 .370 1 .507 2 
265 1 .566 2 .781 2 
266 1 .542 2 .620 2 
267 1 .567 2 .628 2 
268 1 .409 1 .755 2 
269 1 .336 1 .352 1 
270 1 .606 2 .285 1 
271 1 .267 1 .322 1 
272 2 .506 2 .555 2 
273 2 .592 2 .590 2 
274 2 .526 2 .620 2 
275 2 .153 1 .397 1 
276 2 .487 1 .653 2 
277 2 .393 1 .640 2 
278 2 .268 1 .468 1 
279 2 .323 1 .338 1 
280 2 .543 2 .578 2 
281 2 .635 2 .687 2 
282 2 .485 1 .578 2 
283 2 .666 2 .707 2 
284 2 .908 2 .763 2 
285 2 .739* 2 .354 1 
286 2 .774 2 .690 2 
287 2 .703 2 .633 2 
288 2 .583 2 .297 1 
289 2 .774 2 .803 2 
290 2 .724 2 .366 1 
291 2 .647 2 .569 2 
292 2 .832 2 .527 2 
293 2 .490 1 .741 2 
294 2 .707 2 .820 2 
295 2 .659 2 .661 2 
296 1 .412 1 .503 2 
297 1 .872 2 .629 2 
298 1 .369 1 .213 1 
299 1 .349 1 .414 1 
300 2 .665 2 .783 2 
301 1 .504 2 .552 2 
302 1 .628 2 .495 1 
303 1 .205 1 .160 1 
304 2 .712 2 .415 1 
305 2 .825 2 .781 2 
306 1 .483 1 .552 2 
307 1 .651 2 .606 2 
308 2 .775 2 .739 2 
309 1 .607 2 .630 2 
310 2 .678 2 .558 2 
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311 1 .807 2 .608 2 
312 1 .840 2 .786 2 
313 1 .778 2 .393 1 
314 1 .927 2 .729 2 
315 1 .620 2 .541 2 
316 1 .367 1 .223 1 
317 1 .735 2 .402 1 
318 1 .205 1 .160 1 
319 1 .308 1 .516 2 
320 2 .604 2 .588 2 
321 2 .631 2 .405 1 
322 2 .450 1 .264 1 
323 2 .649 2 .739 2 
324 2 .897 2 .433 1 
325 2 .900 2 .607 2 
326 2 .769 2 .534 2 
327 2 .540 2 .640 2 
328 1 .328 1 .480 1 
329 1 .456 1 .508 2 
330 1 .554 2 .408 1 
331 1 .431 1 .459 1 
332 1 .394 1 .619 2 
333 1 .901 2 .590 2 
334 1 .613 2 .427 1 
335 1 .569 2 .449 1 
336 1 .383 1 .534 2 
337 1 .743 2 .639 2 
338 1 .952 2 .624 2 
339 1 .786 2 .534 2 
340 1 .642 2 .940 2 
341 1 .719 2 .502 2 
342 1 .616 2 .605 2 
343 1 .617 2 .693 2 
344 1 .412 1 .423 1 
345 1 .508 2 .389 1 
346 1 .284 1 .207 1 
347 1 .392 1 .589 2 
348 1 .720 2 .510 2 
349 1 .639 2 .787 2 
350 1 .470 1 .538 2 
351 1 .751 2 .445 1 
352 1 .397 1 .587 2 
353 1 .847 2 .661 2 
354 1 .816 2 .729 2 
355 1 .257 1 .231 1 
453 1 .367 1 .263 1 
454 1 .424 1 .280 1 
455 1 .436 1 .692 2 
456 1 .469 1 .674 2 
457 1 .480 1 .783 2 
458 1 .359 1 .445 1 
459 1 .464 1 .534 2 
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460 1 .379 1 .794 2 
461 1 .440 1 .662 2 
462 1 .367 1 .277 1 
463 2 .469 1 .615 2 
464 2 .515 2 .773 2 
465 2 .380 1 .665 2 
466 2  .387 1 .600 2 
467 1 .598 2 .542 2 
468 1 .371 1 .543 2 
469 1 .367 1 .307 1 
470 1 .622 2 .494 1 
471 1 .447 1 .466 1 
472 1 .349 1 .477 1 
473 1 .421 1 .548 2 
474 1 .609 2 .549 2 
475 1 .562 2 .871 2 
476 1 .502 2 .639 2 
477 1 .586 2 .504 2 
478 1 .349 1 .354 1 
479 2 .547 2 .484 1 
480 2 .542 2 .647 2 
481 2 .408 1 .575 2 
482 2 .496 1 .579 2 
483 1 .367 1 .263 1 
484 1 .367 1 .307 1 
485 1 .327 1 .550 2 
486 1 .396 1 .300 1 
487 1 .471 1 .458 1 
488 1 .668 2 .480 1 
489 1 .406 1 .473 1 
Truthful (1)/Deceptive (2) 
